Eric Wong Eric Wong

NFC Champ Preview @ Los Angeles Rams

jfc Stubhub is making a killing on this game

Eyes on the prize [George Rose/Getty Images]

Opponent: Los Angeles Rams
Date: Sunday, 1/30
Location: SoFi Stadium, Los Angeles
Kickoff: 3:30PT
TV: FOX, or wherever you stream it illegally
Line: Rams -3.5

You can almost see it already.

The slow-motion, sepia-toned photos of Kyle Shanahan and Sean McVay as friends. As colleagues. As opponents during post-game handshakes. While they slowly zoom in on each frame, a Keith Jackson wannabe—or some celebrity you didn’t know gave a shit about football (and maybe doesn’t)—waxes poetic about friends turned foes. Of a Niners team looking to avenge a Super Bowl loss. Of a Rams team just as eager to re-write their own Super Bowl history and break an embarrassing streak in the process. There might be a comparison to similar coaching rivalries of yesteryear. Or perhaps even an allegory to something. Sound bites from Aaron Donald mix in with those of Kittle, bulletin board material, as FOX scores it all to something poppy and kind of cringe in a desperate attempt to appeal to the youths.

As has been the case all postseason, this is just the latest moment in a long and winding narrative. While an NFC Championship against Tom Brady would have made it back-to-back matchups against Bay Area-raised, first-ballot HOF quarterbacks looking for revenge against the childhood team that spurned them, our trilogy fight against the Rams seems born out of its own kind of destiny.

Two months ago we were sitting at 3-5 after an embarrassing loss to the Cardinals’ backups. The following week’s 31-10 trouncing of the Rams—then the Super Bowl favorite—became a turning point in our season. There we found our offensive identity—running 44 times for 156 yards—while our defense—spurred on by a players-only meeting led by our defensive captains—reached a new level of cohesion and consistency that is just now peaking.

Three weeks ago, we needed an 88-yard drive in less than a minute and a half to send the rubber match to overtime. Robbie Gould’s game-winning kick launched us into the playoffs, where his latest game-winning kick has us right back where we came from. Regardless of how you swing it, our season has hinged largely on matchups against the Rams, with the third dictating the second Super Bowl berth for either team in the past four years.

Given our first two wins against the Rams—and our six-in-a-row dating back to 2019—it’s a matchup we like. But it’s important to note that three of those wins were decided on game-winning field goals in overtime or as time expired. While we certainly know how to beat this team, the Rams are in the NFC Championship game for a reason, and it would be wise not to forget that.

OFFENSE

Scoring tugs and slapping fives [Katelyn Mulcahy/Getty Images]

Another week, another offense built from the same bones as ours. But to Sean McVay’s credit, while he learned under Shanahan, it was his stylistic and personnel changes that have trickled more to the head coaching ranks around the league. Matt LaFleur of the Packers was the offensive coordinator in McVay’s first year in Los Angeles. Zac Taylor of the Bengals was an assistant WR and then QB coach for the Rams from 2017-2018. Shane Waldron was the Rams’ passing game coordinator for three years before getting the bump to a play-caller in Seattle. While Shanahan has had Mike LaFleur follow Robert Saleh to New York, McVay’s version of this offense—particularly following their last Super Bowl run—has been considerably more in-vogue among team owners.

Personally, I’m perfectly fine with that because I prefer Shanahan’s approach to this offense. But there’s a reason why McVay disciples have been in high demand across the league. When the Rams are clicking, they can score bunches in a hurry.

Atkins Diet Swiss Army Knives. The biggest calling card of McVay’s version of this offense—and the style of the Los Angeles Rams specifically—is their steadfast commitment to 11 personnel. They trot out three wideouts, one back, and one tight end a whopping 84% of the time, which is BY FAR the most in the league. The mindset behind that approach is two-fold.

First, they follow the mentality that it’s better to do a few things really well than a lot of different things at a less efficient clip. In many ways, it’s a professional evolution of the "college spread” mindset. They focus on fewer concepts, but employ tons of formations, pre-snap motions, and other types of window dressing to get into said concepts.

Second, the Rams believe that if all their wideouts are versatile enough to line up everywhere and do everything, they’ll have an innate advantage in the passing game against bigger defensive groups and in the run game when defenses adjust personnel to match DBs on their wideouts.

In the simplest of terms, while we ask big bodies like Kittle and Juice to flex out and do receiver stuff from time to time, the Rams ask smaller guys to mix it up in the box and do tight-end stuff on occasion (they don’t have any fullbacks. Hence, no fullback duties). We’re both relying on versatile players in hybrid roles, we’re just coming at it from two different perspectives.

Hella tight. For those who ask their receivers to block heavily in the run game, tight alignments are nothing new. We use them plenty with our wideouts and there’s a reason that’s the most likely place for Kittle to line up when he’s not being used as an in-line tight end. But the Rams’ commitment to 11 personnel means they lean on tight alignments on more plays than not.

The tight alignments allow their wideouts to operate like tight ends in the run game, digging into the box as extra blockers and giving them the ability to motion quickly across the formation—whether for fly sweeps, shifting defensive run fits, or kick out blocks. In the passing game, tight alignments let them force mismatches with linebackers, who—against a traditional formation—would be covering tight ends and create natural leverage plays by creating more open grass down the field.

The Rams also love deploying their wideouts out of stack and bunch formations—largely to benefit the passing game. Stacks and bunches force defenses to communicate one more thing after every offensive snap, and the Rams have broken many a big play simply by wearing down defenses and attacking them when there’s a blown switch out of the bunch.

Against man coverage, bunches free up wideouts from press and sticky coverage by creating natural rub routes and allow the offense to force mismatches based on defensive rules (such as forcing a linebacker to cover Cooper Kupp). When defenses successfully switch on the bunch release, crossers and double moves and false stems can kill defenders that are already playing hard leverage to one side or another. Against zone, the Rams use bunches to pull defenders’ eyes, force constant communication, and target the open space that comes with two-receiver layered concepts and three-receiver triangle route combos.

Finally, tight alignments and stack and bunch formations make for easier access (and a higher likelihood of unguarded receivers) on deep crossers off of play-action, which—as we all know—is a major staple of the Shanahan/McVay offense as it complements outside zone action.

The Triple Crown (for humans). While an extra game certainly helped his efforts towards chasing a few longstanding single-season receiving records, Cooper Kupp has nonetheless had one of the most impressive wideout seasons in quite some time—becoming only the fourth player in the Super Bowl era to secure the coveted Triple Crown of receptions, receiving yards, and touchdowns. To put that in perspective of a 17-game season in 2022, here is his stat line.

145 receptions, 1,947 yards, 16 TDs

Kupp’s emergence has coincided with his healthiest season to date, and—in no small part—the team’s off-season acquisition of Matthew Stafford at quarterback. More physically talented and better off-script—and with valleys that don’t dip as low as the departed Jared Goff’s—Stafford started the season red hot and was an MVP front-runner a month into the season. While he cooled off since then and hit a rough patch of turnovers, he

While Stafford cooled down after a red-hot start that had him as an MVP front-runner a month into the season, he’s rounded back into form these playoffs, throwing for 568 yards, four scores, and zero picks over his first two post-season games. Of those totals, 246 yards and two tugs have gone to Kupp.

Unlike the All-Pro wideout we saw last week, Kupp gets his yardage mostly out of the slot, and about half of his targets are on short passes. That said, he’s efficient on all levels of the field—with 600+ yards at all three depths of the field—absolutely shreds man coverage, and is adept at getting open in the two-man games that the Rams like to employ underneath. But even when he doesn’t, Kupp’s gravitational pull opens up passing lanes for others.

On this play, the Rams are running a variation of a standard deep cross route combination, stretching the field horizontally with Cooper Kupp (teal) while creating a three-man triangle read with the hook and the post layering on top of them.

Despite showing two high, the Niners actually have a decent play call dialed up. They’re rotating down into Cover 3, with Jimmie Ward (red) stepping down into the middle of the field to wall off any crossers from the trips side.

As Kupp advances, Ward steps into his way, effectively taking away the crosser. But both Ward and Fred Warner—knowing how heavily involved Kupp is to this Rams offense—are eyeing the star receiver at his break point.

By the time Warner gets his eyes back to the field, he sees the hook forming in front of him and both he and the nickel corner take the bait.

With no inside help from the second level and the safety not jumping the route, the outside receiver is able to flatten out his post and secure the pass right in the hole of the defense—a hole created at least in part by the attention that Kupp gets on every play.

That’s a tiny glimpse into the impact Kupp can have on the passing game when he’s not even getting the ball.

Although he’s usually getting the ball.

A lot.

DEFENSIVE KEYS

Detroit PTSD? [Mark J. Terrill/AP Photo]

DeMeco Ryans has been on an absolute roll this post-season, stifling back-to-back top 10 offenses with game plans built off of stopping the run and confusing quarterbacks via pass rush and coverage disguises. This week we’ll need more of the same, as familiarity (and recency) mean execution—and a few well-timed play calls—could be the difference in a matchup where the X’s and O’s are otherwise familiar.

Weird shit incoming? At times McVay can get pass-happy, which can lead to explosive highs—like the offensive outbursts the Rams were riding to start the season—and valleys of inconsistency. Ultimately, when the Rams drift too far away from the run (not because teams are loading up to stop it but due to their own accord), they lose some semblance of their identity and can have stretches where the offense seems inefficient or rudderless. That leads to more of a burden on Stafford’s shoulders, more one-on-one match-ups in pass pro along their offensive line, sloppy play, and turnovers (Stafford led the league in interceptions with 17 this season). Sean McVay knows this and wants to stay balanced. Needless to stay, we want the opposite.

In our two matchups this season, the Rams have averaged 58 yards rushing on 3.1 yards per carry. McVay is a smart dude. He knows that has to change this time around, and he also knows that the fix isn’t as simple as “sticking to it.” Don’t be surprised if the Rams start the game with an offensive game plan hell-bent on slowing up our defensive flow and preventing our DL from teeing off. That could mean a bunch of bootlegs and screens—like the second 2019 game—in hopes of softening up our pursuit in the run game and getting Stafford in a rhythm. That could mean a few early handoffs on fly sweeps opposite run action so that we can’t pursue the front side of their zone/stretch runs so aggressively. It could be both. Whatever the game plan, I’d expect McVay to lean into lateral misdirection to try and gas our defensive line by making them run side-to-side and cut the overall aggressiveness of our defense.

Per usual this post-season, if we can stop the run (especially with a light box), we’re setting our defense up for success. As was the case with the Packers, this is an excellent offensive line as a collective unit—and one that’s ranked #1 in pass win rate—but isolated (and without a run game to lean on) they have weaknesses on the interior in pass protection. In week 18, we pressured Stafford on more than half of his pass attempts. In 37 dropbacks, the Rams’ starting guards allowed a combined 15 pressures, ten hurries, and 3 sacks. Those are matchups we like, so—per usual—mug looks, inside twists, and overloads on long downs and distances will be our friend.

The shell game continues. Part of the reason why Ryans has been shutting down offenses in the back half of this season is that he’s been able to put himself in the heads of opposing play-callers. Against the Rams in week 18, he knew McVay wanted to establish the run and work off of that, so we slammed one-high looks on first downs when we expected the run. When the Niners climbed back to within one score off a 17-0 deficit, Ryans knew McVay would try to stabilize in the run game, so he dialed up first- and second-down one high looks the following drive to force a punt. Finally, after he knew the Rams would try to open up things to create spark, we came out—for the first time all game—with two-high on first and long to combat that.

Obviously, passing success is much more complicated than one-high or two-high safeties, but—in general—Ryans has been able to get into the mindset of opposing play-callers and that’s affected what his back seven shows, when, and whether or not our secondary rotates into another coverage post-snap. This is particularly important against someone like Matthew Stafford, who is as deadly as anyone when he knows your coverage. And in particular, when he knows you’re in a one-high look.

On the season, Stafford is #1 in the NFL in EPA when throwing against man coverage. He’s also #1 in the NFL in EPA when throwing against single-high coverages. In short, when he’s protected, he can put the ball anywhere on the field with the best of them. So if he knows you’re in 1 or 3 before the snap, he’s typically going to have success. But while he can also have success against two-high coverages, Stafford—and McVay—inherently want to throw the shot play. They want a big play that breaks open the game and they can get impatient when that doesn’t materialize. Against two-high, those plays can be a bit harder to come by, and when you can disguise the coverage well enough, Stafford’s impatience sometimes leads to him being late (and reckless) at getting to his check down.

Here, the Rams have dialed up what they believe to be a two-high beater. They’re running a hard play action bootleg with the full intention of splitting the safeties with the post, and—if the far safety rotates over—showcasing Stafford’s arm strength by hitting the post curl underneath him off the bootleg away.

Unfortunately for the Rams, the Niners have once again shown two-high before rotating into cover 3. By the time they snap the ball, Ward has snuck into the box and is ready to play the run.

Despite initially biting on the run, the second-level defenders drop quickly into their zones and find their marks. At this point, the play is already busted. The safety rolled into a single high and is cutting off the post. While the linebacker has gotten great depth on his drop and is directly cutting off the throwing lane of the post-curl.

This is 100% a play where you turf it or—because Dennard continued to bail out wide—run for a few yards and call it a day. However, Stafford spots the one “open” man (teal) all the way across the field for a would-be zero-yard gain.

Stafford rips it across the field but it winds up a bounce pass behind the receiver. Which is probably lucky, because an accurate pass in this situation could have easily been completed to Jimmie Ward and taken the opposite way.

The Rams are a team that wants to take the top off, so if Ryans can get a beat on when the Rams are feeling more conservative vs more aggressive (or better yet, stop the run with a light box), we’ll always have the flexibility to show two-high and rotate to a one-high look (like above) or vice versa.

Two guys, one Kupp. Just like with Davante Adams, we need a plan on how to slow down Cooper Kupp, but it’s a different challenge than last week because of where he lines up and how the Rams use him.

Since the Packers relied so heavily on “alert” plays to Adams when they would isolate him out wide, we could effectively force their hand in regards to whether they were throwing his way or not based on the pre-snap look we’d give them. So when they chose to line up in a formation that would isolate Davante and spring a matchup problem on our end, we’d often give them a bad pre-snap look and force them away from their #1 wideout. The Rams don’t employ anywhere near the number of isolation “matchup hunting” looks that the Packers do, instead relying on their receivers to get open within the greater structure of the play.

Since they’re not just looking for a slant or a fade, it’s harder to just erase Kupp from a play presnap. And even if you do, the Rams’ supporting receivers are head-and-shoulders above the Packers’. A rejuvenated OBJ is their number two—and the guy they love to target when Kupp draws safety help and double coverage—Van Jefferson is a talented overall third option, and Higbee is basically a jumbo wideout. All three supporting receivers are better than their Green Bay counterparts were last week.

Second, since Kupp plays largely out of the slot, if you bracket him with double coverage it’s easier for the Rams to use him as a decoy to open up space for someone else. Whereas the Packers would often isolate Adams away from other wideouts, giving them a numbers advantage but on the opposite side of the field, the Rams often keep Kupp working alongside other wideouts, so the actualization of a double team happens within the quarterback’s field of vision and—naturally—opens space up for another receiver. We already saw how too much attention to Kupp can open things up for other receivers. When doubled, that impact is only amplified.

The hope is that having K’Waun healthy this time rather than Dontae Johnson in the slot and—once Tartt got hurt—Darqueze Dennard(!) in the slot and Johnson at SS—will allow us to survive a bit better when we’re not sending extra help Kupp’s way. Will we still double Kupp in this game? Absolutely. Especially when we’re blitzing and/or forced to go into man coverage and/or on money downs. Stafford wasn’t only #1 in EPA against man coverage but #1 in EPA against the blitz, dicing us in the few snaps where we sent extra men against him, so it’s unlikely that blitzing is a heavy part of our gameplan. But you can’t go an entire game without any blitzing or any man coverage, and—when blitzed—Stafford has targeted Kupp on upwards of 40% of his passes.

If we’re already sending extra guys to get Stafford off his spot, springing a few sneaky double teams while we do it is likely part of the game plan. But just like against the Packers, we need to pick and choose when to double, when to show double, and when to bait a trap to generate a possible turnover.

DEFENSE

Intimidating entrance or crowded club on the west side? You decide

While there’s plenty of familiarity with the Rams’ offense, there’s just as much on this side of the ball, where Raheem Morris—a long-time friend and colleague of Shanahan (and a rumored DC candidate for us when Saleh was hired away)—mans the defense. Typically happy to sit back in a four-man front and two-deep shell, the Rams like to dare teams to run on their light box—a box that still employs the otherworldly Aaron Donald—and force opponents to slowly drive the length of the field and score.

