Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 24, Rams 27

bad, v bad

Last week’s loss was a complicated mess of factors against an ascending team. This one was just a bed shitting. 

In a game that felt like a classic Seahawks tilt from the jump—where the other team hangs around too long and a game that never should have been a game becomes one late—we arrived as the much better squad and looked it for the majority of the contest. But game flow issues, limited possessions, horrendous special teams, and massive execution issues down the stretch led to a truly pathetic giveaway. Our schedule is weeks from getting into its toughest stretch. This was not a game we could afford to lose.

Breaking Backs. For the second straight week, the swing plays killed us. If you wanna see how a team that racks up 425 yards of offense on 6.5 ypp can struggle to shut the door when they’re moving the ball steadily all day, look at the six drops, the soft holding call in the fourth quarter on a five-yard first down run that took us out of field goal range, or the massive miscues on special teams.

Football has never been a game about who dominates the largest majority of plays because so many of those plays are just set-ups for the critical moments that truly dictate the game. Chances to extend or steal possessions. Scoring opportunities on offense and defense. Losing a game like this means faltering in those moments, and we did exactly that in all three phases. On offense, it was mostly drops. On defense and special teams, it was unfortunately everything.

On the bright side, we’ve been here before—flailing early in a season and giving up games to lesser opponents—only to turn things around with massive win streaks and deep post-season runs down the stretch. But that doesn’t make it easier to stomach in the moment. And those seasons were brutally dramatic. So while we shouldn’t be anywhere close to writing off these Niners and their long-term goals, we should brace ourselves for a stressful season.

OFFENSE

The game plan was sound from the jump. Since the Rams are a quarters-dominant defense, we wanted to pound the rock and chip away in the passing game with intermediate routes. But accomplishing this required consistent execution, and–with three stars out on offense–our overall performance hinged largely on which of our lesser-used skill players would step up and which would falter.

Highs and Lows. Blowing past the expectations of even the most ardent Jauan Jennings stan, our bully ball receiver posted career highs across the board–dominating to the tune of 11 catches for 175 yards and 3 touchdowns. Some of those catches were more impressive than others…

…but all of them were desperately needed in a game where few other receivers stepped up.

Brandon Aiyuk was once again out-of-sorts with Purdy, dropping two balls–one a third down killer on a drive that could have broken the game open in the first half–and often struggling to get on the same page on timing routes. Meanwhile, Ronnie Bell tallied three drops, including a back-breaker on our last offensive drive which would have likely sealed a victory. In the post-game presser, Shanahan politely alluded to the idea that rookie Jacob Cowing was still grasping the offense (aka, he doesn’t know the whole playbook). Well, he’d better learn quick. Cause we’ve seen enough to know what Bell is and what he’s not. He seems like a hard worker and a good practice player, but once a roster spot has to open for Ricky Pearsall’s return from the PUP list, it would be surprising if Ronnie Bell were still on the active roster.

OL Stock Watch. Trent Williams has yet to round into the “destroyer of worlds” form we’ve come to expect from him, but he’s still playing at a very high level. Beside him, Banks has been consistently solid. Puni has taken some rookie lumps, but the arrow is still sky-high in his projections. And he’s not exactly being helped by the guys he’s paired with.

Any hope that McKivitz’s relatively strong finish to last year would roll over into this season has proved unfounded. His run blocking has improved, but he still paces our team in pressures allowed, and his whiff in pass pro directly led to Purdy’s fumble against the Rams. Meanwhile, Jake Brendel has joined him in receiving at least one absolute ass-beating in pass pro per game. Our 32-year-old center took a big step back in pass pro last season and he’s unfortunately still trending in that direction. The game against the Rams wasn’t as alarming as his first two contests but—after more than doubling his number of pressures allowed from 2022 to 2023—he’s currently on track to set another career-worst mark.

This is where it would be nice to have any young talent whatsoever at tackle or the point position. At tackle, we have Jaylon Moore and that’s about it. One injury puts us in a tough position. Two means we’re calling dudes off the street.

While at center, Drake Nugent is intriguing—as far as an undrafted free agent rookie on the practice squad can be intriguing—but certainly shouldn’t be playing any snaps this year. The same could have been said for Jarrett Kingston, even if his size and athleticism projected better before he got poached by the Panthers. Personally, I’d have rather kept Kingston than our current backup center, Nick Zakelj, who seems destined to follow in the footsteps of the Justin Skules before him—hanging around on the roster due to his intelligence, blocking more promising prospects, and never having the athleticism to ever give us valuable snaps. If things get really bad for Brendel, maybe the stopgap solution is Jon Feliciano, who likely has a claim to being one of our top five linemen once he returns from injury. But the most likely scenario is Brendel and McKivitz remain our starters at C and RT, pass pro issues be damned.

Purdy Good Though. The silver lining of this thoroughly messy start to the season is that Purdy–despite lesser stats than last year–has taken a sizable step forward in his play. His pocket presence is better, the out-of-structure plays he flashed have become a more regular (and more impressive) occurrence, and his accuracy and reads have gotten much more consistent. Yes, he had one fumble and missed the read on the shot play to Aiyuk that could have flipped this game in our favor, but the fumble was more of a McKivitz issue than a Purdy one, and Purdy created much more yardage out of structure than he missed within it.

Since his emergence, the constant knock on Purdy has been “Well, what would he do without all that talent around him?” Sunday, while playing without three All-Pros on offense, with his highly-paid receiver in a middling rut, and with only one guy consistently getting open and catching the ball, Purdy extended plays, rushed for 32 yards, and threw three tugs and only eight incomplete passes despite six drops. Sure, at least one of those drops was wiped away due to penalty, but Purdy kept us in the game. He’s taken the next step. If we can get healthy and clean up the execution elsewhere, our offense should be fine.

Through three up-and-down games, we’re third in yardage, fourth in yards per play, and seventh in scoring. Lots to clean up, and it would be nice to do so sooner rather than later, but I’m not particularly worried about our offense long-term.

DEFENSE

For now, I am stressing patience because it’s still early. But the second half of this contest was another L for Sorensen. Some hiccups from the offense were expected with so much talent missing, but we just allowed an undermanned Rams team to score on their last four straight possessions. Just three weeks into the season, opposing offenses have targeted the weak spots in our defense, and we’ve been happy to let them. Things will only get harder with the surprising news that Javon Hargrave—fresh off his best game of the season—is now out for the season (or at least the regular season) with a torn triceps.

Connectivity Problems. The one thing no one can argue about the short-lived Steve Wilks era is that he got excellent play from our secondary. So far, things have been much looser this year, whether that’s our coverage (Yiadom) or our communication. I didn’t notice nearly as many communication breakdowns this week, but it’s not a good sign how much separation this depleted crop of Rams receivers was able to generate when it mattered most. 

Tutu Atwell and Demarcus Robinson, two absolute randos deep on the Rams receiver depth chart, combined for 125 yards receiving against a fully healthy secondary. If that’s the sort of performance we can look forward to, what happens when we play a good receiver corps?