That is until they played us. Running the ball and bleeding clock with double-digit play drives is kind of our thing, and that’s exactly what we did in our week 10 matchup when Jimmy completed over 75% of his less than 20 pass attempts and we bled them out on the ground. So by the week 18 rematch, the early-down fronts that the Rams were showing had changed.

To something different, but all-too familiar.

I Got Five On It. In our last trip to LA, the Rams trotted out a bunch of five-man fronts with two stand-up ends out wide, hoping to cover up every gap, minimize double teams with outside eye alignments, and prevent the OL from getting to the second-level so that their linebackers could fast flow to ball. Simplified, this was the Rams’ version of the defensive scheme that Vic Fangio (and then Bill Belichick) used so successfully against them during their 2018 Super Bowl season.

And if that front sounds familiar…

It’s cause we literally saw the same thing last weekend.

While the gap assignments and D-line alignments will vary from snap-to-snap, we’re likely going to see a whole lot of what we saw last week. Five-man fronts with single-high safeties on early downs (and any downs where they’re expecting run), giving way to four-man fronts with more linebackers/nickels on the second level and two-high safeties on passing downs.

Both the Packers last week and the Rams in week 18 found early success slowing down our running game using this front, but both times we were able to find seams in the second half. Considering how the Packers just held us without an offensive touchdown using this plan a week ago, I’d expect Morris to show us these same five-man (or six-man, depending on personnel and how many gaps we’re throwing out there) fronts on early downs.

We’ll have to attack the front more successfully than we did last week.

At least we’ll always have that hilarious GQ interview. Despite massive whiffs on half of their big contracts, the Rams still have elite high-end talent on their roster, and they get the most out of their blue-chippers by deploying them all over the field.

Aaron Donald is unquestionably the best defensive tackle in football—and arguably still the best overall player in the NFL. He is basically a machine made for leverage and explosive burst, and their ability to put him wherever they want along the DL is a genuine reason why they run the scheme that they do. They’ll matchup hunt with him along the line and pair him with either of their edge rushers on twists and two-man games on passing downs.

In the secondary, Jalen Ramsey—who should be required to play against Golden Tate twice a year—is likely the best cornerback in football. The Rams will flip him outside or in the nickel (aka, their “star” position) depending on offensive personnel, and he’s one of the rare corners who is big enough, fast enough, and good enough to truly excel at either position.

To the Rams’ credit, they’ve been able to surround those blue-chippers with excellent complementary players, acquiring low-cost veterans and draft day finds despite being cash-strapped and never having a first-round pick. But—since the NFL is a hard salary cap league and something has to give somewhere—they do adhere to the popular analytics trend on where to cut costs on defense: linebackers.

Their off-the-ball linebackers are clearly the weakness of this defense, and part of the Rams’ defensive scheme involves protecting these linebackers from what they do poorly while freeing them up to do what they do well. Both are plus pass-rushers and willing run defenders (even if their metrics in that department aren’t super impressive). In essence, they have two two-down linebackers manning the middle. Which is something we’ll rotate back to later.

Don’t let them do as we do unto others. While Aaron Donald is the frontman—and rightfully so—the Rams’ front four is as dangerous (and deep) as any in football. After returning to health mid-season, Von Miller is back to torturing offensive tackles, registering 7 sacks in the past six games (including the post-season). People forgot about him because of the general irrelevance of the Broncos and the fact that he missed all of the 2020 season due to injury, but Miller has rebounded with the Rams to grade out on PFF as a top 5 edge rusher. Opposite him is Leonard Floyd—a bargain acquisition from two years ago now playing on a big-ticket contract. His 9.5 sacks and 18 QB hits are second on the team only to Donald. Behind them, Ogbonnia Okoronkwo has slid into Samson Ebukam’s old off-the-bench pass rusher role and has largely excelled.

Unsurprisingly, the strength of this defensive line—which is rated #1 in pass rush win rate—and the pass rush ability of the Rams linebackers means the health of Trent Williams looms large. The Rams just decimated the Bucs up front—largely by putting Aaron Donald at left end opposite their replacement right tackle—and we struggled at times keeping Jimmy G upright against the Packers. That was WITH our All-Pro left tackle. While our game plan will certainly call for avoiding long downs and distances, we’ll need to drop back and pass at some point. When we do, we’d feel a lot better having Williams guarding Jimmy G’s blind spot versus Colton McKivitz—who allowed 4 pressures and 2 sacks in his spot start in week 18.

OFFENSIVE KEYS

The most beautiful sight in football [Katelyn Mulcahy/Getty Images]

Counter the counter before they can counter it (potentially with counters). Against the Rams in the season finale, one of the ways we attacked their five- and six-man fronts was by just getting into gigantic personnel sets and pounding face. We spent parts of the third quarter—including plays leading up to and following Deebo’s marvelous WR-RB-jump pass touchdown—in 22 personnel (two backs, two tight-ends) and just mashing for small-to-medium gains on the ground. This was great for team psyche and clearly led to some success (and gets the fanbase going), but it’s better as a mix-up than as the engine that keeps our run game going.

While sprinkling in some 22 personnel certainly makes sense in a game where we want to force the issue on the ground, where we really started to find a groove in the running game was when we started cranking up the diversity of formations and pre-snap looks and using all that glorious Shanahan window dressing to get into the counterpunches to our bread-and-butter outside zone.

Whether it’s split zone handoffs, cutback tosses off of split zone action, or Shanahan-style counter runs where Juice/Kittle/Wilson bend back against the grain to replace the pulling linemen of a traditional counter play, these mix-ups all utilize pre-snap motion and lots of misdirection to pull the eyes of the second-level defenders and prevent them from filling confidently and aggressively at the point of attack.

Once we found success with our interior misdirection runs, the Rams could no longer key so heavily on our core toss and stretch plays, which then opened up what we wanted to do in the first place. Run our core toss and stretch plays. Basically, we used inside-hitting misdirection runs to open up our staple outside runs.

It’s always tough to tell when to start off with your bread-and-butter and when to lead with the counter punch to open it up. If you get to the counter too early, it’s naturally not effective and you end up overthinking yourself into second- and third-and-long. But because this is a three-match and the Rams’ defense is so well-prepared for what we do best, it could make sense to hit them inside with the confusing stuff before we get to our stretch game.

So you wanna play defensive back… Theoretically, every run play is meant to either have a pure numbers advantage or force a safety or cornerback to be the fill defender. The Niners just do a better job than anyone else of making sure your DBs have to play the run.

This is a standard stretch play out of 11 personnel with Troy Reeder (teal) as the second-level defender at the point of attack. While we don’t hate running stretch against this front because of numbers being even, we decide to motion to shift the matchups along the OL.

Sherfield goes in motion opposite the run action. The Rams are probably less afraid of a Sherfield fly sweep and more so of our 220-pound special teams gunner running a kickout block on the backside end like Jeff Wilson often does when Deebo is in the backfield. Nonetheless, they need to shift their gap assignments to the defensive right in order to account for the added “box” player. This shifts Reeder further inside and Ramsey—who was lining up in the nickel—now enters the box as the second-level player at the point of attack.

While the offensive line’s rules haven’t changed, their assignments have, with Brunskill no longer taking on the bigger Troy Reeder. Now he has Ramsey.

Don’t take it personally, bro. It’s just physics.

The result is a seemingly innocuous five-yard gain, but it’s a body blow both to the defense and (literally) the DB tasked with filling against the run. While the DBs have to worry about the physical toll they’re taking from getting beat up in a phone booth by someone ten weight classes their superior, their involvement in the run game also starts to chip away at them mentally. After all, defensive backs are still your best (and last) line of defense in the passing game. And when they start playing the run too heavily, that can lead to problems.

While the most obvious example of this was the Deebo jump pass over Jalen Ramsey after ten straight runs, here’s another play that shows how forcing corners to regularly act as primary run defenders can spring dudes open.

This is an under center, hard play-action, max protect play with only two wideouts as options. Deebo and Aiyuk are basically just going to sell their releases like they’re blocking, get to their depths and find space behind the second level of the defense. The Niners actually shifted Juice to the position where he starts in this frame and will send Kittle in motion the other way, which is key because this changes the defense’s run responsibilities.

Since the defense is already in a one-high look, they can’t exactly roll down a safety into the box to the side of the motion. Nor do they want to overcompensate at the linebacker level with Juice on the opposite side of the formation. That’s asking to get gashed the other way.

That means the cornerback at the top of the screen could very well be the unblocked player tasked with filling against the run. So as he sees Kittle motion across, this is what’s going through his head:

The corner is expecting a simple power look, with Kittle kicking out the end, Aiyuk releasing inside and crack blocking on the second level, a double team at the point of attack on Donald, and Mack getting a good angle on the trailing linebacker. With the safety way-way deep, the corner knows that he’s really the only guy who is gonna have a chance to fill against this type of run his way.

Worth noting: this is one of those benefits of tight splits that we talked about earlier. Not only does Aiyuk’s split make it much more viable for him to crack block to the second level and force this cornerback to think run, but it also opens up space for the eventual play-action pass.

On the snap, everything looks exactly like the cornerback had feared. Kittle is kicking out the end, Aiyuk has released inside as if to block the second level, and there is a deep hand-off, downhill play-action look coming straight at him.

Unfortunately for him, he took the bait, and Aiyuk—who is so often the man who the Niners spring open in their hard play-action looks—is wide open for a massive gain. Also of note: Deebo has basically drawn triple coverage on his side because (a) he’s Deebo, (b) his slightly wider split and the rolled down safety to his side allows his cornerback to play off and see the play develop, and (c) Kittle’s motion away gives the defense numbers to Deebo’s side if Juice doesn’t release.

In the video you can see, the corner to the play side (who is a very solid player) basically goes back and forth between run and pass multiple times in his head before finally getting beat over the top

This is a great example of how the constant shifts, motions, formations, and battering of defensive backs in the run game can spring open receivers off of play-action, and how Shanahan’s mastery of the details is such a difference-maker in scheming up these plays.

When the run game can get going, these kinds of opportunities open up down the field.

Jimmy “Goddammit, You Get in Rhythm” Garoppolo. Lost in all the talk of bully-ball and pounding the rock is the fact that—in each of our recent wins against the Rams—the run game hasn’t been dominant with explosive runs and big plays. It’s been incessant and draining with an array of short-to-medium yardage body blows. That’s fine (and is mentally exactly what we’re looking for), but that sort of gameplan requires Jimmy to be on point.

If our misdirection runs can open up our outside running game, so too can our intermediate passing game. The Packers defense played a great game last week, but drops by Brandon Aiyuk and a would-be touchdown to Kittle kept our offense off the field for the majority of the first half. We knew entering that matchup we had to complete some short passes underneath early in order to get them off the run. We didn’t and that led to zero offensive touchdowns.

In our first matchup against the Rams, Jimmy was 15-of-19 for 182 yards and 2 scores. In the rubber match, he threw two ugly picks but was also 23-of-32 for 316 and the game-tying touchdown. As much as we’ve liked this matchup over the years, we can only succeed if Jimmy is efficient, and that is doubly important with the Rams likely selling out to stop the run.

When they’re loading the line of scrimmage, there will inherently be room to throw the ball in the short-to-intermediate game. When they back off into more 4-2 looks, space will open up on those digs that we layer over shorter underneath routes and in passes out of the backfield opposite that two-man action. They want their linebackers to be playing aggressively and instinctively downhill. Making them work in coverage—in particular, Troy Reeder, who has always been more of a pass rusher from the second-level—can not only give us advantageous matchups but slow their ability to key hard on the run.

Jimmy needs to hit those underneath passes to open up the rest of our offense, and—when he sees someone open but lacks the arm strength and or space to get them the ball (like the first pick against the Rams in week 18 and the redzone pick last week)—he needs to throw it away and keep us from losing yardage or possession.

Game flow and staying on schedule are ALWAYS important for a team that’s built like us, but it’s especially important against a squad that has the top-rated pass rush in the country. Staying on schedule means Jimmy playing smart, efficient football and keeping long drives alive.

CONCLUSION

Have more of these than the other guys [Kyle Terada / USA Today]

It’s important to note that all streaks end. The Rams will (eventually) beat us again. They’re too talented and too well-coached not to. But much like the general stereotype comparing Los Angeles and San Francisco, I think the Rams’ offensive scheme is sexier but the Niners’ is smarter. While that opinion on offensive theory makes me bullish on the Niners as a franchise and our trajectory schematically, in order for it to actualize into a second Super Bowl berth in the past three years, Jimmy needs to bring it in a way that he hasn’t quite shown since his game-tying drive against the Rams to cap the regular season.

Eager to wash away their own Super Bowl shortcomings and their recent record against us, the Rams are sure to fire out of the gate swinging. If we can match their intensity and execution—and not spot them another 17-0 lead—we’ll be in great shape to book return flights to Los Angeles two weeks from now.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Divisional Preview @ Green Bay

good times

targeting [Getty Images]

Opponent: Green Bay Packers
Date: Saturday, 1/22
Location: Lambeau Field, Green Bay, WI
Kickoff: 5:15PT
TV: FOX, or wherever you stream it illegally
Line: -5.5

The Niners’ Nineties Nostalgia Tour continues with a divisional-round matchup against the Packers—a squad we played four times in the playoffs during the Brett Favre/Steve Young era. While the Packers have won the last two overall matchups—one in week 3 of this year and the other on a Thursday night in 2020 when Richie James totaled 184 yards receiving because literally every other receiver was either injured or on the COVID list—the Niners have come out on top in the past three post-season meetings. We all remember the most recent of those games.

It was sick.

Since a Week 1 ass-beating at the hands of the then-relevant New Orleans Saints, the Packers have probably been the single most consistently good team in the NFL. At 13-4 and with the best record in the league, Green Bay has only lost two games in which Rodgers has started and finished: the week one debacle and—somehow—a mid-season shootout against the Vikings.

While it’s up for debate whether the Packers or the Bucs are the favorites to represent the NFC in the Super Bowl, this is an excellent Green Bay squad that could be returning three of their five best players just in time for this matchup. Lucky us.

But like the game against the Cowboys last week, this is another matchup where what we can do well could align nicely with their weaknesses. And while no one will confuse our season’s roller-coaster ride with the consistent excellence of the Packers, at this point in the season those matchups are much more important than records.

PACKERS OFFENSE

BFFs [Jeff Hanisch/USA Today]

Head coach and play-caller Matt LaFleur is from the Sean McVay coaching tree, thus he runs an offensive scheme similar to ours and the Rams’. But while the Packers lean on zone and stretch, play-action passes off that running game, and pre-snap motion, LaFleur’s offense diverges from the norm in a handful of ways. Mostly because Aaron Rodgers—the Vegas favorite to win his second MVP in a row at age 38—is his quarterback.

If there’s something that this offense—and LaFleur—should be known for, it’s consistency and balance. While McVay can get pass-happy and Shanahan would go an entire game without passing if he thought he could get away with it, LaFleur and the Packers are adamant at staying balanced offensively. In 15 of 16 games since their week 1 stinker, they’ve rushed for 90 or more yards on the ground. In all but two of those same games (one being the game that Jordan Love started), they’ve thrown for 200+. That’s led to an offense that is ranked #2 in DVOA, #2 in passing, and #8 in rushing.

This offense can do it all, and they do so at an efficient clip.

It’s What’s For Dinner. While the Packers’ offensive scheme is closer to McVay’s than ours, their investment in numerous beefy skill guys reflects more of our commitment to physicality. While the Rams are famous for their steadfast commitment to 11 personnel—once again leading the league in its usage at 84% of their total snaps—the Packers run the second-most 12 personnel in the NFL (behind the Dolphins, who ran it a laughable 61% of the time).

With three tight ends who had over 28 targets on the season, the Packers use these big bodies in traditional in-line sets, out wide, or even in the backfield in a halfback/fullback-type role. Their most well-known TE is Robert Tonyan—he of an unrepeatable 2020 touchdown rate that foiled many a fantasy manager this year—but since he’s been limited to eight games this season, Mercedes Lewis has been their top dog this year. He’s filled in admirably, earning a top 10 position rating from PFF.

But the heft continues outside of simple personnel groupings. Davante Adams and Aaron Jones—the Packers’ top two offensive weapons—aren’t particularly big, but the supporting cast is XXL. The receiving corps is filled out by Allen Lazard and Marquez Valdes-Scantling—who, together, sound like a sketchy financial advisor driving his dad’s Audi and the oil freighter stuck in the Suez Canal that’s obliterating his portfolio. At a whopping 6-5 227 pounds, Lazard works mostly underneath, while the slightly smaller Valdes-Scantling (6-4, 206 lbs.) is their “fuck it, go deep” guy. Both are expected to block in the run game and beat press coverage for jump ball situations down the sideline. Those guys and their roles haven’t really changed over the years, but the biggest addition since we last saw them is also their biggest load to bring down in the open field.