Where’s the rat? One of the major inflection points of the DeMeco Ryans DC era was when he started deploying Fred Warner in mug looks on critical downs, putting our star linebacker into the A gap on the line of scrimmage, forcing the OL into one-on-one looks against our pass rush, and then dropping Warner into coverage where he could take away anything across the middle. Sorensen has started to lean on something kind of similar, but the scheme behind those looks has changed and the execution has left much to be desired.

Here the Rams are facing a 3rd-and-8 in the first half.

We’re in a Cover 1 with Huf helping on anything deep. We’ve lined up six men on the line of scrimmage and four defenders to the weak side of the formation to force the OL to open their pass pro to the defensive left. The plan is to have our two tackles slant weak, occupy (hopefully) three linemen, and loop Floyd inside. Warner is rushing as well. Dee Winters (in yellow) is also looping across, but my guess is he’s on an adaptive loop path where he’ll bail off the rush and match up with the running back if he releases on a route.

This isn’t inherently unsound, but situationally, I have some issues. The Rams (and the Vikings last week) LOVE crossing routes, which inherently play to the weaknesses of this coverage. On third downs like these, our expectation should be a crossing route and our call should be one that understands that and has a defender patrolling the area. This is only exacerbated by the loss of Kupp and Nacua and the limitations of their remaining receivers.

Tutu Atwell—who is lined up in the slot—is a 5’9 155 pound wide receiver who ran a 4.39 at his pro day. That alone should tell you exactly what he runs. Deep routes and crossers. That’s what he ran against us on Sunday…

…and that’s what he’s running against us on this third down.

Stafford sees we’re in man coverage, checks the play at the line of scrimmage, motions Tutu Atwell into a bunch formation, and runs a full man-beater concept. The vertical man acts as a rub for the angle route, the crosser is out-leveraged by the late motion, and the return to the solo side is the fallback in case nothing else works.

It’s one thing to lose the rock-paper-scissors battle of playcalling. That happens to everyone. But we’re beat in multiple ways before the ball’s even snapped because we’re trotting out a defense whose greatest weakness is one of their single most common concepts. And we’re showing it pre-snap.

Not to mention, this kinda misses the point of why we went to those mug looks in the first place. Half the reason they work is because Warner is the best coverage linebacker in football. He can line up over the center on the line of scrimmage but is still fast enough to take away a wideout on a deep crosser. He’s the only person in the world who can do that. Use it. Drop him back and take out their crosser. Or have Dee Winters take a bluff rush step then drop back into the hole with eyes towards the first threat from the trips side.

Warner’s a strong pass rusher, and you gotta send him sometimes in these looks just to keep the offense honest. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Either deploy a defense that matches up against what they wanna do most or bluff them one way or another. We’re making it too easy.

Hard Targets. In Sorensen’s defense, everything he does is limited by the fact that he has to hide two guys in coverage. Two guys who opposing offenses are hunting with regularity. Isaac Yiadom’s been in the vicinity but is consistently too loose in coverage—allowing 5-of-5 passes for 52 yards and committing a costly pass interference call on the Rams’ first scoring drive. While Devondre Campell let up 3-for-3 for 53 yards, a touchdown, and a 25-yard pass interference that set up the Rams’ game-winning field goal. Through three games, he’s now allowed 14-of-16 for 149 yards and a score.

At cornerback, we at least have bodies to throw at the problem. After adding Yiadom and Rock Ya-Sin, drafting Renardo Green in the second round, and the healthy return of Darrell Luter Jr. this should (theoretically) be the deepest cornerback room we’ve had in the ShanaLynch era. But Green is the only one of those guys who has been playing and it’s uncertain how much the coaching staff wants to throw him into the fire less than a month into his career.

Dee Winters—who had a strong off-season but missed the first two weeks of the season while recovering from an ankle injury—was rotating in and out with Campbell before re-injuring that ankle on the fake punt conversion—a plan the coaching staff said was in place during the summer. So they’re not blind to Campbell’s limitations. We also deployed a lot of five-man DL fronts in this game—likely to overload against the run (it didn’t really work) but also to find another way to put one less linebacker on the field. But given Winters could miss more time and Dre won’t return until mid-season at the earliest, we’ve gotta get creative.

Against the run, Campbell is decent. And according to PFF, he’s registered a pass rush grade of over 70+ in all three of his seasons in Green Bay. Maybe that means he’s more of an early-down player and—on passing downs—we either blitz him or pull him for a third safety. Maybe he can get by in coverage if we put less on his plate, deploying him only on a few different assignments with plenty of help. Whatever it is, we have to adjust our scheme and what we’re asking of our players so that Campbell and Yiadom aren’t so heavily targeted. Easier said than done, but if we don’t at least put in the effort, things are going to get worse before they get better. Or at least stay the same. Which is bad.

You can’t spell “special teams” without “ass.” A narrowly missed 55-yard field goal is annoying but at least excusable. But how many times do we have to see a coulda/shoulda blowout become a game due to a fake punt, a muffed punt, or a big punt return against us? This game ends before it begins if the Rams don’t convert on that fake (a fake that we expected but somehow still couldn’t stop). It likely goes to OT if we cover down on our punt. In the past two weeks, we’ve had a punt blocked, a punt muffed, a long punt return that led to the go-ahead points, and a fake punt that was converted against us on a touchdown drive.

That is unacceptable.

Depth Disparity. It’s worth noting that there were depth wins in this game. Jennings was the first Niners receiver to tally three touchdowns in a game since T.O. in 2001. Eric Saubert had a whiff in pass pro but otherwise looks like a sizeable improvement over Charlie Woerner at backup tight end. Jordan Mason—as the only one of our top three running backs who is healthy—is an absolute wrecking ball. But as much as those players were featured in a positive light, our issues elsewhere were just as bright.

Ronnie Bell is the most obvious scapegoat, but the fact that Devondre is even on the field is a testament to how our young linebackers taken in the past two drafts haven’t developed into playable territory. While Yiadom was added—and made a starter—this off-season because none of the many cornerbacks we’ve drafted over the years have asserted themselves beyond Lenoir. And while you could certainly point to the Trey Lance and CMC and Chase Young trades over the past years as gutting our high-round draft capital and leading to that lack of depth, our third-round whiffs have been at least equally as responsible.

I’ve always believed that any picks made in the first two days of the draft should be expected to play major snaps within a calendar year, and the third round is a natural place to add depth pieces who you can bring along slowly as rookies. But our third rounds have been barren for years. And that’s just magnified when we’ve been without so many first and second-round picks. 

Ji’Ayir Brown (2023) and Jake Moody (2023) are regular starters. Dominick Puni (2024) has started right away and could round into a stud. But Cameron Latu (2023), Tyrion Davis-Price (2022), Danny Gray (2022), and Trey Sermon (2021) were all whiffs. Ambry Thomas (2021) at least started some games but if we were at all confident in his ability in that role, we wouldn’t have imported Yiadom. While Drake Jackson (2022)—our only second-round pick over a two-year stretch—is out the year with a preseason injury. His most valuable contribution may wind up the three-sack season opener from last year. That’s half of his career sack total. 