At 6-0 247 pounds and with quads so massive they’ve gotten their own nicknames (“Quadzilla” and “The Quadfather”), sophomore back AJ Dillon has emerged in the second half of the season to create a timeshare in the Packers backfield. While Jones—with his superior explosiveness and skill in the passing game—continues to be their top dog, Dillon actually has had more carries and rushing yards this year. Granted, some of that is likely due to the Packers trying to preserve the oft-injured Jones for the post-season, but Dillon has made himself a major factor nonetheless. The two backs have considerably different styles, and the Packers use them both in the screen and passing game A LOT (a combined 100+ targets, 86 catches, 704 yards, and 8 scores on the year). Angles and tackling in the open field will be key.

Return of the Bak. 2020 All-Pro left tackle David Bakhtiari returned from a season-long injury last week against the Lions, and—after playing partial snaps in that warm-up game—is probably good to go for Saturday. Considering our best chance of pulling the upset is disrupting Rodgers via pass rush, Bakhtiari’s health—alongside that of Nick Bosa—will be worth monitoring up until kickoff. Last time we faced off, we recorded only two quarterback hits and one sack. Clearly, we’ll need to do better this time around.

Easy-ups. In addition to a heavy dose of diverse and well-designed screens to their backs and wideouts, LaFleur loves to combine alignments, motion, and Aaron Rodgers’ speedy release to get the ball out quick on the perimeter via leverage plays.

While far from the sexiest, most complex, or explosive of plays, LaFleur dials these up as rhythm starter—like a metronome before the orchestra kicks into full gear. In each of these plays, Rodgers is basically just looking for a slight numbers or leverage advantage (soft coverage, defender too far inside) then getting the ball out in a hurry. Since Rodgers can zip the ball out wide in a split second, the Packers use these throws almost as an extension of the run game. They’re like horizontal handoffs or variations of what a bubble screen can look like when you have a Hall of Fame quarterback throwing it.

As stated above, LaFleur’s calling card has been consistency, and by dialing up screens, play action, and these kinds of layups, he keeps the Packers’ offensive floor high while saving the more complex, higher-risk concepts for his shot plays.

Vulcan Mind-Meld. The other benefit of those easy completions to the boundary is that they often flood one side of the field, forcing defenses to make a choice. They can run with the motion man across, roll their safeties, or shift linebackers so that they don’t get out leveraged play-side, but all those solutions create more space and one-on-one matchups backside, where—you guessed it—they usually play Davante Adams.

Rodgers’ ability to read and diagnose coverages in the blink of an eye, paired with possibly the greatest arm talent the NFL has ever seen and seven years working alongside the best receiver in football, makes for the world’s deadliest game of pitch-and-catch.

One of the major differences between Green Bay’s offense and the other units from the Shanahan/McVay tree is that Rodgers is one of the best and most prolific matchup hunters in the NFL, so LaFleur gives him and Davante Adams great leeway to audible to a quick-hitting pass when they both see a matchup that they like. Namely, any time Davante is one-on-one against press-man.

It’s not out of the question that when Rodgers held up that one finger in the replay, he was telling Adams that they were in Cover 1 and that he was about to make a lot of fantasy owners happy.

Adams has the best release in football, so the Packers go out of their way to isolate him away from trips and empty formations in hopes that defenses give him a one-on-one look and play the math to the other side. When that happens, the Packers will feed Adams until you stop it. Which—in one-on-one coverage—is probably never.

Here’s an example in its most simplistic form. In this case, they don’t even bother isolating Adams. Rodgers just likes the look.

When Adams is lined up in the slot he can run a quick arrow route down the seam off an audible, but when he’s outside it’s typically a fade or a slant. Since he’s not isolated in this situation—and is lined up with plenty of outside space to work with—they’re looking fade.

Despite the corner lining up in press with outside leverage, Rodgers has faith that Adams will beat him outside. With the near safety lined up on the hash, both quarterback and receiver know this cornerback won’t get any help until the ball is already completed. They also know that—since they’re throwing this opposite a called run play—the safety may just stick inside for a second off the run-action look from the box.

Since the corner has lined up outside to begin with—and thus is unlikely to get beat over the top unless he just whiffs at the LOS—Rodgers and Adams expect to throw a back-shoulder fade.

Which they complete, rather easily.

Other times, there’s a bit more work involved to set things up. But not by much.

Pre-snap motion to the short side of the field makes the defense adjust. Rodgers sees the high safety move to mid-field where—once again—he can’t play over any fade route that’s thrown early enough. Rodgers takes one peek post-snap to make sure Adams has gained leverage, then drops it over the top for an easy 33-yard gain.

On slant routes, the set-up is a bit different, but it’s ultimately more of the same.

Pre-snap, Rodgers and Adams already feel like the near safety is deep enough and far-enough inside that he won’t be a hinderance. In this case, they’re more worried about the alignment of the nearest linebacker. As the running back motions to empty the other way, the linebackers slide over, giving enough room for Adams to work with.

For these two, it’s basically warm-up lines at practice. Davante feasts if given this look—like he feasted against Dontae Johnson and Deommodore Lenoir when they were thrown into play due to injury in week 3. If a defense chooses to keep safety help over Davante, the Packers will gladly chip away with a numbers advantage opposite him using quick game and the leverage plays mentioned above. If defenses go two-high and widen their safeties more to the boundaries, the Packers will pound them on the ground with their two talented running backs then hit them with a skinny post off play-action when they least expect it.

When it all comes together, you get an offense that is schematically sound and unquestionably dangerous but not entirely exciting from an X’s and O’s standpoint. While Shanahan may dial up an RPO slant with motion across and pulling guards to open up a running alley for Deebo or Aiyuk across the middle, Rodgers does a lot of his damage outside the hashes by immediately diagnosing flat defenders and out leveraging them and/or feasting on one-on-one coverage against Davante. Then, when you’ve adjusted your defense to stem the bleeding, Rodgers uncorks one of those wild, unearthly rockets over your defense for six.

If you had to choose one guy between McVay, Shanahan, and LaFleur to scheme someone open, it’s unlikely to be the Packers head coach, but he’s also the one with the winningest record and the highest rated offense. While there’s debate as to how much of that is LaFleur versus him having a significant quarterback advantage over his two colleagues, the Packers coach has done a great job of creating easy completions underneath to raise the floor of this offense. He knows that the Rodgers-Davante combo means a big play could happen at any moment. What differentiates the Packers now from the era of The Thumb is that when that big play is well-covered, they can still stay on track through a commitment to the run game and easy completions underneath.

DEFENSIVE KEYS

When seated, he can’t throw [Mark Hoffman / Milwaukee Journal Sentinel]

Dudes on Davante. In order to beat the Packers, you have to have a plan for how you’re gonna cover #17. Now it’s easy to yell at a bar to “double team him!” after he gets a clutch third-down reception—and double-coverage should 100% be a part of our plan—but you can’t do that all the time or they’ll just kill you with numbers elsewhere.

The key, as is often the case in NFL pass coverage in 2022, is mixing things up and confusing the pre-snap read. If done correctly, this can be especially effective against a tandem like Rodgers-Adams that relies so heavily on both of them seeing the same thing at the same time.

In week 10, Seattle’s defense did as good a job as any at bottling up the Packers’ full-strength offense, in part by giving Davante a lot of different looks. Here’s a snapshot of one coverage that they’d show pre-snap:

In this case, the safety (Jamal Adams) is CLEARLY in double coverage. So much so that his hips are literally turned away from the center of the field and towards the Packers wideout. While I wouldn’t necessarily support that kind of pre-snap commitment (because—like—what if they just run the ball behind you?) this at least makes it clear to Rodgers that—while the cornerback may be in press coverage on Davante—there’s another dude who is fully committed to denying him the ball.

As the game went on, Seattle would continue to show this look before the play, but instead of always sticking to it, they began to rotate into different coverages post-snap.

In this instance, the Packers are really forcing the issue. They’re in an empty set with four wideouts to the offensive right and just Davante to the left. Once again, Jamal Adams has widened out over Davante’s side, meaning any kind of “alert” passes that the Packers would throw to Davante based on a pre-snap look would be out the window. With a clear leverage and numbers advantage, the Packers CAN’T NOT throw to the four-receiver side.

Based on the called play to the offensive right and the defense lining up in what looks like split safeties with bracket coverage on Davante, Rodgers expects the safety to the top of the screen to widen, Jamal Adams (circled) to stay locked on Davante, and the arrow route (marked in red) to open up right down the seam of the vacating safeties.

But Jamal Adams creeps away from Davante leading up to the snap, and—once the play has begun—we can tell he never had any double team responsibilities based on how he’s turned his back entirely from Davante. Instead, the Seahawks safety is acting as the high wall to any third vertical route from the four-wideout side. He’s meant to block any crosser deeper than the linebackers, or carry any vertical route down the seam.

Rodgers looks to the arrow route that—if Jamal Adams had stayed on Davante—would have split the safeties easily down the middle, but since Jamal rotated to center field, that route is sufficiently smothered. With his timing off and no place to go in a collapsing pocket, Rodgers eventually scrambles for a first down. But it’s called back on holding.

Showing a double team and then rotating out of it doesn’t just force other receivers to make plays, but it also makes Rodgers get off of his #1 receiver earlier than he’d like to, which at times can be just as effective as an actual double team (but without losing the defender). Sure, the Packers could adjust away from their pre-snap “alert” plays and involve Davante more in traditional passing concepts. In that case, our double-team bluff would be outed within the play and Adams could still get his looks within Rodgers’ standard progression. But we’d still be bracketing Davante on some of those plays, and—even when we aren’t—we’d have taken away the easy pitch-and-catch completions that this offense makes into such a meal.

Mano-a-mano (on the D-Line). While Bakhtiari’s return certainly complicates things, I generally believe the Packers are weaker on the offensive line than many people think. To be clear, they operate very well as a unit, and that matters more. Their adjusted sack rates, adjusted line yards, pass block win rates are all ranked in the top 5. But if you can isolate their three interior linemen, I don’t think they hold up as well.

The Packers struggled to run against Seattle, but that’s because Seattle throws five men on the LOS, is one of the last defenses that is still built to stop the run, and gets heavy snap counts from nose tackles who are 336 pounds and 360(!) pounds. We haven’t really prioritized the same skill-set along our defensive interior, but DJ Jones and Arik Armstead—who rank first and third, respectively, in run stop rate—should be up for the challenge. Our run defense has had the league’s highest EPA/game average since the changes we made mid-season, and winning on the inside—in addition to tackling better than in our first matchup—will be key to setting up longer third downs. That’s where I think we can really take advantage of some mismatches.

In the passing game, the interior line should be our target. Whether that’s utilizing inside twists, presenting overload rushes that force one side to block man up (which can also include twists), sending blitzers up the middle, or showing mug looks by covering up a lineman with a linebacker before dropping him back into coverage, we should be doing everything we can on passing downs to force one-on-one matchups on the inside.

This is also a matchup where those inside blitzes and mug looks could be less likely to punish us. Yes, Rodgers sees and finds openings in zones in a hurry, but the drawback of the Packers’ super-sized skill players is that—other than Davante—you don’t really have anyone who excels at getting open early on the sort of slants, quick-ins, and option routes that can punish interior blitzing or linebackers who are late getting to their spots. If anything, Randall Cobb fits that mold the best, and—all due respect to him—you’d prefer five yard completions to Cobb over the middle versus most other things this Packers passing attack does. And while the threat of a dig getting to the vacated space in the middle of the field is always present—especially against a quarterback as talented as Rodgers—our linebackers are very fast in coverage, and if Rodgers is getting the time to complete that throw because we’re not getting home on a five+ man pressure then we’re probably screwed anyway.

We know—and have seen every year—how this style of offense helps offensive linemen by running the ball and putting them in advantageous positions in pass pro. But if we can force their hand into true dropback pass protection sets and target those interior linemen with our rushers, we can make them block us one-on-one, and that’s where I think we hold an advantage. Obviously, that advantage is exponentially greater if Nick Bosa plays. At the moment, the team seems optimistic, but you can never tell with concussions. That said, we still pressured Dak at a higher rate than he’d seen all year in the wild card matchup, and that was without Bosa for two quarters. Our line in the first matchup was Bosa and everyone else. Now it’s more of a cohesive unit, and one that will have to show up big on Saturday.

Fudge the Flat. Disguising coverages and showing multiple looks pre- and post-snap is absolutely crucial to slowing down Aaron Rodgers. If he knows what you’re in and you stay in it, he’s gonna kill you in the short game and—if they can protect it—beat your corpse again as they throw down the field. Against some quarterbacks, you can get away with rotating safeties and keeping them guessing on the back-end to slow them up, but against Rodgers—and his quick release and recognition skills—you really have to be able to muck up the works on his flat reads as well. Once again, Seattle had some success in hiding what they were doing in their last matchup.

Early in the first quarter, the Packers are in a typical empty spread set. With Davante in the slot to the weak side, they’re trying to work a two-man game for some easy yardage.

At the bottom of the screen, DJ Reed (ugh) does a great job of showing press-bail, keeping his hips open to the formation before the snap as if he’s going to turn and bail with the outside receiver as he runs down the field. Seeing this, Rodgers assumes Adams (in red)—who is matched up on a linebacker (teal)—will be open on the quick out.

But on the snap, Reed squares up his shoulders. While his pre-snap positioning alluded to him being a deep third or quarter defender, he’s actually pressing the outside receiver off the LOS and squatting in the flats. The Seahawks are in a funky variation of Cover 6 and Reed is on the “Cover 2” side. And while he shouldn’t be allowing the receiver an outside release, I’ll give Reed the benefit of the doubt and say that he wasn’t particularly worried about the fade and read Rodgers’ drop to know the ball was coming out quick.

Reed breaks on the ball, forcing an incomplete that just as easily could have been a pick six.

Say what you will about the Seapenises—like that they’ve benefited more from uncalled PI’s and overly-called roughing calls than anyone in the league, that their fans don’t act like they’ve been there before cause they haven’t been there enough, that their last good first-round pick is older than me, that their obsession with weird highlighter colors on their uniforms will be looked back upon as the jheri curl of this era of jerseys, that their backup quarterback had to spend six weeks sidelined cause he got punched in the face by his own teammate over $600, that their inability to invest in the offensive line is running an elite quarterback in his prime out of town, or that that same elite quarterback, when given the ability to sling it early and often, faltered so heavily down the stretch that they once again returned to an offense that hasn’t had a firmware update since the Bush administration—but… Pete Carroll knows how to coach DBs.

To be clear, some of these snaps—whether feigning double coverage or something else—wind up in press-man. They have to, otherwise, the bluff doesn’t work. It’s one thing to do that every once and a while with Moseley on Adams. With Ambry Thomas—or anyone else—that’s a tougher sell. Especially because Rodgers if you’re in it, Rodgers is bound to find out eventually. But when you’re disguising flat defenders you need to have the threat of the corner squatting and taking away that quick stuff, or they’ll just dink-and-dunk you to death. Sometimes, allowing shorter stuff and rallying up isn't the end of the world. Other times, it gasses your DL and neuters your defense’s ability to dictate game flow. It’ll be up to DeMeco Ryans—who has been DEALING—to keep his pulse on the defense and figure out exactly when and how to crank up the aggressiveness.

Whether it’s disguising blitzers or disguising coverages, the Packers offense is too strong, balanced, and well-coached—and Rodgers is too damn old and good—for us to get away with telegraphing where we’re gonna be. And the more aggressive you are at hiding coverages in the shallow zones and bluffing or delaying blitzers, the more of a shell game it becomes. Every once and a while you can get burned. But those are the risks you take when you’re going up against a HOF quarterback and the best receiver in football.

PACKERS DEFENSE

new blood [Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel]

After the 2020 season, LaFleur replaced former DC Mike Pettine with Joe Barry, who must be a reasonably chill dude because the entire defensive staff—many of whom were Pettine’s guys to begin with—stuck around to coach under the new guy.

Barry, who had unsuccessful stints as a DC in both Detroit and Washington, spent the past four years working with the Rams—first under Wade Phillips, then for a year under Brandon Staley. In the same way that LaFleur and Shanahan are familiar with one another, Barry has butted heads with us plenty of times, with the Niners sending both his former bosses out with 0-2 records against us in their final seasons as DC.

Barry brings with him a two-high, odd-front base defense that looks to rotate coverages on the back end, prevent the big play, and focus on stopping the pass. While his new-look Packers defense started out hot, it’s cooled a bit in the past month or so. While still a top 10 unit in yardage allowed and a top 15 squad in points, analytics are a bit less friendly, with an overall DVOA of 22nd. Is it a unit that was coasting a bit as the Packers approached the post-season? Will it be rejuvenated to early-season levels (and beyond) with the potential return of a few superstars? Or was it simply a defense that was beginning to decline as it regressed to the mean? Hard to say, but I know which one I’m rooting for.