Now there are some important caveats to be applied here before we get too out of control. We were missing three All-Pros on one side of the ball. There isn’t a unit in football (offensive or defensive) that’s not going to miss a beat with that kind of talent sidelined. And offensively, we only really felt that dropoff with Ronnie Bell’s disastrous outing at wideout—a position we did try to address in the off-season, both in the fourth round with Jacob Cowing—who likely doesn’t know the whole playbook after missing a big chunk of training camp—and in the first with Ricky Pearsall. He just happens to be on the PUP list for, you know… getting shot. Even Grant Cohn couldn’t pretend that was our fault. And while we don’t know a ton about Ricky as a pro due to his injury, we know that his hands were lauded as some of the best in a historically deep receiver class. So we can safely assume he’s probably not dropping three passes on four targets. 

While at linebacker, even a team as dependent as ours on quality LB play still only regularly plays two of them. So it’s not like we were going to be spending first or second-round picks on the position when the two we have are top 10 talents who are just now 27 years old. It’s also worth noting that we have had, over the years, Kwon Alexander and Azeez Al-Shaair—a current plus starter for the Titans—as our third linebacker. And there is at least talk of Dee Winters as a rising player. So how much capital were we really supposed to spend at linebacker prior to last year?

But the short careers and wealth of injuries in the NFL means roster building is always a multi-year process. It takes years to develop the players you play now and years of preparation to fill the holes that form when they depart. We’ve known we needed CB depth for years. Just cause we threw numbers at the problem this off-season doesn’t mean that would necessarily fix it.

So while CMC, Deebo, Kittle, and Greenlaw should all return at some point this season, this does shine a light on depth concerns moving forward and our upcoming cap crunch after this year. Our incredible late-round and undrafted track record has helped us paper over some of those issues to this point, but this class needs to hit (and so does the next one) if we want to keep this window open through the primes of many of our top players. 

NEXT UP: SUNDAY VS. NEW ENGLAND (1-2) @ 1:05 PM PT

Rookie Drake Maye got some run late in last Thursday’s game and the Pats have a few extra rest days to prep him this week to take over starting duties, but veteran placeholder Jacoby Brissett is expected to remain as the Pats’ QB1 for a largely anemic offense. This could very well be the right call in the long term, but it does put a rather obvious short-term cap on a passing attack that has some developmental weapons but little consistency or explosive potential. RB Rhamondre Stevenson is the weapon to key in this matchup and forcing them into a pass-heavy attack is the best way to stifle what should be a very stifle-able offense. The Jets, who run our scheme, just held them to 3 points and 2.9(!) yards per play. Let’s do that plz. 

Defense is Jerod Mayo’s specialty, and he adheres to the “blitz and play man with versatile pieces” approach that New England has employed for years. It’s a sound scheme and one that could present some problems depending on how many of our weapons we have injured. But it’s also a unit that just allowed 400 yards of offense to the Jets. The talent level just isn’t what it used to be. There will be openings but we’ll need to find them in the passing game to loosen up what is generally a stout run defense.

Despite a week one upset of the Bengals, the Patriots seem well on their way to a top 5 draft pick as they continue their quasi-rebuild. If we lose this one, it’s time to panic.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 17, Vikings 23

i hear the state fair is nice at least

Another year, another road loss to the Vikings. Since 1993, the Niners have played the Vikings 17 times and the away team has won 16 of those contests. I’m not sure what to make of that, but it is a stat.

Swing-and-a-miss. On paper, the results of this game look quite even. We had 399 yards of offense to their 403. Both teams committed two turnovers. Neither was particularly successful in the red zone. But we were thoroughly outplayed on the swing plays.

We were 3-of-13 on third and fourth down to their 7-of-12. If we treat our two fourth down fails and the blocked punt as turnovers, we lost that battle 5-to-2. You don’t win games when you are so soundly beaten on the plays that extend possessions and create new ones. That’s the simple explanation.

OFFENSE

As ugly as it was, it was good that we got to play Brian Flores’ defense early in the season because I genuinely think this kind of defense is the next big trend throughout the NFL–in part because it matches up so well against the Shanahan style of offense.

Brian Flores comes from the Patriots’ man-dominant, blitz-heavy coaching tree but adapted his scheme and made it his own while working under Pat Narduzzi and his Quarters defense in Pittsburgh. He still loves to blitz, but he now mixes and matches those pressures with a greater variety of coverages, presenting exotic fronts and just enough confusion on the back end to create open rushers and generate turnovers.

If this sounds familiar, it’s because Flores’ defense–while separate from the Ravens’ scheme–shares a lot of similarities with Mike Macdonald and his three former disciples who are all newly minted DCs. And–despite operating out of base odd fronts versus even ones–it also shares somre similarities with Steve Spagnuolo’s defense in Kansas City.

Amoebous fronts, loaded lines of scrimmage, linebackers who moonlight as defensive ends, the ability to confuse pass protection with alignment and crank up the pressure when needed, and various hidden coverages are what I expect to see from every defense we face that has the coaching, base scheme, and personnel to pull it off.

So, while annoying, our offense should see it as much as possible now so that our players and coaches can get used to it and not be caught by surprise when the games really matter.

No Run, No Fun. Every defense we play wants to prioritize stopping the run, and the Vikings do so through their well-earned reputation of being a blitz-heavy squad (they sent an extra man on 51.5% of snaps last year, tops in the league) and through sheer numbers on the line of scrimmage. Sometimes to the extreme, like this:

With it mathematically impossible for us to run, the Vikings will mix and match which of those extra defenders blitz and which will drop into coverage. Sometimes that coverage is man, sometimes it’s a two-high shell, but they always prioritize jumping and smothering check downs and hot routes. The thought is that if they’re blitzing (or you think they’re blitzing), smothering your safety valve will either generate turnovers or make you hold the ball long enough for their pass rush to get home.

On this 4th-and-3 in the first half, the Niners set up hi-low options to either side, hoping to take advantage of man coverage with a quick hitter (likely Aiyuk on the slant) or to play a two-man game on either flat defender.

The Vikings counteracted it with eight men on the line of scrimmage, implying a blitz, before backing off into a four man rush with Tampa 2 behind it to jump any underneath routes.

This clogged up the short passing lane to the right and before Purdy could potentially get to the open receiver (Kittle backside), he was already under pressure and had to scramble, getting tackled one yard shy of the sticks.

Of course, there are drawbacks to this kind of aggressive front, and one of the best ways to attack it is by targeting the second layer of the defense in the passing game. Which is exactly what we did on our next offensive play.

Here, the Vikings are in a very similar look to the previous play, with eight men on the line of scrimmage and plans to rush four while clogging the underneath routes by dropping back into a Tampa 2. The corner and safety at the top of the screen are switching assignments and the players who are rushing vs dropping have changed, but the base coverage is the same.