I feel like they should sit out one more week. To be fair to Barry, his first year running the defense has mostly been without the defense’s top two players—both of whom are questionable to play in Saturday’s game.

Our last matchup in week three was the last full game that star cornerback Jaire Alexander played in, as he went down with a shoulder injury the following week that kept him out the remainder of the regular season. He’s questionable to return to a unit that has fared well without him and is suddenly stacked if he’s back.

Meanwhile Za’Darius Smith—the Packers’ best edge rusher—has yet to play a snap all season while dealing with a back injury. Assuming he gets taken off IR at some point in the next 24 hours, he’s also questionable to play. As is the case with Bakhtiari on offense, potentially regaining another two All-Pros just in time for a playoff game is a big deal. If they play, it will be interesting to see what kind of snaps they can give—and at what level they can play—after such a long layoff.

Both men would return to units that have impressed in their absence. In the case of Smith, his absence has partially been offset by the breakthrough campaign of third-year size/speed freak Rashan Gary, who has paired with always-steady Preston Smith to lock down the two edges as stand-up defensive ends/linebackers. While Kenny Clark may be their most important defensive lineman, Smith and Gary are their best pass rushers, combining for 18.5 sacks and 45 QB hits this year.

Great linebacker, greatest chicken soup. De’Vondre Campbell, who the Packers signed to a one-year $2M deal in the off-season, absolutely exploded under the tutelage of Barry, who—as associate head coach and linebackers coach his last year with the Rams—is clearly a linebacker-friendly DC. A 2016 fourth-round pick by the Falcons, Campbell started for four years there before a one-year stint as a starter with the Cardinals—regularly ranking in the 60th-70th range in terms of PFF. This year he blew up in Barry’s scheme, ranking 2nd in PFF among all off-the-ball linebackers and getting a first-team All-Pro nod just last week.

It’s good for the Packers that Campbell has emerged into such a force because their preferred front requires a lot of their middle linebacker, and the other off-ball linebackers who have gotten regular snaps this season have been largely forgettable.

The Packers like to line up in a 5-1, muddy up the gaps, and present a light box. While the two tackles in this photo are in four techniques, the Packers also like the double 4i alignment—which was popularized in college ball to stop spread to run teams (coincidentally, one of the first teams to pioneer the double 4i alignment was Oregon, with their 4is being Arik Armstead and then DeForest Buckner). The thinking in this alignment is that the down linemen cover all the gaps, give the Packers five natural rush options, and prevent the offensive linemen from working up to the second level in the run game. This lets their linebacker run free and fast to the ball, which Campbell has done all year.

In some ways, it’s similar to the scheme that Vic Fangio drew up to halt the meteoric ascension of the Rams offense during their Super Bowl run in 2018. To stop an offense that relied heavily on the run, play-action, and deep shots, Fangio—then the DC of the Bears—loaded the line of scrimmage to prevent double teams and movement along the OL then played a deep two-high shell behind them. This forced the Rams to throw the ball underneath and in rhythm, which they weren’t able to do, and presented the blueprint to slow down their offense—a foundation that the Patriots would use to beat the Rams in that year’s Super Bowl.

But the front has its weaknesses, especially against us. Which we’ll get to in a second.

Trent Baalke would be proud. Like their jumbo wideouts, the Packers have invested in lengthy outside cornerbacks—with Rasul Douglas (6’2, 209 lbs.) and rookie Eric Stokes (6’1 185 lbs.) starting on the outsides with Jaire Alexander down with injury. While we all know how much Fangio’s scheme can help hide average cornerback play, both Douglas and Stokes have played well while stepping into unexpectedly larger roles.

At safety are Darnell Savage—proud owner of just an all-time classic football name—and Adrian Amos, the eraser of the back end. Amos—who likely had an easier transition than many to this defense given his experience in Fangio’s scheme while playing for the Bears—has been playing at a good-to-great level since he entered the league and can do a bit of everything well.

If there’s a weakness in the secondary, it’s starting nickel corner Chandon Sullivan. To be fair, the one linebacker alignments really put him out on an island in coverage, but that island has been visited routinely throughout the year. Additionally, according to PFF, Sullivan has the worst run defense grade of any Green Bay defender—regardless of snap count. As an alley player about to face a team that loves to attack the edge with power runs, you know Shanahan is well aware of this fact.

Special teams…advantage? Our much-maligned special teams unit is ranked 27th in DVOA. The Packers special teams are worst in the league. DVOA is expressed as a percentage, so a team that leads the league in overall DVOA—in this year, Dallas—has a percentage of 30.9%, meaning they are 30.9% better than an average NFL squad. Each unit (offense, defense, specials) contributes a negative or a positive percentage and the aggregate of those makes the overall DVOA.

This year’s top special teams unit—certainly buoyed by the unreal play of Justin Tucker—is the Baltimore Ravens, with a special teams DVOA of +5.3%. We come in at -2.4%. The Packers check in at -5.2%. Their worst-rated special teams area is field goal kicking, which is understandable because Mason Crosby is only hitting 73.5% of his field goals, which is ranked 31st out of 33 qualifiers.

OFFENSIVE KEYS

Not like this, but still run a lot [Kirby Lee/USA Today]

THAT SOFT(ER) NOUGAT INTERIOR. I’m gonna be honest, I don’t know if they can stay in their preferred 5-1 defense against us and have any chance at stopping the run. This Packers team might be 11th in rushing yards allowed, but that’s more the product of game script and their stellar offense. Their defense is ranked #28 in run defense DVOA, has the third-worst yards/carry average in the league (4.7), and has a lot of tape of them being bullied on the ground. The last time we played them they mixed up 5-1 and 4-2 looks, leaning more towards the latter—but there’s a chance that preference was to put more underneath defenders in the middle of the field as we abandoned the run.

Not only did we get down 17-0 early in that game and have to pass, but—if you remember—that was the game where we only had one healthy running back on roster and it was Trey Sermon, who the coaching staff clearly didn’t trust. That led to Juice handling the majority of our snaps at tailback and even getting an inside zone carry on the first play of the game. Love Juice, but he’s not really the type of guy we want threatening the edge in our dynamic stretch game. We only rushed for 67 yards in that game—and that is certainly a data point worth referencing—but MAN there were a lot of extenuating circumstances.

Now that we’ve found our identity on offense and have Elijah Mitchell, Jeff Wilson, and Deebo all healthy and playing out of the backfield, the 5-1 seems like it’s a single missed read/tackle away from a potential house call. There’s a very real chance they show us something completely different than what they’ve been doing to this point. But… less than a month ago in Week 16, while playing a Browns team piloted by a one-armed Baker Mayfield that—as an offshoot of the Kubiak offense—runs a similar base scheme as us and is just as (if not more) run-heavy, the Packers trotted out the 5-1 regularly. And got absolutely shredded on the ground.

Obviously that 5-1 becomes a 5-2 and morphs and changes as we play more heavy personnel. When we grow the box, they will too. They aren’t going to just sit in a six-man box against 21 personnel and wave the white flag. But what happens when we call 11 personnel, split Kittle into the slot, and put Deebo Samuel in the backfield?

The Browns rushed for 219(!) yards in that game and only really lost because of four Baker Mayfield interceptions. So I don’t know, the Packers might have to do something different. If they don’t—or even if they do—we should be POUNDING IT on the ground in this matchup. As mentioned in the Dallas preview, teams that aren’t great at stopping the run can rise to the occasion based on hustle and adrenaline early in games, so it would be nice to start balanced and with plenty of misdirection to keep them off-guard. But this is the kind of prime “our strength vs. their weakness” matchup that could snowball in our favor if we can get some positive momentum (and a friendly game script) early. Let’s be diverse in our run game, mix in gap runs and pulling guards, and slowly drain them on defense while keeping their offense off the field.

If the Packers do stay in the 5-1, our goal should be to hammer those edges between the 4i down lineman and the wide standup ends—both play-side with gap schemes and back-side via split zone—and to free up our linemen with some pin and pull sweeps. If we block down on the two tackles with advantageous angles, we can let our interior linemen pull out into space where their athleticism and our team speed can shine. The Browns murdered the Packers with pin-and-pull sweeps and there’s no reason why we shouldn’t be able to do the same if given the same look.

Digging for Gold. The other reason why I don’t think the Packers will sit in as much 5-1 as they typically do is because that alignment is made for winning upfront and taking away passes deep and outside the hashes. So, you know, everywhere we don’t throw the ball. And with only one second-level linebacker, it is inherently TERRIBLE at defending the short-to-intermediate passing game between the hashes. Which is… everything that we want to do through the air and Jimmy Garoppolo’s wheelhouse.

The idea of deep safeties taking away digs has always been a bit more of a fantasy than a reality. While a dig from the slot can technically be a safety’s responsibility on anything with a vertical stem, driving on digs typically means a safety is exposing the deep post area that they’re required to help the corners protect. And while talented linebackers or a lockdown nickel can help take away those inside routes, no single linebacker can cover that much ground, and the Packers’ nickel—as referenced earlier—is a bit of a weak link.

To be clear, this is less of a problem against slants. They’ll have alley runners and—when they don’t—their safeties do a great job of slipping off slot receivers and jumping the outside slant—something they did multiple times in our last matchup, which led to big collisions and dangerous passes. Digs and crossers—whether they’re coming from the outside receiver or the slot—and post-curls all take time to develop. Naturally, with their five-man front, the Packers are hoping to get home before teams can target that defensive weakness. It just so happens that said weakness—like their vulnerability to the running game—aligns well with our strength.

Contain Kenny. Kenny Clark is the engine that makes this defense go on the interior. He’s the only real inside lineman who makes much of an impact, and when he can shoot gaps and disrupt plays before they get started, the Packers defense typically thrives. Alex Mack had one of his worst games as a Niner in our earlier matchup, in large part due to Kenny Clark’s athleticism and burst at the nose. But if you can prevent him from messing up the rhythm of your plays before they get started, there’s lots of room to run (and pass) behind him.

As always, protect the ball. Yup. No need to bring up any more turnover stats. Or to harp on how Jimmy’s interception—and his torpedoed play afterward—kept a Dallas game close that we should have ran away with. While a turnover could happen at any moment (as we saw last week), it would be smart to watch out for creeping safeties who don’t feel threatened over top, Jaire Alexander if he plays, and any defenders dropping into the hole off the line of scrimmage. While I would LOVE if we could just repeat the run/pass ratio (and the success) of our last playoff matchup with the Packers, the most likely scenario is that we’ll need to complete (at least) some timely passes to win this game. That means protecting Jimmy (and his multiple injuries) and being careful with the ball.

CONCLUSION

victory fist pumps [Tom Lynn/AP Photo]

Once again, our commitment—on both offense and defense—to zagging when most others are zigging gives us a real shot at pulling off another playoff upset. Our run defense held the Cowboys to 77 rushing yards and kept them off balance until late—allowing our pass rush to tee-off on a talented offensive line—while our offense put up 169 on the ground against a top-ranked defense hell-bent built to stop the pass. This week, we’re faced with another situation in which our run defense needs to step up to make things easier on our pass defense and our rushing attack has to carry the load offensively. But Aaron Rodgers and Davante Adams are not Dak Prescott and CeeDee Lamb. And we will not be able to win this game if we play as sloppy as we did down the stretch last week.

I really hope our poor week 3 performance in the run game will give Green Bay a false sense of confidence in how to approach our run game on Saturday. That they’ll just roll out what they’ve shown and we’ll dice it up like it’s 2019. But Matt LaFleur, who knows Shanahan well, is surely, SURELY remembering that NFC Championship Game in preparation for this game. He wants/needs some playoff success after three straight years of 13 wins and he knows we want to run the ball. Maybe that leads to some seriously weird stuff on defense—stuff that they haven’t put on film this year. In the past, due to the complexity of our rushing attack, that sort of strategy has led to some slow starts on the ground and uneven performances. Then again, getting away from what you’re used to doing on defense also leads to busts and breakdowns.

Regardless, this seems like a game where we have to score. That’s not to say I don’t have faith in our defense. I fully expect them to come out with a strong game plan ready to play. But the best way to minimize the impact of a Hall of Fame quarterback in 2022 is to minimize his looks at what you’re doing in coverage. There’s only so many coverages you can run and so many ways you can hide it that are structurally sound, and the more possessions a good quarterback and play-caller get to see those things, the more likely they’ll be able to diagnose what’s coming and target its weaknesses. That means running the ball, shortening the number of possessions on defense, and punching the ball into the endzone so the Packers must stray from their coveted offensive balance and get into true dropback passing situations.

While the faces have changed and the challenge is far greater this time around, the formula for winning this game remains the same. Hopefully, we come out ready to execute it.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Wild-Card Preview @ Dallas

Of all the gin joints in all the towns…

Fancy seeing you here [Peter Read Miller / SI]

Opponent: Dallas Cowboys
Date: Sunday, 1/16
Location: that hideous dome thing in Texas
Kickoff: 1:30PM PT
TV: CBS, or wherever you stream it illegally
Line: DAL -3.0

Hello, old friend.

In a matchup that could garner better TV ratings in the Los Angeles area than the Rams home game, the Niners and Cowboys rekindle their long-time playoff rivalry in their first postseason matchup since the 1994 season—the third straight year the two met in the NFC Championship game and the prelude to the Niners’ last Super Bowl win.

In many ways, this Cowboys team should be a legitimate Super Bowl favorite. They lead the NFL in Total DVOA, are tops in the NFC in points differential, and have—by nearly all forms of measurement, advanced or otherwise—top 10 units on both offense and defense. But—fair or not—there are questions.

Some (many?) of those concerns revolve around the Cowboys’ reputation and recent playoff history. They haven’t advanced past the divisional round of the playoffs since 2Pac was alive (1995, their last Super Bowl season) and Jerry Jones is—you know—Jerry Jones, which many believe has contributed to some real butthole-clenched postseason flops throughout the years. 

But the other (likely more legitimate) questions revolve mostly around whether this is a team that’s a contender or a team that looks like a contender against lesser competition. The Cowboys are the champs of the much-maligned NFC East. While the division has improved since last season (mathematically it may not have been possible for them to get any worse) and sports two playoff entrants this year, the Cowboys got to beat the piss out of teams like the Racial Slurs and their backup quarterback and the New York Football Giants, which is basically a team of backups, twice a year. 

If you exclude a drubbing of the Eagles’ reserves last week, the Cowboys are 2-5 against playoff teams and 9-0 against everyone else. Granted, that stat is a bit misleading. Only two of those losses were by more than a single score—neither being blowouts—and the Boys lost two games in OT and another two by a combined five points. But it’s a stat that could be important nonetheless.

Realistically, the Cowboys probably lie somewhere in between their contender analytics and pretender meme status. Oftentimes, that kind of team—the one that just simply CAN’T breakthrough—is less a case of can’t and more a case of when. Perhaps it’s this year and the Cowboys finally make a run. Or perhaps our season of ups and downs through the NFC West gauntlet will have us battle-tested and ready for the upset.

Either way, this is a talented and dangerous Cowboys team and a matchup that—in some ways—is favorable, and—in others—potentially worrisome.

OFFENSE

No, you stop. No, YOU stop! [Matthew Emmons / USA Today]

33-year-old offensive coordinator Kellen Moore—who will likely be a head coach sooner rather than later—helms a Cowboys attack that leads the NFL in both offensive yards and points scored. Averaging over 400 yards of offense and 31.2 points per game, this Cowboys offense is unique in that its offensive identity is largely based on not having one.

The man with no name. In terms of personnel groupings, the Cowboys offense largely fits the mold of a typical modern NFL offense. They are a one-back team, with the majority—if not the entirety—of their two-back snaps coming on the goal line or when they want to get both of their talented tailbacks on the field at once. They’re primarily a three wideout squad but will run double tight as well. They lean more shotgun than under center. Nothing surprising there.

But while their personnel and general formation tendencies are expected, the Cowboys’ offensive scheme thrives in multiplicity and in doing a lot of things well. They’re largely middle-of-the-pack in terms of usage percentages for any kind of play subcategory—such as play-action passes, using motion, etc.—but their efficiency metrics are strong across the board, making them incredibly difficult to game plan against.

Whereas the Baltimore Ravens or a Sean McVay offense take the In-N-Out Burger approach—a limited menu done well—the Cowboys are like Cheesecake Factory. They throw an unbelievable amount of shit at you and hope that the sheer quantity of it all overwhelms you (and gives you diabetes).

For defensive game plans that are built around taking away an offense’s bread-and-butter and making them win a game by doing anything else, this can be a problem. By not knowing what the Cowboys want to do in any given week, there’s no real bread or butter to take away. It’s like a keto diet. And just like the keto diet, it kinda sucks to deal with.