Putting lots of guys on the line of scrimmage is great at dissuading runs, generating confusion, and putting potential blitzers closer to the quarterback, but it does inherently put your guys out of position on guarding anything wider or deeper than a quick hitter. Your defenders can still book it and get to those zones, but they’ll be playing catchup due to their alignment.

Knowing this, we’ve decided to hard target the space behind that wall of defenders, with three receivers out on intermediate—to-deep routes and another two checking for blitz before releasing on short routes underneath (primarily as safety valves and eye candy for underneath receivers).

Just before the snap, the non-blitzing defenders start to back off a bit so they can get in better position, and on the snap, the middle linebacker opens up and bails deep into his Tampa 2 zone. Theoretically, this should make him capable of defending—and responsible for—Deebo on any deep in-breaker, but he’s looking in the wrong direction.

This is by design. We know that whether or not it’s Tampa 2 or simply quarters, whoever is dropping back to defend the middle of the field is going to have to open up to one side to get the proper depth. This is the drawback of putting so many men on the line of scrimmage. They have more distance to travel to get back into position to cover downfield.

By putting Deebo opposite the passing strength, we know that even if there is a deep middle defender, that defender will be turned away from the dig, which opens up nicely for a big gain as the defender overruns it.

There weren’t a lot of truly open receivers in this game, but this is the one area where we had very consistent success. On passes between 10-and-19 yards downfield, Purdy was 9-of-11 for 155 yards. And the more we were able to attack this area, the more Flores and the Vikings had to back off the line of scrimmage, which then opened up our run game.

Purdy + Protection. The problem with having to regularly hit intermediate routes to keep a defense honest is that your QB needs to see the coverages right and your offensive line needs to keep him upright long enough to deliver the ball.

Pass pro was a struggle all game. Colton McKivitz and Dominick Puni (this was always going to be an excellent test for the rookie guard) combined to allow nine pressures. Brendel allowed two, including an ugly steamrolling in back-to-back weeks. Even Trent Williams allowed four pressures. There’s no real way around it. We just need to get better in pass pro against these varied fronts. And we need to structure our weekly gameplans with that in mind.

This was far from Purdy’s best game. He had a handful of turnover-worthy plays and held the ball longer than usual, even if that wasn’t necessarily his fault given that’s what the defense was giving up. But this was far from a truly “bad” Purdy game. There weren’t a lot of receivers open or big windows to throw into, but he stayed accurate and confident throughout en route to a whopping +17.8% completion percentage above expectation.

Still pounded dat rock doe. It is worth noting that once we got a little rhythm offensively we ran the ball quite well. Jordan Mason had his second straight 100-yard game on 20 carries for a clean 5.0 ypc, with 80 of those yards coming on tosses, stretches, and other off-tackle or outside runs. As is usually the case, if we can get defenses into fronts where we can feasibly run on them, we usually do so successfully. We just need better (and easier) ways of getting them into those looks.

DEFENSE

17 points felt about right for our offense given our mediocre performance, but allowing only 23 was honestly flattering for our defense.

The Vikings’ 7.5 yards per play were the worst we’ve allowed since giving up 7.6 YPP to the Raiders in week 16 of the 2022 season. Vegas racked up 500 yards of offense and 34 points in that overtime game on New Year’s Day. If it weren’t for an outrageous game from Fred Warner, a few timely sacks from our front four, and our massive time-of-possession advantage, this game could have easily gotten into the 30s.

Teetering on the Edge. We had a ton of communication problems on the boundaries, including issues on switches from motion and bunch formations—like on the Vikings’ wide-open touchdown following the punt block—as well as on a handful of dump-off and short passes where receivers had far too much room to run.

The issues on the edges even extended to the run game, where our corners—who are typically strong in run support—were either late or off-angle when forced to step up and set the edge as run defenders.

Hindsight But Also Just Regular Sight. As stated before, last week was not going to be our new DC’s big test. Now, we get to see how he adapts. The Vikings had a few “gotcha” moments from a play structure and play-calling perspective in this game. Some of those were just well-built designer plays called at the right moment. But others felt like they could have been prevented.

In what is becoming our annual tradition against the Vikings, we got burned for a massive touchdown on a blitz in the second quarter that seemed like it could have been easily avoided. This was not as egregious of a call as last year’s–when we dialed up a Cover 0 blitz with 17 seconds left in the half and sixty yards from our goalline–and I have no issue with heating up Darnold when he’s throwing from his own three. But the execution, situational dynamics, and base structure of the play were quite poor.

I was going to go into a whole breakdown of what happened on this play, how it was drawn up, and how situation-based checks could have turned a massive negative into a positive, but ultimately the most important takeaway is this:

Why is George Odum on JJ in man coverage? I get trying to hide what you’re in, but Odum on either of these two receivers in Cover 1 is just a bad matchup, even if he has deep help from Ji’Ayir Brown. Why not put Ward on JJ? Or better yet, put Ward on JJ and have Lenoir join him to the two-receiver side while bumping Odum over the tight end to the closed side of the field?

Was the execution poor? Yes. Ji’Ayir could have not peeked in the backfield, read the route correctly, and stayed on top of it. Flannigan-Fowles could have had a blitz adjustment on play action away and hit Darnold before he could throw, rather than just sit at one yard deep and QB spy as he unleashed a bomb down the field. But ultimately, we were set up for failure from the jump.

Static Shock. Last year, the Jets (who run our defense) were the only team in the NFL who was more likely to line up in one coverage look pre-snap then run that exact same coverage post-snap. In an era of complex defenses and sim blitzes and all variety of bracket coverages, this style of defense may sound overly simple, but it can still result in elite defenses because if you keep the playbook thin, defenders can master each call, learn how to adapt to anything and play fast and aggressive on every snap.

That’s the pitch behind our (relatively) static defense. But if the players are NOT playing fast. If there are communication issues or botched assignments. If we don’t have dynamic adjustments for different situations. Then we’ve lost the supposed advantage. We’ve lost the entire point of the scheme.

This is not to say that we should change up our defense. Far from it. But this is where we learn a lot about what kind of coach Sorensen really is. Because this scheme only works when everyone is on the same page. When we’re not, we get performances like this one. And that is not sustainable.

NEXT UP: Sunday (9/22) @ Los Angeles Rams (10:00 AM PT)

After a fundamental shift away from zone and stretch and towards downhill gap runs and shotgun passes, the Rams’ offense is now less about rhythm and flow and more about a stable of 5’9” running backs, whatever slot receiver is healthy (Kupp or Nacua), and the arm of Matt Stafford. Right now, none of those slot receivers are healthy. Oops.

At his best, Stafford is a top 5 quarterback, capable of rifling the ball into any window on the field and confident enough to try it. But he has and will always be victim to bouts of turnovers–some Jimmy G-like in their absurdity. Even in their Super Bowl-winning season, Stafford led the league in interceptions and nearly lost in the divisional round (self-recovered 4th quarter fumble) and NFC champ game (dropped pick in the 4th quarter) after turnover-worthy plays. With both of their top wideouts injured, much of this game will come down to stopping the run and collapsing the pocket against an offensive line that has been sketchy at best in hopes of creating those kinds of turnovers.