Usually, this kitchen-sink approach to offense leads to rickety or inconsistent units. You do a lot of everything and end up doing nothing well. The reason that’s not the case with Dallas—aside from Moore’s experience and talent in building an offense this way—is that the Cowboys are loaded in every offensive position group.

Big Uglies, pretty blocks. Save for an injury-plagued 2020 season, the Cowboys have had a legitimate claim to having the best offensive line in football for much of the past half dozen years. 

Tyron Smith—of “my arms are so huge I wear knee braces as my elbow braces” fame—has probably been the best offensive tackle in football not named Trent Williams this year. According to PFF, he’s been graded out as a top ten tackle in 7 of his 11 professional seasons. Bookending the opposite side is La’el Collins, whose horrendous draft day luck led to an absolute heist of an UDFA acquisition by the Cowboys. He’s a stud in his own right.

On the interior, Zack Martin has been a mainstay at right guard since he was drafted. He’s been a PFF top 5 guard for each of his eight years in the league, with the #1 ranking during this 2021 season. Opposite him at left guard is Connor Williams, who is less top tier than the three guys just mentioned but still grades out in the top 10-ish range. 

Filling out the front five is second-year center Tyler Biadasz. He’s a major step down from former point man Travis Frederick—who retired last year after coming back for one more Pro Bowl season following a bout with Guillain-Barré syndrome—but when you’re surrounded by the talent the Cowboys have, you can afford an average center.

Undoubtedly, much of what Kellen Moore is able to call—and the multiplicity in which this offense operates—is due to the strength of this offensive line.

When he’s drafting from his coke yacht, you know he’s taking a wideout in the first. This wouldn’t be a Jerry Jones team if it didn’t have an excess of exciting skill players, and the Cowboys are talented and deep out wide.

The veteran presence in the wideout room is Amari Cooper, a talented route runner and after-the-catch threat, who—up until this season—was their No.1 option. He’s consistent but seldom spectacular, which is one of the reasons he’s been passed up by the rapidly-ascending second-year wideout CeeDee Lamb.

Lamb—who we’d contemplated drafting at 15 in the Javon Kinlaw/Brandon Aiyuk class—is a long, slippery, and acrobatic three-level threat who excels both after the catch and when adjusting to the ball in the air. He lines up in the slot for nearly half his snaps and is at his best picking through the open areas of zones. Expect to see him on digs and crossers if they can protect it. He’s also their primary target on vertical routes. 

Elsewhere, Michael Gallup was the Cowboys’ designated ''fuck it, go deep” guy until he went down for the year with a late-season torn ACL. Soaking up his snaps is Cedrick Wilson Jr., the son of former Niner wideout Cedrick Wilson Sr.—who had his best professional season in 2004 when he was second on our team in catches. Yes, we sucked ass that year, won two games, and would go on to draft Alex Smith shortly after.

At tight end, Dalton Schultz has taken a big step forward this season. He’s a very effective pass catcher but a solid blocker as well, and his emergence as an underneath safety blanket has really helped this offense’s consistency. When Schultz is getting his looks, this offense is usually humming, in part because of his reliability working the short middle of the field.

Two guys who are fantasy relevant. While the hiring of Moore in 2019 has been an unquestioned success, the balanced nature of his attack has led to a production drop-off from one of the Boys’ top weapons.

While Ezekiel Elliott led the NFL in rushing yards per game in each of his first three seasons in the league (101.2 yds/game on 4.7 ypc), his production has steadily declined as the Dallas offense has shifted away from being so run-centric (69.5 yds/game on 4.3 ypc).

In fact, for the third season in a row, third-year back Tony Pollard—who emerged more on the national scale with over 1,000 yards from scrimmage this year—has actually outdone Elliott in most averages and advanced efficiency metrics. Granted, Elliott gets a lot more defensive attention when he’s on the field, which opens things up for other players—Pollard included—but the shift to Moore has made the need to spend big on a single running back less of a financial priority than during the Jason Garrett years. 

That said, both backs are dangerous and utilized heavily in the passing game. They love to dump them the ball on shoot routes with natural picks/blockers downfield, motion them into empty for quick screens, or give them slip screens out of the backfield. They want to get these backs in space and for good reason.

Is Dak Dat Dude? Fair or not, most questions surrounding the Cowboys’ ceiling as a Super Bowl contender also involve Dak Prescott’s status as an elite quarterback. While many have come around to the idea that Dak is at least a Tier 2 signal-caller, he still has his doubters.

This year, many of those questions surround Dak’s mid-season calf injury. While it only kept him out of two games, he was noticeably off when he returned, and—although his play has clearly improved since then—the Cowboys passing attack hasn’t had the same punch in the latter half of the season. While Dallas may lead the league in offensive yards and points scored, they were 3rd in points from weeks 1 through 6 and only 13th in that mark from weeks 7 through 17. Similarly, Dak threw for 300+ yards three times in the first six weeks, but only twice in the last ten. While this is still an explosive offense and passing attack, that drop-off tracks with the Cowboys Offensive DVOA rating, which—at 9th, and a weighted 12th (before facing the Eagles’ backups)—is potent but doesn’t scream “best offense in the league” like its traditional counting stats might.

Additional questions surround the fact that Prescott can put up absolutely monstrous numbers, but the Cowboys as a team are typically better when he doesn’t. In games that Dak has attempted 40 or more passes this year, the Boys are 2-3. In games that he’s attempted 37 or fewer, they’re 7-0. Arbitrary numbers? You bet. But—just as the Niners are 7-0 this year when they log 30 team carries or more—that doesn’t mean they’re not relevant.

DEFENSIVE KEYS

I’m going with incomplete [George Rose / Getty Images]

Make them load up on carbs. As a team that can attack defenses in any number of ways, the Cowboys—and Dak—are at their best when they don’t have to attack a defense in one way repeatedly. Whereas a team like the Niners or the Ravens are happy pounding you on the ground with a diverse and effective run game that follows their offensive identity, the Cowboys strive for balance. When they’re forced out of that balance, they can struggle. I just mentioned the cherry-picked stat about the Cowboys’ record when Prescott attempts 40+ passes, but here’s another: when the Cowboys rush for less than 100 yards this year, they’re 1-5. That’s every single one of their losses.

While I believe Dak is a very good quarterback, the way to beat the Cowboys is still to force them to throw. That’s not just on the quarterback, but a potential inherent drawback of this kind of multiple offense. 

Save for a 73-yard fake punt against the Seahawks, the Niners haven’t allowed a team to surpass 90 rushing yards since week 9. Much of that credit is due to the play of Arik Armstead—who slid primarily inside about that same time—and DJ Jones—who’s having his best year as a pro, but improved play by Samson Ebukam on the edge, rotational snaps from Charles Omenihu, and Arden Key’s emergence as our svelte interior pass rusher have helped unlock a next level for our defensive line. Mo Hurst—who practiced in full for the first time all season—should also be back for this game. While injuries have limited him to only 41 snaps this season, if he’s actually healthy and in game shape, he could provide valuable spot snaps on the interior. 

Even though the Cowboys are no longer the run-first, run-heavy scheme of years past, forcing them into being one-dimensional is still one of the best ways to slow up their offense.

Turning greased-up pigs into bacon. The Cowboys are likely fine with being a high-volume passing attack if they’re breaking 6-8 yard gains off the wide array of quick screens and shoot routes that they use to get the ball quickly outside the hashes to their backs and wideouts.

We’ve had a few ugly showings when it comes to open-field tackling, with the game against Arizona’s backups being the most glaring example, and the Boys love to manufacture those “long handoff” type plays to the perimeter to test defenses early in games and get their offense in rhythm. 

Despite the Boys’ dominance upfront, every team will be looking to manufacture ways to slow up our pass rush, and one way is to get us running sideways enough to gas our D-line. If Dallas’ screen and quick perimeter game is humming, that softens the box for the run, and that lets them stay composed, on schedule, and—once again—balanced offensively. 

It’s not out of the question to think the Cowboys may come out with an initial game plan similar to the Cardinals’ in their second matchup against us: tons of quick perimeter passes paired with some power running inside. Thus, sound tackling will be key, especially early on as the Cowboys attempt to establish their identity. While Azeez Al-Shaair’s development and knack for the splash play has been welcome (and crucial) this year, Dre Greenlaw has been one of our soundest tacklers since he entered the league, and his return should help us track down plays on the perimeter.

If we can flow to the ball quickly and tackle well in space, we’ll take away a lot of the easy stuff that the Cowboys like to employ to steal yardage on early downs. If that happens, they’ll be forced to manufacture their offense through more difficult means.

[Another terrible food analogy]. Dak is a smart quarterback who excels at audibles and pre-snap adjustments, which makes him a really good fit for the variety of plays featured in Moore’s multiple offense. When he’s reading defenses well, Dak can chip away in the quick game, take deep shots down the sideline, and do basically everything in between. So why does Dak sometimes get knocked as a dude who seems “out of rhythm” in games?

If there’s an area where Dak struggles, it’s when his pre-snap read is off. That’s when you start seeing issues in the timing of Dak’s progressions and more scattershot decision-making. Often, you see these issues materialize on intermediate and deep throws across the middle. Dak’s never going to be the most accurate quarterback—with his misses typically sailing high—and—when a coverage dupes him pre-snap—he can be late to recognize and trigger on second and third reads between the hashes. Late throws high over the middle make for a sketchy combination and that’s led to the majority of his turnovers this year.

Dak’s completed 68.8% of his passes with 37 TDs-to-10 INTs on the year. On intermediate and deep passes in the middle zones, he’s completing 50% of his passes for 4 touchdowns and 8 picks. Over the last three seasons, 18 of Dak’s 25 interceptions have come on passes in the middle of the field. While most quarterbacks throw the majority of their interceptions across the middle—where there are more defenders lurking and less open space to work with—Dak’s numbers on second-and-third level inside passes are a legitimate trend. 

This is where the healthy return of Jaquiski Tartt—who has considerably more range than Hufanga (also injured)—and K’Waun Williams will be crucial. For the past few years, the 49ers have done a great job of hiding their coverages pre-snap, utilizing a number of different looks against trips formations, and regularly rotating their safeties after the snap. That skill set could be especially important in this matchup, as confusing Dak at the LOS may throw off his timing just enough to keep the Cowboys’ offense off-kilter, or—even better—lead to late/ill-advised throws over the middle that could swing the turnover battle in our favor.

If we can hide our coverages, rotate safeties post-snap, and make Dak a beat slow on his reads, that might be enough time for Nick Bosa and Co. to get home against the Cowboys’ stellar offensive line. While Dallas’ offense has underachieved in the second half of the year, this is still a unit with as much explosive potential as nearly anyone in football. It just hasn’t broken out yet. The best way to make sure that breakout doesn’t happen against us may reside in how well we hide what we’re doing on the backend.

Misc.

  • The return of Emmanuel Moseley makes our defense a totally different unit, but hopefully, Ambry Thomas continues his slow (but consistent!) growth on the opposite side. Thomas went from “get burnt” (@ CIN) to “get burnt sometimes but get mossed” (v. ATL) to “usually in good position but sometimes getting mossed” (@ TEN) to “good position, nearly making plays on the ball” (v. HOU) to “game-winning interception to seal a playoff bid” (@ LAR). It would be ignorant to think this means he’s suddenly a lock-down corner, but I’m glad the coaching staff let him work through his issues during the season, as he’s bound to be heavily targeted in this matchup. If Thomas can hold up, we should be in good position.

  • While the Cowboys have a great offensive line, we still need to find ways to get pressure on Prescott and flush him out to where he makes those late throws that get him into trouble. Look for Ryans to dial up some well-timed blitzes, mug looks to create one-on-one blocks off the snap, and inside twists in an attempt to isolate and confuse Biadasz in pass pro.

  • Cedrick Wilson Jr. is 5-of-5 for 111 yards and a touchdown over the past two years. Just sayin… If you see him on a fly sweep or a deep outlet pass don’t assume it’s legit.

DEFENSE

A not-that-rare sight this year [Tom Pennington / Getty Images]

Familiarity runs deep on this side of the ball, as Shanahan takes on his old boss in Dan Quinn. The former Falcons head coach has rejuvenated his brand in a hurry, taking over a defensive unit that was absolutely horrid last year and building them into Football Outsiders’ #2 overall defense in terms of DVOA.

Since their last playoff appearance in 2018, the Cowboys defense had been sliding. The promising young linebacker duo of a rookie Leighton Vander Esch and a fully-rehabilitated Jaylon Smith never became the cornerstones of a defensive revolution—the latter finally getting cut mid-season after his play plummeted following his big-ticket contract extension in 2019. Things bottomed out last year with the hiring of Mike Nolan to run some kind of 3-4 hybrid-esque scheme—a pairing that barely lasted a single season and left the Cowboys in historically bad defensive company.

To be fair to the former Niners headman, the fit was poor from the jump. The Cowboys had basically been a 4-3 unit since Rob Ryan got the boot in 2012. A shift to a 3-4 base would have required years of personnel adjustments, and Dallas—as they are known to do—wanted results immediately. In the off-season they turned to Quinn, who brought them back to a 4-3 scheme with Seattle 3 roots. By simplifying assignments, putting players in the right positions, and coaxing the emergence of a few young superstar talents, the Cowboys’ defense is now a strength rather than a liability.

As one of—if not the singular—hottest names in the coaching carousel, this is likely a one-and-done season for Quinn in Dallas, with the Cowboys hoping the foundation he laid can be repeated in years to come. But, this is probably not the type of airtight defense you’re used to seeing top the ranks. There is variance in this Cowboys unit, and with that comes a potential weakness that can trickle down to everything else they do.

And by god we will do our best to exploit that.

Cavemen vs. the NEW iPhone 13 Pro Max with XDR Retina Display. The Cowboys defense is good. That is largely inarguable. But how you view them beyond that is in part based on your opinion of what makes a great defense in 2022.

By many traditional counting stats, the Cowboys aren’t particularly impressive. They’re 7th in points allowed (a highly respectable number) but an unimpressive 19th in yardage. Often times that difference is due to a stingy redzone defense—you know, the whole “bend don’t break” thing—but inside the twenty, the Cowboys rank only 21st. So what makes for the difference in the gap between the Boys’ yardage allowed and their points allowed? Just as importantly, why is this considered an elite defense?

Like an NBA team trying to only take shots at the rim or beyond the arc, the Cowboys excel at the two things advanced stats groups love: third down, where they are ranked second in the nation (34.08% conversion) and takeaways, where they are tops in the league (34). This makes up for their other, less impressive, counting stats, and makes them quite the advanced stats darling.

Many people believe that a modern-day defense is all about possessions, the thought process being that—due to the league’s heavy shift in favor of offenses—you can’t actually have a lockdown defense anymore. From this perspective, pass defense should be prioritized above all else, and physicality, yards allowed, and stopping the run are exponentially less important than increasing the likelihood of generating turnovers.

This isn’t to say that the Cowboys defense is undisciplined or wildly inconsistent, but their emphasis on hunting for “havoc plays”—sacks, tackles for loss, and takeaways—means they lean into variance in a way that elite defenses of the past have not. The Cowboys are near the top of the league in taking the ball away, getting off the field on money downs, pressure rate (5th), and have a #2 rank in pass DVOA. That means they’re an elite defense.

But there is another—more old-school—train of thought from a group that is less bearish on the idea of playing defense in the post-PI, post-roughing the passer world. While often disregarded as traditionalists who have yet to update to the times, these believers continue to stress physicality, stopping the run, and fundamental play over the higher variance, higher risk world of takeaway chasing.

It’s important to note that the two ways of thinking aren’t mutually exclusive. Offensive rule changes or not, it’s impossible to be an elite defense if you aren’t generating takeaways. Likewise, if you can’t tackle anyone or are always out of position you’re never going to cause turnovers. Typically, today’s best defenses fall somewhere in between these two belief systems. The Cowboys are just one of the first defenses to be considered elite that leans so heavily towards the new way of thinking. They want to generate pressure and create takeaways, and they don’t particularly care what happens other than that.

The three-layer cake method. As has become commonplace in a hard salary cap league with exorbitant quarterback contracts and a constant lean towards offense, the Cowboys’ defense is built off of a few studs at every level of play who help mask the presence of some of their less impressive teammates.

On the front line, we’re likely all familiar with Demarcus Lawrence, the Cowboys’ star defensive end. Despite missing the first 12 weeks of the season with a fractured foot, he hasn’t missed a beat upon his return. Through the season, the Cowboys have shown a willingness to blitz with regularity if the moment calls for it, but—since Lawrence has come back from injury—those blitz figures have dropped. They are still more than willing to send extra men, but the combination of Lawrence and fellow disruptive defensive end Randy Gregory has made it less necessary on a regular basis.