Defensively, Chris Shula (yes, of that Shula family) takes over for Raheem Morris, and–as a McVay disciple who has been with the Rams since 2017–he’s likely to run much of the same 3-4 base (but really a 3-3-5), two-high stuff his predecessor did. He’s kind of like their Nick Sorensen. As always, the matchup we’ll be looking to exploit is their linebackers in pass coverage. Like Troy Reeder, who now starts at mike linebacker, but–in the past three games he’s played against us–has not once eclipsed a 35 PFF rating while missing 7 tackles and allowing 9 of 10 completions for 142 yards. No Deebo is tough here because soft zone coverages against linebackers not meant to play in space is basically his catnip. We’ll need some receivers to step up in this one (and for the foreseeable future), which means some of these young guys are gonna get some run (and hopefully, some success).

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 32, Jets 19

it's fun to run

Who’s to say whether this Jets team will become the cuspy second-tier contender promised a year ago on an HBO reality show or the depressing also-ran potato they’ve been for much of the past two decades? All we know at the moment is that this team has an excellent defense and was 7-10 last year with a cheesecloth offensive line and a freshman squad quarterback room. So while questions remain about their ceiling, this Jets squad should at least be a better version of last year’s. And after an off-season of long drawn-out contract negotiations, it was nice to see the Niners come out of the gates with a solid, throwback win.

OFFENSE

D = m/v. After Jordan Mason’s breakout first start, George Kittle referred to him (in the most endearing way) as “dense,” as if our young sledgehammer’s atoms are packed so tightly that there’s no room in them for shoestring tackles, running out of bounds, or any other tomfoolery such as defensive backs. Which…

Fair.

For Niners fans, Mason’s emergence wasn’t particularly surprising. Since he showed up as a UDFA two years ago, he’s rushed for 400+ yards on 5.6 ypc and was actually PFF’s highest rated RB over that time span–in part because his microscopic sample size was limited to doing exactly what he did on Monday: run through faces. But Mason has improved greatly this off-season–particularly in the passing game–and is now able to showcase that in greater snaps.

Who knows how long CMC is out. Achilles injuries have taken away two Bay Area championships in the very recent past, so–by all means–let him rest as much as needed. We’re in good hands until he returns. 

Hype Train Activated. Only a traumatized man would crank out highlights of a rookie right guard after one week of play. I am that man.

Puni was regarded as smart, versatile, and strong in pass protection out of college. He’s been all of that, allowing just one hurry in 34 dropbacks on Monday. But his ability and strength in the run game were on full display in his NFL debut. It’s still early, but we might have a dude. And at a position where not having a dude has really REALLY hurt us deep in the playoffs.

Chips Ahoy. Our offense is at its best and most explosive when we’re running wild on the ground and generating chunk plays attacking the middle of the field. When it’s working, that mix of ground-n-pound and dumping passes over confused defenders’ heads is poetry in motion. But sometimes we get greedy trying to set up intermediate passes and catch-and-runs when all we need to do is move the chains. 

Which is why—even though it wasn’t our sexiest or most explosive outing—it was nice to see a patient, methodical passing attack that largely targeted the outside alleys and wasn’t afraid to take easy, quick completions against soft coverage. To be fair, Purdy still dropped some dimes over second-level defenders, and we still hard-targeted players in coverage (the Jets’ two starting safeties combined to allow 5-of-5 completions for 106 yards), but Purdy’s spray chart shows how heavily we operated outside of the middle of the field.

We weren’t forcing YAC yard plays against a defense that was expecting them. We weren’t holding the ball too long to get that perfect long-developing strike over the linebackers and exposing ourselves to a potent pass rush. There will be some games where defenses play us conservatively and crowd the middle of the field in pass coverage. When that happens, a little patience–both from Shanahan and from Purdy–could be exactly what we need.

Double Duty Deebo. Slimmed down and rocking #1, Deebo’s impact far outweighed his modest stat line (8 carries for 23 yards and 1 TD, and 5 catches for 54 yards), especially because we weren’t putting him in many easy YAC situations. It would have been nice if he’d been able to create more separation and secure more of those tightly contested slant routes, but Deebo looks good, and the longer CMC is out, the more important his play will be–especially early in the season as Aiyuk gets his sea legs.

I also love Deebo returning kicks in the new kickoff format. Now teams must decide whether to boot the ball into the endzone and allow our offense to take over on the 30-yard line or attempt to pin us to the 20 by kicking it into the landing zone and risking a return from the world’s most dangerous man with the ball in his hands. I expect many teams will just spot us the ten yards.

Holdout Holdovers. Both of our long holdout guys had moments of rust. Trent Williams’ was seen mostly when he had to get pulled for an IV on a 4th-and-1 we otherwise may have gone for. Otherwise, he played great.

The same can’t be said for Aiyuk.

As much as I was NOT a fan of his prolonged contract negotiation, I AM a fan of Aiyuk, but once you start making $30M a year you need to be able to take over a game when your number is called. This matchup against the Jets and their elite outside corner duo was never going to be that game, but–when Aiyuk had a chance to step up–he looked rusty and fatigued–particularly in the string of plays around his drop in the endzone. Hopefully, he can get back into game shape quickly as we’re sure to need him at the peak of his powers as the season goes on.

DEFENSE

New Faces, Familiar Results. One week in, the new guys along the defensive line certainly look like savvy additions. Leonard Floyd recorded his first sack as a Niner and had a QB pressure that led to Flannigan-Fowles’ interception. He doesn’t seem like the fanciest or the flashiest edge rusher, but he’s a grinder on the edge who wins with relentlessness. Opposite Bosa, that consistency is what’s the most important.

On the interior, neither Maliek Collins or Jordan Elliott brought what a healthy Arik Armstead does as a two-way threat, but both were strong against the run and Elliott flashed a little pass rush potential in registering a QB hit. Collins had 5 sacks and 18 QB hits last season, so he’s the one we should be expecting to round into a pass rusher as he gets settled. Anything we can get in that regard from Elliott will just be icing on the cake.

As for new DC Nick Sorensen, this game was not the biggest test. But, the defense played sound (13 points allowed if we disregard deep garbage time) and he showed the ability to make adjustments when needed.

On this third down on their first scoring drive, the Jets have diagnosed that we’re in a Cover 4 trips adjustment where the near linebacker (Warner) high-walls and runs with the No.3 receiver if he goes vertical. So to exploit this they send that No.3 receiver on a clear-out and have the No.1 break into the vacated space underneath.

DeVondre Campbell gets stuck in no man’s land, and the Jets get an easy completion for a first down.

A few drives later, the Jets once again go to trips on third down, and—after motioning their tight end into a bunch formation and seeing how our DB (Renardo Green) follows him—Rodgers checks into a mesh concept meant to run off the defender on the No.3 receiver to free up space for the No.1 receiver underneath.