On the second level, linebacker Micah Parsons is a shoe-in for DROTY and an All-Pro selection in his first year in the league. Despite opting out of his last year of college, the 6’3” 246-pounder who runs a sub-4.4 forty has slid effortlessly into the Cowboys’ SAM linebacker position. His size/speed combo makes him an obvious sideline-to-sideline chase down threat, but where he really excels is as a pass rusher. Dan Quinn loves to slide him down as a stand-up edge—especially in their traditional 4-3 under fronts—as well as send him as a blitzer from the second level. That’s led to 13 sacks and 30 QB hits—an unreal number for a guy who spends the majority of his snaps as an off-ball linebacker. Even if the rest of the team isn’t blitzing much, they’ll be sending Parsons plenty, and whether he plays more snaps off-ball or as a stand-up end is largely dependent on the matchup. In the 16 games he played in this year, he totaled more snaps on the DL than at LB four times.

The Cowboys’ third big-ticket item is much more polarizing than the first two. While there’s little debate about the prowess of Lawrence and Parsons, cornerback Trevon Diggs is another story. If the Cowboys are a test of what makes an elite defense in 2022, Diggs is that question personified in a single player. Diggs has 11 picks this year, the most interceptions in a single season over the past 40(!) years. But while he led the league in picks, he also led all cornerbacks in penalties (somehow, even more than Josh Norman) and yardage allowed. By A LOT. He’s given up over 1,000 yards receiving this year, a feat that—per PFF—has only been reached by nine other cornerbacks over the past ten years. While some advanced ranking sites have Diggs as a top 5 corner based on his interceptions, PFF has him ranked 84th out of 120 cornerbacks. Among players who have played over 100 snaps at outside corner this year, Trevon Diggs ranks 98th out of 100 in yards per target, and when the ball does get completed, the average gain is a whopping 18.2 yards per reception.

Clearly, opposing teams have not been afraid to target Diggs in coverage despite his tremendous ball-hawking ability. When he isn’t taking the ball away, he’s regularly giving up big yardage, touchdowns, and first downs—whether from completions or penalties. Like Lawrence and Parsons, Diggs is a huge reason why the Cowboys are 11-5 and their defense is ranked as highly as it is, but if you needed a portrait of the variance that we’re talking about with this Cowboys defense, Diggs is a prime example.

That soft nougat interior. When you’re prioritizing the pass rush and generating takeaways on the backend, it’s natural that you’re going to have some weaknesses elsewhere. And usually, that weakness presents itself in the run game. The Cowboys are no different.

The Boys have allowed 100+ rushing yards in 11 of the past 12 straight games. To be clear, that’s not actually that crazy in 2022. They rank 17th in rushing yards allowed per game, 16th in DVOA against the run, and their yards per carry allowed (4.5) is about league average. By all accounts, they are just that—an average run defense.

Their guys on the interior are just guys, even if the scheme and rolling into 4-3 under fronts allows them to be hidden at times. Their corners are not particularly strong tacklers in the open field. There’s space to be had here, even if the defense has stood up well to the challenges they’ve faced. Speaking of said challenges…

That soft(er) offensive schedule. We’ve talked briefly about the Cowboys’ suspect slate of victories and the issues they’ve had in closing out some of the stronger teams on their schedule. But the most legitimate worry that comes from their strength of schedule (or lack thereof) is on the defensive side of the ball. Not because their defense hasn’t looked good in these matchups, but because they’ve faced so many horrendous offenses.

Below is a breakdown of every single offense the Cowboys have faced since the beginning of December (5 teams, 6 games). This includes the offense’s DVOA plus its starting QB, starting RB, and #1 receiver who played in that contest.

So… yeah.

The Cowboys have had their moments against strong offenses, generating four turnovers against the reigning champion Bucs (#1 DVOA) and holding the #4 DVOA Chargers to 17 points, but they did allow over 400 yards in both those games, and it’s safe to say they haven’t been tested in quite a while.

OFFENSIVE KEYS

you know it had to be this picture

Two Tickets to Pound Town. It should come as no surprise that we’ll want to pound the rock in a matchup against an elite unit with an average—and largely untested—run defense. While I wouldn’t expect anything like a “Raheem Mostert on god mode versus a bottom five rushing defense trotting out nickel personnel and six-man boxes in the 2019 NFC Championship Game”-level performance, we’ll need to run the ball effectively to win this game.

Give the Cowboys credit, they’ve stepped up before when they know the run’s coming their way—holding Dalvin Cook to 78 yards on the ground in their matchup against the Vikings—but Minnesota’s rushing attack wasn’t what it has been in previous years. Make no mistake, the Boys haven’t seen a ground game like ours.

Teams that are inconsistent against the run can rise to the occasion when they know it’s coming—especially if their plan is to fast flow hard against our stretch game and not get beat outside. But if we utilize misdirection and backfield cross-flow early, it becomes harder for defenses to keep up on just effort and hustle alone. That’s when you can find cracks in their run D.

While untested against the run, this defense is likely too good to just be bludgeoned to death (at least right out of the gate), which means misdirection in the run game and some key plays through the air may be key to unlocking the kind of ground-and-pound game that we’re looking for. I also have to imagine that Shanahan and Mike McDonald are scheming up as many ways as possible to make the Cowboys’ cornerbacks the unblocked man. Whether it’s unbalanced and closed formations or shifts and motions when we diagnose man coverage, there’s nothing our coaching staff would like more than to make Trevon Diggs spend the majority of this game filling in run support rather than covering down the field.

Beat man coverage on early downs. I have to assume Dan Quinn will take a page from Pete Carroll and the Seahawks and load up against the run with 4-3 under fronts, tons of single-high safeties, and seven-to-eight guys in the box on every down that isn’t third-and-long. That’s why—despite it likely leading to some frustrating “why didn’t we run it there?” situations—we’ll need to attempt (and complete) some passes on early downs to keep the running lanes open.

Despite coming from the Seattle 3 system, Quinn has actually employed a ton of man coverage in Dallas this season, good for third-most in the league. That’s a surprising development for a team whose star corner is clearly better in zone, but I think part of the reason why that strategy has been so successful is that loading the box and calling man 1 and man 1-robber on early downs allows a team that isn’t that great against the run to play above their means be just fitting lots of hats in gaps. It gives them numbers and keeps things simple, which—after their many issues against the run last year—is a great place to start.

I fully expect Quinn to start the game out with single-high loaded boxes and press coverage. Lockdown man with a loaded box, plus a pass rush that can abuse the right side of our line (to be fair, Compton has improved a decent amount in pass pro) has been our Achilles heel on offense. For all his incredible contributions as an offensive Swiss army knife, Deebo’s only real drawbacks have been the occasional drop and the fact that he is considerably less effective against man coverage than zone. Deebo is a slippery dude and incredibly tough to tackle, but he’s not the most electric route runner. Against zone coverage he does a nice job of finding the open lane and building up steam to abuse everyone in his path. Against man coverage, he’s less likely to generate that kind of space and momentum. While Deebo is sure to be involved in this matchup—be it as a receiver or as a runner (hopefully both)—Kittle and Aiyuk may need to step up as our man beaters.

Aiyuk was always drafted to be Deebo’s long and explosive counterpart—a more traditional wideout who could develop into a deep ball threat and run everything in the route tree against any coverage. This is as good a time as any for him to play that role. If we want to get our underneath chunk yardage game going, Aiyuk will need to win some battles against Diggs and fellow outside cornerback Anthony Brown—who is no slouch himself. Early separation against press will be key.

Kittle has been our man-killer all year, and we’ll need him to be that once again in this game. My guess is the Cowboys throw the kitchen sink at our All-Pro tight end, rotating a bunch of looks his way with safety/big nickel Jayron Kearse getting the first shot at locking him down. I personally think that slot and tight end defense is a weakness of this Cowboys defense and that they don’t have a particularly strong answer for Kittle. Kearse is a solid player, but slot corner Jourdan Lewis is just too small to cover Kittle and I wouldn’t trust any of their linebackers to be able to hang.

Shanahan will undoubtedly do his best to move Kittle around and get him matched up on as many linebackers as possible, but regardless of who gets the nod to cover him, Kittle needs to win when his number is called.

Stay on target… It may seem overly simplistic to say that avoiding negative plays and turnovers against a defense that is built on generating those very things is the best way to beat said defense, but… it is.

The Cowboys have forced two or more takeaways in all but five games. In games where they haven’t forced any takeaways, they’re 1-3. Conversely, we’re 5-0 in games where we don’t turn the ball over, 8-2 when we win or tie the turnover battle, and 1-5 when we lose the turnover battle. The Cowboys are an opportunistic defense that uses takeaways as their primary means of obtaining field position. The Niners are a run-heavy outfit that wants to play physical, complementary football. It is more likely than not that whoever wins the turnover battle in this game, wins the game itself.

Offensively, that means keeping on schedule in drives through incremental gains, minimizing losses, avoiding penalties, employing an efficient—even if not spectacular—passing game, and delivering a few well-timed play-action shots. And—of course—not turning the ball over.

Looking at you, Jimmy.

Misc.

  • People seem optimistic that Trent Williams will play. Needless to say, having the best offensive tackle in the game—whose PFF rating of 98.3 is (I think) the highest PFF rating ever for any position over an entire season—against a pair of talented defensive ends would be critical.

  • Trey Sermon was activated off IR on Tuesday, which was at least a little surprising. Elijah Mitchell was limited in practice this week, and there’s a chance the roster move was done in case Mitchell can’t go this weekend? But perhaps it was just to keep the running back room stocked in case we can make a run at things.

  • Tom Compton is currently ranked as PFF’s #4(!) overall tackle, based largely on his impeccable run blocking. That’s pretty generous, but Compton has done a great job of filling the “Mike Person on roids” role for us this year. He’s even better than Person in the run game and—after improving throughout the season—less of a liability in pass protection.

BONUS CATEGORY: The Thumb. Mike McCarthy, head coach of the Dallas Cowboys, looks like a thumb. You know it’s true, and now you can’t unsee it.

CONCLUSION

long live the run game (in all its forms) [Getty Images]

If you don’t love the Cowboys, you probably hate the Cowboys. And if you’re twenty-five or younger, you probably don’t know why anyone ever cared about the Cowboys in the first place. But despite the internet’s penchant for meme-ing the Boys, this is a more dangerous and complete squad than Dallas has fielded in quite some time. They’re balanced, talented, piloted by two top-flight coordinators, and certainly hungry to make some noise in the postseason. Soft schedule or not, it would be unwise to underestimate a team that was a Week 17 loss to the Cardinals away from genuinely vying for the #1 seed in the NFC.

If there’s anything we know for certain about this year’s 49ers, it’s that we have no idea what’s coming next. This isn’t the 2019 squad, which was a buzzsaw from the jump and was basically destined to win the NFC. Sometimes we come out slow, or shoot ourselves in the foot, or—in a few unfortunate cases—do both, but—to be perfectly clear—we have a very good football team. And we can hang with anyone when we’re on our game.

We are the NFL’s new (old) unicorn, a physical run game paired with a quick passing attack, and that’s a hard thing to prep for when no one else does it. If we can protect the ball, I think our grind-it-out style, punishing ground game, and successful maneuvering of countless “wtf” games this season make us a tough out for anyone and a particularly bad matchup for the Cowboys.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Ascending, Contending, or Pretending?

shrug emoji

Clinging onto our playoff hopes like… [49ers.com]

In Seattle, it rains nine months out of the year, games are required to end with goal-line stands, and quarterbacks 5-11 and under must be handled delicately with velvet gloves. On Sunday, as the unforced turnovers flowed like box wine at a college party, we were once again reminded—as if we needed it—that there is only one constant at (checks new sponsor) Lumen Field: never ever call defensive holding.

If there’s a constant to our 2021 season as a whole, it probably has something to do with pulling out our hair in frustration and making exasperated noises that are incomprehensible to most speaking adults. After the most Seahawks game that ever did Seahawk, we’re now 6-6 and—for all intents and purposes—battling six other teams for the final two wild card spots in the NFC. That’s right, we’re even summoning the number of the beast. Sunday was a bad loss for every reason imaginable but mostly because we now have little-to-no margin for error to make the playoffs. A win would have put us pretty comfortably into the six spot, with a chance to catch the Rams at the five. Now we’re in the muck.

Joining us in said muck are the…

  • Racial Slurs (6-6): They have the tiebreak over us and are currently in the six seed while in the midst of a four-game winning streak. This could be us. This could be us… They’ve got the Cowboys and the Eagles twice down the stretch. Of the teams listed, this one is playing the best.

  • Eagles (6-7): Half a game back and winners of three of four. Them playing the Slurs should help us one way or the other. They also play the Boys one more time. We have the tiebreak over them due to head-to-head.

  • Panthers (5-7): They play the Falcons and the Saints and then the Bucs twice to end the season. No one knows who their quarterback is. They only know they will suck.

  • Saints (5-7): Speaking of quarterbacks who suck… Despite a five-game slide, their remaining schedule only has one playoff team (Bucs) and they’re better coached than most of this crop. They could make a move.

  • Vikings (5-7): The second team on this list that we’d beat in the tiebreak cause of our head-to-head win, matchups against the Steelers, Bears (twice), Rams, and Packers, make for a tough schedule the rest of the way. Other than the Slurs, they’re probably the best team of this bunch but the Lions game may have doomed them.

  • Falcons (5-7): This team sucks and we play them at home in two weeks. If we lose to them, we—by the transitive property—also suck.

As you can see, there’s going to be a lot of cannibalization in that group, which is great for our chances. Unless one team from the NFC East and one team from the NFC South both go on a tear through the last five games, the playoffs are still very much in the picture.

Due to the top-heavy nature of the NFC, a team will most likely sneak into the post-season with a 9-8 record, but assuming that as fact—and that we’d win the ensuing tiebreak with our terrible divisional record—is a risky proposition. Our final five consists of two home games against absolute horrendous teams and then three road games against playoff squads. If we go 4-1 or better down the stretch, we are almost certainly in the playoff field. If we go 3-2, we need some things to fall our way but are probably still in. That means we need to beat two doormats and AT LEAST one playoff squad (preferably two) to have a shot. Any worse than that and we’d need a heavy dose of chaos.

As all who watched last weekend’s debacle can attest, chaos has not been friendly to us this year. So let’s just win some games plz?

Things were (are?) looking up Milhouse. Soured by our loss to the Seahawks—who only exist to play in excruciatingly close games they have no business being in—was the greatly improved play that had us on a three-game winning streak entering the weekend. A number of factors contributed to that turnaround—including the players’ only defensive meeting that Jimmie Ward helmed after the embarrassing loss to the Cardinals—but the biggest keys to our improved play centered around winning the turnover battle, a recommitment to the run game, and—up until Sunday—a highly efficient Garoppolo who was playing the best ball of his career.

While it seems simple, we’re 1-4 when losing the turnover battle, 1-2 when even, and 4-0 when we win the battle and/or don’t turn the ball over. As a physical team that likes to control the clock and lean on our run game, we’ve got less ability than most to get away with sloppy play, and it shows in our record.

On the ground, we’ve done a great job of deploying window dressing, misdirection, and creative formations and personnel sets to average 42 carries and 178 rushing yards through our three-game winning streak. Elijah Mitchell’s (mostly) healthy return has been clutch, as his vision, decisiveness, and elusiveness seem to improve with every passing week. 

Meanwhile, Jimmy G has performed exceptionally well on money downs and was PFF’s highest-rated quarterback through the month of November. In the five games since The Shit Show In the Storm (TM) against the Colts, Jimmy G led the league in EPA, DVOA, and (I think) QBR, while also leading the league in EPA and success rate on 3rd and 4th downs. While I’d guess his stinker in Seattle has dropped him down the leaderboard a bit, we’d found a nice balance of running the ball and letting Jimmy pick apart defenses on favorable downs and distances.

The question moving forward is if the Seahawks game is a sign of things to come or just a blip on the radar where everything went wrong while missing key parts? We’ll find out next week when we take on a Bengals team that—on top of being nearly as bipolar as us—could give our cornerbacks fits, especially since Emmanuel Moseley was diagnosed with a high-ankle sprain on Monday.

Doubling Down on Deebo. A recommitment to the run game means fewer passes to go around, so Shanahan has kept one of our best offensive weapons involved by getting Deebo the rock as a running back. 

With Deebo, the appeal is simple. He’s one of the best ball carriers and space players in the league and is routinely bigger, stronger, and faster than defenders realize. He is a freight train in the open field, only slowing momentarily to collect the souls of defensive backs before heading to the section of the field that has the big letters painted in it. But his insane efficiency in the run game—203 yards, 5 TDs, 8.1(!) ypc—is aided by how Shanahan creatively uses different formations, motions, and personnel groupings to create marginal advantages all over the field. 

One of the most interesting and most effective examples of this is when we deploy Deebo in the backfield with a true running back (usually Jeff Wilson) as a lead blocker to generate run game mismatches on every level.

Here we show up in 21 personnel, but—by putting Deebo in the backfield—we’re basically deploying two lead blocking backs as we run stretch lead.

Wilson goes in motion across the formation so that he can get a head start getting outside the box, while Kittle and Juice work the two edge linebackers.

Every time Deebo is in the backfield, we’re theoretically creating a blocking mismatch with a bigger body on a smaller one. In this instance, the big mismatch is Wilson (a physical running back) on a corner.

Deebo hits the edge, Wilson pancakes his dude into the safety, and the result is a 20-yard touchdown.

This time, we’re once again in 21 personnel but have spread Juice out wide to the formation’s offensive right. The Vikings aren’t buying that we’re looking to throw out of this formation so they keep their seven-man box, but now we’re modifying our edge blocking to leverage positioning and mismatches.

Wilson is once again pulling out onto a cornerback. Compton is pulling outside to the safety. And Juice (off-screen) is cracking down on the linebacker (59). So in two out of three blocks we have a massive size advantage, and in the third, Juice has a good angle. The one block that seems like a TERRIBLE matchup for us is Aiyuk sealing the defensive end. But due to the speed and outside aiming point of the play, Aiyuk only has to wall him from immediately getting outside and chasing Deebo from behind.

Even though Juice misses his block, Deebo does Deebo things, shaking a defensive end in space before accelerating up the field behind a horde of downfield blockers that almost resembles a screen.

Another DB gets ruined. 49 yards.

Against the Rams, we showed a similar look out of 11 personnel, spreading the field just enough for the Rams to deploy a six-man box with safeties creeping up. Unlike our stretch runs against the Vikings, the Rams game saw us pounding zone and split-zone in what was a more grind-it-out, downhill performance.

On this run, we’re running inside zone, but in a way that more resembles a “duo” concept. Wilson will once again go in motion to kick out the wide crashing stand-up DE, while Compton and Kittle will double-team the down lineman over the tackle. Because he’s Aaron Donald.

This play is meant to be a quick hitter, but—and this is the part that most resembles duo—Deebo is given the leeway to read second-level flow and bounce the run one way or the other if he sees fit.

Showcasing how truly rare of a talent he is, Deebo reads the second (and third) level flow as he gets the ball. Immediately, he recognizes that the unblocked run support player (Taylor Rapp, circled in blue) is taking an inside path to meet Deebo in the hole or cut off the path if he stays on the intended track. So Deebo makes one hard step frontside off the hand-off then bounces into the cutback outside of Tomlinson.

Rapp (blue arrow) gets caught inside, and Deebo bounces outside of the trailing defensive end, once again showing that he’s too fast for the big guys…

…and too big for the fast guys, easily stiff-arming the outside cornerback as he walks in for a touchdown.

That’s a good cut and run for a running back, much less your leading receiver. Lots of teams will trust their wideouts on a fly sweep or an end-around, where they can see an outside opening and simply sprint through it before it closes. What makes Deebo so rare is that he could actually be a running back in the NFL.

Despite missing the Seattle game with a groin injury, Deebo has already become just the third player in NFL history to record 1,000+ receiving yards and 5+ touchdowns receiving and rushing. He’s the only receiver ever to accomplish said feat. And he did it in 11 games.

The plus side of this is obvious. Deebo is awesome, he’s one of the funnest players to watch, and our offense is much more creative and harder to defend when he’s healthy. The downside is there is only one of him and, when he isn’t available, we lose a dimension of our offense that is near impossible to replace. 

Searching for The Mythical GaroppoLance. Entering the season, I was as guilty as anyone in hoping that we could run a two-quarterback system. If the Saints could do it with a sex criminal and the world’s most overpaid third-string tight end, I was sure we’d be able to bridge the gap between our present and future at quarterback. But I was greedy.

And—based on comments made by Shanahan in the week leading up to the Vikings—it doesn’t seem like the “Lance package” is coming back anytime soon.

“We get into a rhythm of attacking a defense and what fronts they’re playing, what coverages. Every play kind of plays off the next play and you get a feel, our players do and I, kind of what we’re going to …

“What’s been hard on me that I didn’t realize is when you do bring in a quarterback who gets a different set of plays, then it’s almost like it’s the first play I’ve been seeing of a new defense. Because now, yeah, you see what fronts and coverages they’re doing, but they’re doing it completely to a plan as a threat of a runner at the position. And so I don’t know what to anticipate with it. And then I’ve got to stay in it for a while to get a feel for that. And then when you go back, that feels kind off for the last guy.

“So it kind of hurts my rhythm a little bit of understanding what the defense is (doing) and that’s why personally as the year’s gone I’ve gotten a little bit more away from it. ‘Cause I like to get a feel for what the defense is doing.”

In short, Shanahan’s offense is sequential. Plays and formations and looks set up better plays and formations and looks, and every time we switch to quarterback B, we lose information on how to attack defenses with quarterback A. While the bulk of the worry about the two-quarterback system was if the signal-callers themselves would get out of rhythm coming in and out of the game (and, to be fair, Jimmy has played much better now that the Lance subpackage has been shelved), we’d underestimated how much the rotation could throw Shanahan out of rhythm as a play-caller. 

Does that hurt our ability to get Lance valuable reps as a rookie? Yes. Does it make the fourth-and-one where we ran a Jimmy G zone read against the Seahawks even more frustrating? Yes. But the Niners decided that they had to make a call on ONE quarterback who was going to lead them out of the bye week, and since the inexperienced rookie with the tantalizing upside had a knee sprain with a then-undetermined recovery timetable (he’d end up missing the bye plus at least one game due to injury), they went with the quarterback who they knew and who they knew would be healthy enough to play out of the break.

Now, if Lance had finished out that Arizona game healthy would that still be the case? At this point, that’s just another fascinating “what if” in a season that’s been full of them. But it doesn’t really matter now. Barring a string of performances similar to the one he had against Seattle—or a late-season stumble that eliminates us from the playoffs—Jimmy is likely our guy for the rest of the season, and we should be rooting for him to do as well as possible so that we can swap him for a draft pick come spring.

If only we could play ourselves on defense… Emmanuel Moseley has been a stud this season, stepping into the No.1 role after Verrett went down and allowing only a 47% completion rate while keeping wideouts out of the endzone on his past 51 straight targets. Now, he’s out with a high-ankle sprain. Considering the injury and the position he plays, that could easily mean he’s out the rest of the season.

If our starting cornerbacks weren’t already the worst in the league, they most certainly are now. Josh Norman mans one side cause he leads the league in forced fumbles. He also just happens to lead the league in crippling pass interference calls and (if this were a stat) times dusted deep down the field. I wanna say I remember him making one good play at the catch point this season, but I couldn’t tell you when that was, and I only remember it because it was such an outlier from the mean.

Opposite him will probably be Dontae Johnson, who honestly could have replaced Norman weeks ago if he hadn’t run into his own nagging injuries and wasn’t needed in the slot while K’Waun was out. He’s played solid in limited reps. Perhaps with an increase in snaps he can maintain that rate of play. Perhaps he can’t. But did you read the thing I just wrote about Norman? As long as Dontae’s a warm body that can contest the occasional go route, he’ll see plenty of play moving forward.

As for our rookies, things are just moving a bit too fast for them at the moment. Thomas has the athleticism and top-end speed to develop into a starter, but he needed a transition year after opting out of last season and only being a one-year starter in college. He’s just not seeing things quickly enough and has been living in the trail technique in the limited snaps he’s seen. Deommodore Lenoir has more of a chance to pull a starting spot away from one of the veterans above, but he’s smaller and less athletic than Thomas and—whether he’s breaking on short passes or covering deep down the field—he seems just a step too slow. Both have potential down the road. But for now, teams are gonna dump the ball underneath them in off coverage and target them deep whenever they press. We’ve seen it in garbage time. We saw it last weekend against the Seahawks. If the rookies get major snaps moving forward, we’ll see it some more.

That said, it’s probably still worth giving them some run here and there. That’s how bad our cornerback situation is. So bad that it might wind up the nail in the coffin of our playoff hopes.

Special, but not in the way you want. Our special teams have been about as bad as possible. So much so that you could make the very legitimate argument that our special teams units ALONE have lost us AT LEAST two games this season. Or you don’t have to make the argument because, according to David Lombardi of The Athletic, advanced stats can for you:

But the 49ers’ total lack of awareness on special teams doesn’t enjoy the benefit of the doubt this time, not when we consider how Seattle won, 28-21, back in the first meeting. The 49ers’ special teams accounted for a staggering negative-14.3 expected points in that game. That was the losing difference. Coordinator Richard Hightower’s unit also nearly blew last week’s game against Minnesota, losing 6.1 expected points in a tight contest.

Last weekend, a missed extra point, a fumbled kick return, and the most successful fake punt of all time would be the difference in yet another disappointing loss to our division rivals.

I get that every time an offensive or defensive player goes down, a special teams unit loses another dude to promotion up the depth chart and that keeping a rotating crop of bench players and practice squadders in lockstep is a tall task. But our inadequacy in this department has gotten out of control, and we’ve been paying for it dearly.

It gets the people going. Lance will take over next year. We’ll (theoretically) address the cornerback position in the off-season. But the biggest thing stopping us from being a Tier 2 or better team is consistency. We know when we play our best we can compete with the best. But how in the world can we stop playing our worst so regularly? If we can’t figure that out, we’ll never be a legitimate contender. At least not for the long haul.

Right now, it’s nearly impossible to predict how we’re going to look on any given week. When we play clean—without turnovers and a slew of penalties and mistakes—we look like a team that can do real damage in the playoffs. When we don’t, the wheels fall off. While I do believe the changes we made mid-season will result in more consistent play moving forward, we may have dug a hole so deep that it doesn’t matter. We’re down our best two players at our thinnest position and everyone in our remaining schedule knows that. If there’s a time to circle the wagons, it’s now. Otherwise, we’ll be looking at back-to-back seasons missing the playoffs, and this year—unlike in 2020—we’d have no good excuse as to why.

Go Niners 👍🏈

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Mid-Season Breakdown

Not to be confused with the mental breakdowns that come every Sunday

Can we win a game here plz? [Karl Mondon/Bay Area News Group]

We are (about) halfway through the season now, and—while a top-heavy NFC and a seventh playoff spot make a post-season push still well within the realm of possibility—it’s hard to imagine our squad in its current form doing much of note if given the opportunity.

Considering our expectations entering the year, our current 3-5 record—and the way in which we’ve gotten there—has been quite the shocker. So what’s gone wrong? And is there any hope to salvage this season?

Below are six reasons why we’re currently tied for last in the NFC West and five things to look for in the back half of the season.

6 SIGNS OF SADNESS

Brain Drain. We’ve had some excellent coaches come through here in the past few years, and we may be starting to feel the effects of just how many of them we’ve lost. Both the success of our own coaches (Saleh in particular) and the spread of Shanahan’s scheme across the league have made our staff ripe for the poaching.

Saleh is a clear upgrade over Ryans. The latter could get there eventually, but there’s a reason every team with a head coach opening wanted to talk to Saleh last spring. Not only did he excel at film study and scheming to team’s tendencies, but he was also the emotional hype man of the coaching staff, and—in a season in which we’ve been maddeningly inconsistent—losing that high-energy presence shouldn’t be underestimated.

Saleh took Mike LaFleur, John Benton (OL), and Tony Oden (DBs). Oden’s departure was the second straight DB coach to last only one year in SF, with Joe Woods—architect of the drastic turnaround in our secondary during the Super Bowl run—leaving for the Browns the year before. While it’s hard to make any judgment calls on their replacement, Cory Undlin, particularly in a year when our secondary has been ravaged by injuries on all levels, it’s not a stretch of the imagination that we’d be a bit more secure in that area under Woods or Oden. Woods had the benefit of a generational pass rush as he shaped our secondary, but has done good work in Cleveland since leaving. While Oden dealt with seven different starters at cornerback, but still patched things together to help us to a top 5 passing defense in 2020.

Former quarterback coach Shane Day left for a QB coach/passing game coordinator promotion with the Chargers. Johnny Holland had to step down just before the season due to a re-emergence of cancer—meaning the linebackers lost both their position coaches after Ryans was promoted. This isn’t to say our new coaches aren’t good or don’t have bright futures, but some of them—like Ryans—will need some time to settle into peak coaching form, and there are always growing pains with large-scale staff turnover.

Injuries at our deepest positions. In true Niners fashion, even our two deepest position groups have been wrecked by injuries. And that’s led to major issues on the field. 

We already talked about how our string of running back injuries derailed offensive continuity in the first quarter of the season. We not only drafted two running backs this year but released a perfectly capable backup on cutdown day simply because we ran out of roster space. That depth dried up quickly, even if it’s (knock on wood) getting healthier by the day.

Just as impactful—if not more—have been our injuries along the interior defensive line. Excluding Armstead, who is more of a defensive end, we entered the season with five seemingly capable interior linemen (and another on the PUP list preparing for an early-season return). Now, it’s a position of weakness. 

While Kinlaw hasn’t developed into the pass rusher we’d hoped, he’s been a vital piece against the run. In games that he’s played, we’ve allowed 86 yards rushing to backs and receivers. In games that he hasn’t, we’ve allowed 110.

Kevin Givens went down early this year and has only now been rotating back in, but his play isn’t up to the level that we’d grown to expect given his two-year upward trajectory. Part of that could be lingering injuries. Part could be that he’s at his best when paired beside a space-eater so that he can really operate as a one-gap penetrator. Kentavius Street hasn’t taken a major step forward. Him, Givens, and the now-released Zach Kerr have had their issues getting washed out against the run. The new guy (Charles Omenihu) was a nice value trade, but he’s more of an Armstead type. Giving him snaps inside as a situational pass rusher isn’t going to help our run defense.

DJ Jones has been his usual reliable self, but when he gets dinged up and has to come off the field, we really feel it. On the second level, the return of Dre Greenlaw—who has been a remarkably consistent tackler through his short career—should help against the run. But maybe our best hope to bolster our front-line (other than Jones staying healthy) is a speedy return from Maurice Hurst, who was very disruptive against the run in the two games he’s played in this year. Unfortunately, those games have been bookended by injuries. Any way you look at it, our interior DL has underperformed.

The Snowball Effect. Let’s try and chart our defensive philosophy and approach through DeMeco Ryans’ up-and-down first season as DC.

We go through the pre-season expecting to play more man coverage and blitz more because of the strength of our STARTING cornerbacks and the fact that we need an added pass rush boost upfront. Verrett goes down in week one, which makes us bring in aging veterans Josh Norman and Dre Kirkpatrick to fill his void.

Still lacking an ideal pass rush, we continue to be aggressive and run more man, and we even have some success in doing so—like against the Eagles and in a stellar first outing against the Cardinals. But our historically bad pass interference rate on deep balls pulls us away from that. Although even when we play zone, receivers eat up our cushion in a hurry and force one-on-one jump balls down the field, a strategy that reaches peak frustration during the rain-soaked Sunday night shitshow in which seemingly every Colts scoring drive was buoyed by a deep shot penalty that set up a first-and-goal.

So against the Bears, a team that—in contrast to everything Matt Nagy stands for—had started slinging the ball down the field to cater to its rookie quarterback’s strengths, we began deploying huge cushions underneath. We’d been absolutely devastated by deep ball pass interference calls for a month straight, so the mentality shifts to allowing underneath passes and rallying up to them. The result was Justin Fields’ most productive game as a starter. Then, last week—against a team who wants nothing more than to dink-and-dunk you to death in the short game—the same general game plan led to one of our more embarrassing defensive displays of the past three years. Afraid of being toasted deep by the Cardinals backups—and rightfully worried about our replacement safeties having to play man coverage against speedy slot players like Rondale Moore—we allowed the Cardinals to do nothing but complete short passes then eviscerate us on yards after the catch. If you think that’s an exaggeration, we’ve missed 10+ tackles in both of the past two games, and last week, Colt McCoy’s average depth of completion was a “laughable-if-it-hadn’t-worked” 3.5 yards down the field.

Through eight games, Ryans has had his good moments and his bad moments. Injuries have put him in some unenviable positions, but you only have to look to last year to see what an elite DC can do to adapt to those problems. At the moment, I don’t think Ryans’ job is in jeopardy because of three games post-bye. But for our sake, we have to hope his adjustment period speeds up and he finds some answers despite our depleted secondary.