While this isn’t the same concept, it’s similar in how it’s trying to vacate space with the No.3 receiver to open up the No.1 underneath. But we’re not in man coverage or the quarters adjustment we were in earlier, we’re in a funky rotation of Cover 3.

So when Rodgers snaps the ball and looks to the trip side No.1 receiver, he notices he’s running into—rather than away from—a waiting defender. The same goes for the second shallow coming from the top of the frame.

By the time his third read maybe comes open, Rodgers is already halfway to the ground as our pass rush has gotten home.

This isn’t full-blown, hacking-the-mainframe, DeMeco Ryans telepathy-level stuff, but it’s nice to see our new DC diagnose what the Jets are doing and adjust quickly and effectively to take it away.

Campbell’s Coverage. But it wasn’t all roses for the Niners’ new faces on defense. DeVondre Campbell had an up-and-down debut and got picked on quite a bit in coverage, especially on the Jets’ one long touchdown drive. Campbell had some issues with positioning–sometimes dropping too shallow and other times too narrow–and the Jets dink-and-dunked him for 5 of 6 completions for 38 yards.

This will be something to monitor moving forward. We’ve been lucky with Warner and Greenlaw, but there’s no longer a Kwon Alexander or Azeez Al-Shaair to fill in while Greenlaw’s out rehabbing. Perhaps when Dee Winters returns from injury he could provide a spark, but most likely we’ll have to hope Campbell improves with more reps in our defense.

Money Moody. Yes, he had a 53-yarder luckily doink inside the left upright, but Moody was an otherwise automatic 6-of-6 on field goals, with three boots over 45 yards, continuing his strong play through the off-season. Rookie kickers are rarely that good, so here’s hoping that Moody has figured it out and is a mainstay for us for the next decade. 

Next Up: Sunday (9/15) @ Minnesota Vikings , 10:00 AM PT

As you may have heard, the Niners play eight games against teams with a rest advantage. Their four games against teams coming off byes and their -32 gross rest days are both the worst since 1990, while their -21 net rest days are the worst in the league for the second year in a row. The first of those games is this Sunday.

Despite a boner-killing preseason injury to first-round quarterback JJ McCarthy, the 2024 debut of a rejuvenated Sam Darnold under QB whisperer Kevin O’Connell made for an impressively efficient week 1 showing and a 28-6 victory over a NY Giants team that will likely compete with the Panthers for this year’s award of shittiest piece of shit on the shit heap.

Aaron Jones is a massive upgrade over the “scrubs by committee” approach Minnesota employed last year at the running back position, and—even without the currently injured TJ Hockenson—this is a talented offense led by a great offensive mind. If DeVondre Campbell is gonna be a problem for us, we’re likely to find that out as soon as this Sunday. When the Vikings are on defense, expect a whole lot of blitzing and a mix of man coverage and two high zones behind it.

This isn’t the most talented roster, but it’s a cohesive and well-coached one. The pieces they have fit within the schemes they employ, and that–along with a short week and a morning kickoff after an east coast road trip–has the potential makings of a trap game if we don’t approach it properly. 

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Outward and Upward

making the best better

Last season’s offense was easily the best of the Shanahan era, leading the league (or close to it) in nearly every metric imaginable. But improvement always starts from looking inward, and–with our multiple holdouts finally back in the fold and the season quickly approaching–it’s worth examining our worst offensive performances in hopes of staying ahead of the curve.

According to PFF, our offense graded out under 65 (their mark for average or below) in only two games all season. According to Pro Football Reference, our offense provided negative expected points in only two games all season. You know which games: losses against the Browns and the Ravens. But I’m also going to include references to our performance in the Super Bowl because the Chiefs clearly used the Browns’ game plan as the foundation for what they did and there are some parallels between the game plans of all three defenses.

What Worked Against Us

Amoeba Fronts + Run Blitzes: In general, last season’s offense was hyper-efficient against the blitz. This follows logical sense in that most blitzers come from the short alley or middle regions of the field–two areas that we love to target in the passing game–and that fewer defenders in those areas allow both for easier completions and more yards to run after the catch. But the Browns and the Chiefs were blitz-heavy outliers. The Chiefs in particular took this strategy to the extreme, blitzing on 60% of their defensive snaps–the highest blitz rate the unit has deployed in four seasons under Spagnuolo. 

To me, there were two big differences between how the Browns and Chiefs deployed their blitzes where most everyone else faltered. The first difference is that they were blitzes with a run-first mentality. Both the Browns and the Chiefs showed five- and six-man fronts with seven in the box–the same sort of shell we’ve seen deployed against outside zone teams ever since the Patriots ran it against the Rams in the 2018 Super Bowl.

Their goal was to create walls on the outside with rolled-down linebackers or extra linemen in wide techniques while letting their linebackers sprint to the ball with simple reads inside the box. This forces the offensive line into one-on-one matchups rather than double teams at the point of attack and keeps the linebackers clean from offensive linemen who would otherwise be climbing up to obstruct them on second-level blocks. 

This isn’t a particularly new strategy, but it worked so effectively against us because (the Chiefs in particular) paired this basic scheme with a litany of different fronts and a ton of five- and six-man pressures behind it. Instead of risking their linebackers getting confused with motion, misdirection, and other offensive window dressing, they simply blitzed them up the B gaps, figuring they could undercut any runs before we could hit the edges and–if it wound up a pass–our guard play was poor enough (particularly after Jon Feliciano went down) that they could get home as pass rushers as well. This overarching logic of setting a wider edge than we could block and aggressively pursuing from the inside even extended to their nickel corners, who would often come down and reset the edge as blitzers as we motioned down into condensed formations.

Effectively, the Browns and the Chiefs made it mathematically difficult to run on early downs and they dared us to complete passes on first- and second-downs to set up more manageable third downs. Teams know that our dropback passing game is our schematic weakness and features much less of the motion and misdirection that opens up so much of our offense. But while the blitz-heavy approach makes numerical sense against the run, it still doesn’t work without the right coverages behind it.

Man Coverage: Where every other blitz-heavy team was scared of getting absolutely roasted off and ran a soft zone underneath, the Browns (52%) and the Chiefs (41%) were the only teams to run more than 26% man coverage against us all season. To be fair, they were probably the only two teams who had the personnel to feasibly attempt it. But what allowed them to do that (other than talent and coverage disguises) was how heavily they keyed the areas we liked to attack in the passing game.

Spot Dropping: With the Browns and the Chiefs, this meant keeping a hole defender on the second level who was specifically looking to jump the slant routes and quick-ins that are often best at beating blitzes and using a backside safety to rotate down into the middle of the field to take away digs and crossers.

Here, we’re trying to run a variation of a cross concept with Aiyuk (in blue) as our primary receiver and Jauan looking to clear him out and set a natural rub route with an outside release and out and up.

However, the Browns may be showing two-high but are in Cover 1 across the board with a high safety playing anything deep and the safety to the bottom of the screen looking to step down into the hole and jump any crossing routes.

Naturally, this doesn’t work well for us, and by the time Purdy has to move off Aiyuk and reset, there’s already pressure in his face.