Who should know better, more? The 33-year-old corner or the 42-year-old coach? [Kyle Terada-USA Today Sports]

Leading the league in backbreaking plays. We know about the penalties. Despite playing soft the past two weeks in an attempt to discourage the deep ball we—unsurprisingly—still lead the league in defensive penalty yardage, pass interference penalties, and pass interference yardage (and pass interferences declined because they resulted in catches anyways). And that’s having played one less game than most teams. Many of these penalties have been on deep balls and many have come on third downs. Needless to say, these are backbreakers. 

But if it seems like our penalties are more backbreaking than most, that would be because they statistically are. We’ve had 17 defensive penalties that have resulted in automatic first downs, which is (only) fourth-worst in the league (although two of the teams ahead of us haven’t had their bye weeks yet), but we’re the single worst team on third down, third and long, and “desperation” situations.

While penalties can be backbreaking, nearly all turnovers are. When it comes to our turnover differential, the 49ers sit at -9, which is tied for second-to-last in the NFL with the Jaguars and the Chiefs—who have eked their way to 5-4 on the back of close wins over the Giants and Jordan Love making his first career start. Offensively, we cough up the ball too much and often in crucial situations—like the two fumbles last weekend while we were dicing them on offense. Defensively, we just don’t generate takeaways. This is obviously a stat that is the result of multiple different things going wrong, but it’s also a great way for a good team to lose more games than they should and a bad team to stay afloat.

All this at least provides a numerical explanation for why our advanced efficiency metrics are shockingly strong—9th overall in DVOA, 6th in Offense, and 17th in Defense—and calculate that we should have 5+ wins on the season despite our on-field results inverting that projection.

Our counterpunch lacks knockout power. Every good defense knows that our bread-and-butter is the outside run game. To make sure teams can’t cheat too heavily to stop that, we like to deploy our quick game between the hashes and take play-action shots over the top. 

The problem is that teams no longer care if we’re completing a ton of 8-to-12-yard passes underneath because they’ve realized that (A) they’d rather allow that than be bludgeoned by 5-to-10-yard gains on the ground and (B) when they load the box against the run, they’re also creating tighter passing windows for our quick game because we so often throw inside. In essence, they’re killing two birds with one stone—selling out against the run while simultaneously shrinking our strike zone on the slants and in-breakers that Shanahan likes to employ because of how many bodies they have crammed in the box. And so far, our quick game counterpunch hasn’t been effective or explosive enough to get teams away from this strategy.

But wasn’t that basically our offense in 2019? Now we have a re-emerging Brandon Aiyuk, and a third-year Deebo, and Jimmy G, who—by many measures—is actually playing better than he did during that Super Bowl run? If anything, shouldn’t we have fewer issues?

The biggest difference between then and now is that teams are fully committing to that defensive strategy and have become so aggressive with their box alignments that it’s difficult to get the ball onto the perimeter with the stretch run handoffs that set up our play-action game. By lining stand-up defensive ends far outside our tackles and tight ends, putting down linemen outside shade of everything, and utilizing aggressive slanting, we’ve often been forced to resort to relying on crack tosses—condensed splits from wideouts and quick pitches to the running back—to get the ball outside faster than on a normal handoff. While that’s led to plenty of decent gains on the ground, pitches are terrible for play-action purposes and open up fewer cut-back opportunities for our backs.

Part of the benefit of our outside run game is that it stretches the defense horizontally for our play-action game behind it. That’s why we so often spring wide-open crossers going against the flow of the play. Or we used to. But you can’t really do that when you have to rely so heavily on pitches to outflank the defense. Pitches also allow the defense to see run immediately, which means the linebackers and other second-level defenders can fast flow towards the outside gaps without the threat of being punished backside or over the top.

That isn’t to say we should never be running pitches. After all, some variation of crack toss was behind most if not all of our explosive runs in the past two games, but a heavy reliance on tosses means a less effective play-action game. And since our play-action game is basically the only way that we can threaten teams deep, leaning on the crack toss means we’re forced to choose between running more effectively into loaded boxes or forcing defenses out of those loaded boxes in the first place.

Unfortunately, this once again comes down to some combination of Jimmy G’s talents and what Shanahan is comfortable calling while he’s under center. Teams know we won’t drop back and throw the ball outside the hashes or deep down the field. They know that our deep ball comes off of play-action, which is at its best when we can show stretch looks to create more space horizontally on crossing routes. So they choose to commit fully to stopping our #1 threat, the outside running game, knowing that in doing so they’re slowing down our second threat as well and—when they get us out of our play-action game—our third threat on top of that. Right now, the primary difference between us and the currently-more-successful Rams and Packers’ offenses, is that opposing teams know those offenses can drop back and dice them in the passing game if they load up against the run. Currently, we can’t do that. And until we can, teams will continue to force us out of the stretch handoffs. 

That doesn’t mean the rest of 2021 (or however long Jimmy G is our quarterback) is hopeless. Despite all the issues, our offensive metrics are still high. In that hideous game against the Colts, one of the bright spots was how well we ran the ball with our split blocking in the backfield. In a non-monsoon, the offense could have had quite a performance that night. And even though it feels like ages ago, we’re less than two weeks removed from absolutely gashing a strong Bears defense, in part because Jimmy was able to hit a deep pass or two over the top and pull their safeties out of the box. But at the moment, when teams sell out against the run, we have to be playing flawlessly to string together long drives via our intermediate passing game while threading the ball between underneath defenders. And whether it’s drops or penalties or—in the last game—backbreaking fumbles, we haven’t executed nearly well enough to keep those drives alive.

Reactive versus proactive roster building. There is no such thing as a “luxury pick” in the NFL. As a hard salary-cap league with large rosters and a rookie pay scale that keeps young players’ pay rates artificially deflated, the best teams remain consistently competitive by choosing to make roster decisions ahead of when they have to make them. In other words, they fill holes on the backend of their roster in the present before they become problems in the future. The Niners, in two specific positions that they’ve had issues at for years, have failed to fill those holes, and the entire team has suffered because of it.

After Chris Jones annihilated our interior OL in the 2019 Super Bowl, we knew that we had to improve our interior pass protection. At right guard, Mike Person was a stellar run blocker, but he had issues in pass protection. Ben Garland, our backup center, was much the same. That off-season, we hoped that Weston Richburg would return healthy at center and that star swingman Daniel Brunskill would take over right guard duties. But instead of adding a starter-level player or a promising young developmental prospect at either position—whether to start now or later or even just to push the incumbent—we brought in elder veteran Tom Compton and fifth-round pick Colton McKivitz, who many considered a reach on the interior due to his lack of ideal movement skills. Richburg never played another down of professional football, we had a new center every week, and McKivitz is currently on the practice squad.

With our interior still a mess this off-season, we added Alex Mack—who has played well and given a big boost to our pass protection but is also 36 years old—and second rounder Aaron Banks, who—like McKivitz and Skule before him—scouts considered a bit of a reach while questioning his movement skills in our system. After missing much of the preseason due to injury, Banks has yet to take meaningful snaps in a game. While it’s far too early to write him off, we clearly took him where we did with the expectation that he’d be a starter by now. If we’d properly addressed the position the year before, he wouldn’t have to (or wouldn’t have been picked in the first place). 

Moving forward, we’re about to see an additional ripple effect from all this, and it may not be pretty. If Banks was comfortably starting, or if we’d added playable interior depth this year or the year before, or if we’d moved on from Shon Coleman years ago when it was clear he wasn’t going to contribute, then maybe we’d be more confident in how we’re going to patch up the giant hole at right tackle that now exists due to Mike McGlinchey’s season-ending quad injury. For all the shit McGlinchey gets on social media, he has steadily improved after a tough start to the season and was really rounding into shape as a strong two-way tackle when he went down against the Cardinals. After his injury, we got absolutely abused along the right side of the line, with his replacement (Compton) and Brunskill acting as turnstiles for Cardinals defenders. It seems clear that Brunskill is not only at his best as a swing substitute, but could be best outside—where he had lots of success on both sides of the line during our Super Bowl run. If Banks (or someone else) were ready on the interior, perhaps shifting Brunskill outside would be the best move to patch up our OL. But now, our best hope may be playing a promising rookie who has taken mostly (if not entirely) snaps on the left side of the line up until this point. 

Similarly, cornerback has been an area of concern for at least the past three off-seasons. Ahkello Witherspoon’s brutal sophomore season meant we entered the 2019 draft with a still-recovering Richard Sherman and giant question marks opposite him. Hoping that Witherspoon would rebound, we took a low-risk flyer on Jason Verrett and added the injury-prone Tim Harris in the sixth round. Witherspoon fired out of the gates, and—after he went down to injury and came back a shell of his former self—we struck gold with the emergence of Emmanuel Moseley opposite Sherman. But entering the 2020 off-season, the cornerback position looked like a UDFA with half-a-season of good play under his belt and two aging and injury-riddled veterans (one who hadn’t played in three years) across from him. Yet we didn’t address the position at all through free agency or the draft. In fact, the biggest cornerback move we made was letting DJ Reed go to waivers during training camp. He was promptly swooped up by the Seahawks and has started 16 games for them since.

When Sherman went down in week one last year, we again struck gold with the re-emergence of a finally healthy Jason Verrett, who—against all odds—returned to a Pro Bowl form that let us play more man coverage and blitz to offset our many defensive injuries. But entering this past off-season, with Sherman’s play dropping and his injuries accumulating and Spoon off to the Seahawks (and then the Steelers), we found ourselves with Moseley and Verrett—a top-level corner who has missed about half of his career to devastating injuries. Once again, we had injury concerns with our starters and question marks behind them. We didn’t add anyone in free agency, choosing to address the position in the draft, but we waited until the end of the third round—at the tail of the run on defensive backs—to take a player who had opted out of last year’s COVID season and was seen by most as a 2022 contributor rather than a 2021 one. Then a fifth-rounder.

Once again, in the first week of the season, Verrett went down. With Moseley already dinged up, that left us with a fifth-round rookie and veteran journeymen at one of the most important positions in football. Anyone who has watched us play this year knows how that’s gone.

I fully believe in drafting for value over need, but—just like anything else—it’s a balancing act. A pick like Nick Bosa or Deebo Samuel—a high-level selection used on a high-level player at a position of need, is obviously the dream—but that’s not always possible. The best teams stay strong year-to-year by hoarding mid-round picks to accumulate depth and patch up roster holes ahead of time before they become massive problems down the road. Because when your team’s weak spot becomes a hole and then a genuine problem—as we have at cornerback or on the right side of our offensive line—there’s no hiding it (or fixing it mid-season) in the NFL. And that’s what we’re seeing this season.

Either of these guys doing dope shit would help [Getty Images]

5 KEYS FOR THE SECOND HALF

Shanahan and Lynch aren’t going anywhere. The calls for their heads have grown loud since the bye week, but that’s not happening. Nor should it. Despite mistakes in the draft and our woefully disappointing first half of 2021, we just traded three first-round picks for a quarterback who Shanahan hand-picked with the intent of sitting his entire rookie year. Now that Shanahan finally has his quarterback—one who is dripping with physical tools and potential—why would we boot him to the curb in lieu of a new coach who may not like our new QB, or lacks the ability to build an offense around him, or wants to rebuild the team in their image with all the first-round picks we no longer have?

We’ve got a lot of high-end talent and should be performing better than we have. And if we flop next year and are looking at three straight years out of contention despite said talent, then we can start looking at making moves up top. But until then, understand that we’re less than halfway through the season and are only ONE GAME out of the final playoff spot. Things could get much worse and are far from unfixable.

Play the young bloods. It’s one thing to let Trey Lance sit for the majority of his rookie season. We’re already all-in on him as the future. If he sucks, we suck. That’s the deal we made. But guys like Aaron Banks and—now that McGlinchey has gone down—Jaylon Moore need to see the field at some point this year. Same with some combination of Deommodore Lenoir and Ambry Thomas. Because, even if they’re not totally ready, we need to know what we have in these players so that we know how to approach free agency and the draft.

Part of the reason we’re in this situation in the first place is that we’ve been overly optimistic with our self-scouting. Whether that’s with injuries (Tim Harris, Jalen Hurd) or talent level (McKivitz, Skule) or simply valuing aging veterans over their younger, greener counterparts (Compton), we need to make sure we don’t repeat those same mistakes as we enter a crucial 2022 off-season. The worst possible outcome is that we enter next year as we did this one—unrealistically optimistic about our ability and health in crucial positions and then struggling through the year for patchwork options to offset our suspect depth. 

With few draft picks and little cap room, every personnel decision is going to matter more. I’m not saying we throw in the towel and give up on the season (once again, we’re one game out of the playoffs), but we gotta see what we have from our latest draft class.

Have successful knee surgeries. Jason Verrett. Raheem Mostert. Javon Kinlaw. Things would look a tad different if we had even one of them healthy this year. With Verrett, the future is very cloudy. He’s on a one-year deal, has a long history of knee injuries, and it’s too early to know how successful the surgery has been or what his timetable for return might be. But despite also having lengthy injury histories, the other two present a bit more hope.

Both Mostert and Kinlaw were shut down and opted for surgery because they believed that going under the knife was the best way to eliminate the lingering knee issues they’ve had over the past two years. Bite the bullet now for the promise of better long-term health. Will that be true? Who knows. And Mostert at least is in the last year of his contract.

But if both guys can come back truly healthy (and with surgically repaired knees that are more likely to stay that way), that’s a huge boost for our future prospects.

Maximize QB return. This could mean a lot of things, but for the remainder of the season, our goal for the quarterback position isn’t just “win as many games as possible.” Obviously, that is important. The growing “throw-in-the-towel” crowd really needs to look at how detrimental that can be to a group of talented veterans and how ineffective that is when you don’t have your next two first-round picks. But our unique quarterback room means we have other priorities as well.

Obviously, we want Lance to be put into the best position to succeed next year and in the years after that. Whether that means he should play sooner or later is up for interpretation. If anything, Mahomes’ significant drop in play this season lends credence to the idea of sitting Lance for most (if not all) of the year. Mahomes has been way too aggressive and has been forcing ad-libbed plays out of the structure of the offense—in part because he’d gotten away with all of those “oh my god Mahomes is the best” throws in the past. But variance has caught up to him. And while I’d still build a squad around Mahomes before most, his current slump really points to how much he could have flopped if he hadn’t sat for a year behind one of the smartest, most professional, and most risk-averse veteran quarterbacks in the league.

I’m not saying we should or shouldn’t start Lance (although I would like to see him in subpackage work). I’ve already had my say on that, and I have to have faith that the coaching staff knows what he can do right now and is doing what’s best for his development. But the “do everything off-structure, it’s way better” crowd has certainly taken a hit this year. The ability to extend plays and create positives out of would-be negatives will always be effective, and it is part of the massive allure of Lance, but if anything this year has once again confirmed that you need to win within the structure of an offense before you can think about making plays outside of it. Otherwise, you dig yourself into a hole that’s hard to dig out of.

The other side of this coin is Jimmy Garoppolo. Part of the inherent value of the Trey Lance trade is in what we can get in return for Jimmy. And with so many of our high picks now gone, the higher the draft pick compensation the better. At the moment, I’m not sure what (if anything) he’d get on the trade market. Large QB classes in the past few years mean most teams have established or young quarterbacks on their rosters, and Jimmy has been good but not great. But if he does hold off Lance through the rest of this year and helps the Niners surge into the playoffs, we could be looking at the kind of second-day draft pick compensation that we desperately need to offset what we gave up to pick Lance. It’s far from unreasonable to think that someone like the Panthers, Steelers, Packers (post-Rodgers), Racial Slurs, or Browns(?) could see value in acquiring Jimmy G in the off-season. But only if he finishes the season strong and healthy.

If you love something, you set it free. If there’s one silver lining to this year, it’s (hopefully) that Shanahan and Lynch can finally let 2019 go. It was a great run cut short by some knocked-down passes and the complete inability for anyone to call a hold. In 2020, when we returned nearly all our team, it made sense to try and run it back. Even this year, when the COVID cap and injuries the year before depreciated the value of many of our veteran players, it made sense to believe that—if we could only avoid repeating as one of the single most injury-riddled teams in the past two decades—we could rekindle some of that Super Bowl run magic. But our commitment to the status quo for the past two years has hampered our continued evolution both schematically and as a team.  

The fact of the matter is that we’re old at some critical positions, and our commitment to sticking with those veterans means we haven’t properly developed the talent behind them. We once again will have a lot of free agents at the end of the year and big extensions looming in the near future for Nick Bosa and Deebo Samuel. That means making hard decisions elsewhere and letting go of some players that you like while accumulating value through the backend roster turnover required of teams that want to become perennial contenders. 

It also means changing things up schematically to match our ascending talent, opening up offensively to match the changing way games are officiated and keeping an open mind to what needs to change for us to take that next step forward. In short, by finally letting 2019 go, we free ourselves to make the evolution needed to contend again.

Go Niners 👍🏈

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