These hole or rat defenders let the DBs in man coverage play aggressively and over the top, knowing that they had help on the YAC yard generators we so often love.

While the Ravens didn’t run nearly as much man coverage or blitz as often as the Chiefs and Browns, they were able to create a similar effect defensively by always making sure there was a new defender dropping into the hot zones we so often attack.

These sim blitzes and unexpected spot droppers helped force Purdy into the worst game of his career.

Masters of disguise: Spot-dropping and pressure is a great foundation to slowing down our offense, but it isn’t necessarily enough unless you can also mix up your looks. While the Chiefs’ defense had more coverage disguises and variety than I think I’ve ever seen in a defensive game plan, the Ravens defense as a whole is fundamentally built off of the idea of showing weird fronts and sim blitzes and dropping back into as many complex coverages behind it as physically possible. This creates confusion for the skill players but also for the linemen, who often get put into disadvantageous one-on-one looks due to misreading pressure–effectively creating the same advantage as a blitz would while still having numbers in coverage.

These weird fronts and back-end coverages were a notable issue for our OL and for Purdy, who (understandably) struggled to decipher the Ravens’ and Chiefs’ pre-snap looks–particularly when under quick pressure–whether the blitzes were simulated or not. It’s probably worth noting here that you can still get to the right receiver even if you have the wrong pre-snap read, but not when you’re moved off your spot before you can get there.

While our offense as a whole may have had only two games all year (out of twenty) that were graded by PFF as  below 65, or “average or below,” our offensive line only had five games all year that were graded ABOVE 65. Our pass pro can be problematic in a vacuum, so it certainly isn’t helped by increasingly complicated fronts. 

Countering the Counterpunches

I’m about to talk a lot about pass game stuff, but it’s important to note one caveat in all three of the games being referenced here. Yes, the defenses loaded up against the run. Yes, they made it harder to run with numbers and aggressiveness forced us to pass more in more situations where we’d rather not. But… we still ran the ball successfully against all of these teams. These are our rushing totals—excluding QB scrambles—in those three games:

Browns: 20 carries for 104 yards and 1 TD @ 5.2 ypc
Ravens: 16 carries for 110 yards and 1 TD @ 6.9 ypc
Chiefs: 28 carries for 98 yards and 0 TD @ 3.5 ypc

And in the Browns game, CMC, Trent Williams, and Deebo Samuel all went down due to injury. So we should not abandon the run. In fact, against some of these teams (the Ravens in particular), running the ball should be the first part of every game plan. But when teams go so far out of their way to key our run game and our middle-of-the-field passes, we need to be strong enough in our dropback game to make them play honest.

Get better along the OL: Loading the line of scrimmage and committing numbers and blitzers to the box is a sound strategy to force one-on-one blocks in the running game… unless the offensive line wins those one-on-one blocks. Then you’re just getting gashed. While our OL is largely the same unit that finished out last year and we (le sigh) still don’t have a young tackle to develop, there is some hope for improvement in the trenches.

I’m not going to pretend like Colton McKivitz is a future star at right tackle, but–other than an atrocious Ravens game–his best play was towards the end of last season. The ceiling’s not high but he may be just a tick better in his second year as a starter. We can still (I guess) hope for Aaron Banks to take another step in his development, but–after seemingly plateauing last season and missing all of training camp–I’m not sure how likely that is. But the biggest ray of hope lies in Dominick Puni–our third-round rookie and new starter at right guard. 

In a draft where it seemed like we kept trying to trade down and couldn’t or wanted to trade up but missed our window, Puni was one of two offensive linemen outside of the first two rounds who I was excited about as a potential year one starter, and–through deft draft maneuvering–we were able to secure him in the third round after nine other linemen (who I largely thought were lesser prospects) went off the board.

After injuries to Jon Feliciano and Spencer Burford opened the door for him, Puni quickly locked down the first-team right guard spot, impressing coaches and veterans with his intelligence, maturity, and quickness, as he looks slated to start week 1 in a massive test against the Jets’ stacked defensive line. Every spot along our offensive line (other than Trent Williams) could be upgraded, but with the massively inflating salaries of offensive guards this season (four guards now make upwards of $20M/yr) the best way to do that is through the draft. If we found a keeper in Puni, we may be able to rest easy at the right guard position for the first time in the ShanaLynch era.

Take the Party Outside: Our offense thrives in condensed splits because they allow us to get across the field quicker, sell play action, and dig out defenders in the run game. None of that–nor our focus on the run game–should change. But we need to find ways to attack quickly outside when a team is too heavily keying motions and trying to reset the edge with blitzing nickelbacks. When teams go that far out of their way to stop our core offense, they’re opening up other things, and–in this case–that’s quick outside passes. 

Some of this may be as simple as diversifying and evolving our dropback passing game, an idea that seems possible after some advancements last year and the first off-season in a decade(?) where we have a starting quarterback who we’re optimistic about. Other signs of an evolved dropback game include us rostering 7(!) wideouts in our initial 53–even if part of that was likely due to the Aiyuk contract situation at the time–and a run-pass ratio that skewed more towards balance by the end of last year.

But I think there are other ways where we can still incorporate motion and condensed splits into our dropback game and punish teams for over-keying our tendencies. I already mentioned one example in the Super Bowl preview:

Tic Tac Toe. One of the tenets of the Chiefs’ defense is that they almost always have a check or two prepared for different types of motion. The thinking goes that–if the offense is going to get more information and an advantage from motion–the defense can reclaim that advantage by adjusting from the motion just before the snap. That could mean players rolling up as edges (which we saw above), rotating safeties, receivers being handed off, d-line stunts, blitzes, and everything in between. Defensive checks are great, but if the offense deciphers what checks you’re making in what situations–either during film study or the game itself–the offense can spring people open in a hurry.

Here the Chiefs are in man and have Trent McDuffie running across formation with orbit motion. In order to keep a good angle on his man he has to really book it, so–knowing this–the Bills have called a play specifically to get the motion man loose the other way. 

It will be up to Shanahan, our coaching staff, and our offensive line, to get a grasp on what checks are most likely to happen against what looks and attack them both in the passing game and the running game.

But there are various other ways to punish defenses for overpursuing backside of motion. Here’s an example of Georgia deploying a play action pass off of return motion to spring open a wheel route down the field in this season’s opener:

Even if the potential blitzing nickel peels off into coverage when they read a route release, their eyes can get caught up in the underneath route, and they’re still out leveraged by the slot receiver going over top.

And while the shallow crossers of a pass concept like mesh would seem to play right into the rat defenders and rotating safeties trying to take away slants and crossers, there are ways to use their leverage and expectations against them to get CMC out to the edge with a natural pick:

Whether it’s by playing more spread out and empty sets, mixing and matching our personnel to create mismatches on the perimeter, evolving our dropback game, or implementing more pass game counters away from motion, we need more options to attack the outside when teams commit so heavily to crowding the box.

Win on the Boundary: The Chiefs ran a ton of different bracket disguises, which–in conjunction with the pressure–made it harder for us to target our outside wideouts down the field. Ultimately, if pressure is coming early, you just can’t throw the ball down the field. But when the pass rush is picked up, there are ways to create isolation looks outside when you know a team is running man and clogging the box. We saw as much in a mid-season dismantling of the Eagles…

Win outside. Clouding the middle of the field to try and take away slants and digs isn’t something new or particularly innovative. Teams have been trying to do that to us for years. The big difference is we now have more answers and—on most days—a QB who can exploit defenses who play our tendencies too heavily.

The Eagles tried their best to take away inside-breaking routes when we played them earlier this year, and our response was to utilize trips and quads formations to isolate a receiver backside—usually Aiyuk—and force the defense to either give that backside player help or have a numbers advantage to the multiple receiver side.

With the inside players keying inside-breaking routes, they inevitably weren’t getting much width, but to make sure that linebacker at the top of the screen would clear out, CMC ran a spot route to the middle of the field and directly into his line of sight. That let Purdy and Aiyuk just chip away relentlessly on one-on-one coverage with no underneath help by throwing quick and intermediate passes outside the hashes.

And even in that disastrous Ravens game.

Even though it seemed like nothing was going right on Sunday, we actually had success doing something somewhat similar against the Ravens—albeit with concepts that created a high-low look to the backside rather than a pure isolation.

Since the Ravens are more likely to drop into something like Cover 2, we used a player coming across formation (or later, a running back) to keep the flat defender shallow, out of the way, and distracted, then basically let Aiyuk cook someone deeper down the field for an easy completion.

After the snap, you can see that the linebackers are looking to take away inside routes and haven’t widened at all. While the true flat defenders must play up to take away the motion man who has immediately threatened their zone (especially when that player is Deebo). The end result is a single corner with deep responsibility covering Aiyuk, and… as we should all know by now…

Aiyuk is always open.

My apologies. There is nothing lazier and more self-serving than using my rambling writing to quote my own rambling writing of months past, but this is just to show that these are all things we’ve shown we can do. We just need to continue to expand this facet of our playbook.

This is where Brandon Aiyuk needs to earn his money. After the longest, weirdest, and undoubtedly most annoying contract negotiation, he can earn his payday by absolutely EATING against man coverage and on clear isolation plays. Because our offensive scheme is good enough to get a lot of people these looks, but BA is the dude we’re relying on to routinely win those looks.

Read the Wave. I fully believe that sim blitzes are the next wave to take over NFL defenses, and–unfortunately–the closest thing to a godfather of that scheme is now the head coach of the Seahawks. This is annoying because we basically ate for free against the stagnant Seahawks defenses of late, but it does give Purdy a lot of practice against a defensive look that he struggled against and that he’s bound to see a lot of going forward.

This isn’t a knock on Purdy, nor a statement on whether or not he can figure it out. You can count the number of quarterbacks who quickly picked up disguised blitzes and complex backend coverages as a first-year starter on zero hands because it’s just something you have to see to understand. Now, he’s seen it. He’s seen multiple versions of it. Hopefully, last year was a learning experience for him and he’ll be more prepared and precise when facing these looks in the future. 

The same goes for the offensive line. Even if Purdy can read and diagnose who’s open, it won’t matter much if the OL is letting defensive linemen and blitzers run free into the backfield.

Ultimately, these are small changes, not big ones. Little wrinkles to the playbook to punish those who don’t play us straight. There’s every reason to believe that our offense should once again be one of the league’s best and thus no reason to think of any real wholesale changes. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue to evolve as defenses adapt to combat what we do best.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

Final Draft Thoughts

i’ll have another of these plz

Draft time is almost upon us. When teams are forged and contenders are built. When the filthy casuals are separated from the absolute loser football nerds. When every Eagles and Patriots mock draft gets stuffed with as many white players as is possible to defend in the year 2024.

Let’s start with John Lynch’s pre-draft press conference, which was more informative than I expected.

170. Several draft experts have talked about how this draft class falls off around the 150 mark. For the Niners, that number sits at 170. Lynch stated that the scouting department has 170 players in this class with draftable grades, a number that is lower than usual in part because of NIL.

Before the college season begins, the Niners evaluate players who they think have a 50% chance or greater of turning pro next year. This year, 83 of those players (35 of whom the Niners considered “starter grade”) decided to return to college. That doesn’t mean that at pick 171 we just call it quits and start throwing darts. Our 170 won’t line up with anyone else’s 170 (or whatever their number of draftables is), and if we have to spend a late-round pick on a guy we’d rather take as a priority free agent, then so be it, but the low number of draftable grades will likely lead to a lot of teams trying to leverage sixth and seventh-round picks into trade packages to move up higher in the draft.

22. Of the 170 draftable players, the Niners have first-round grades on 22 of them, which is less than ideal but is a higher number than we’ve had the past few years. While that number might imply that the Niners are primed to move up in the first round to secure a guy with a first-round grade, I think it’s more likely that we move down to accumulate an additional day 2 pick.

On the block. I still contend that if we move up it should only be for a truly elite prospect and/or one of the Top 6 tackles (Mims or better). But let’s talk about what a trade down could look like. The bottom of the first is always potential trade territory because teams like to lock in the fifth-year option that only comes with first-round picks. And due to the high cost of quarterbacks and how fifth-year option rates are one of the initial starting points for negotiating contract extensions, the bottom of the first is particularly appealing for teams looking for a new QB.

Is there risk involved in trading down? Absolutely. You could drop down so low that you miss out on the next tier of prospects and—if you really play it wrong—a run on a position of need could leave you out in the lurch entirely. But the upside is gaining an additional top 100 pick, and in this class, we should be able to find as many legitimate contributors as we have picks in the top 100.

As a purely theoretical exercise, pick 31 is valued the same as picks 40 and 100 combined, two picks that Washington currently has (the last one coming from us in the Chase Young trade). If a run on tackles means we’ve missed on the Top 7 guys and are staring down the likes of Jordan Morgan, Kingsley Sumataia, etc. but don’t love any of them, we could trade down, snag any of those tackles if they were to fall to 40, or take best player available at 40 and pull the trigger on someone like Blake Fisher or Roger Rosengarten when we pick again at the bottom of the round.

Of course, this is all speculative. And if one of the 22 guys we like on day one falls to No. 31, the most sensible move is to just draft him, regardless of position. But at this point, I’d consider a trade down equally (if not more) likely than a trade up.

Needs vs. Wants. While Lynch noted that the team doesn’t have a lot of “needs” for this upcoming year, he also mentioned that there are probably more starting positions up for grabs than people on the outside may expect. To me, that means the Niners will be drafting value over need (aka they won’t reach on a right tackle they don’t love in the first) and that–in addition to right tackle–immediate competition to improve cuspy positions like corner, center, and guard is on the table.

Reading the Tea Leaves. While the Niners don’t always meet with the players who they draft, a pre-draft visit to Santa Clara is the strongest possible indicator of our interest. In both of the past two drafts, we’ve hosted five of the nine players we’ve picked (plus a lengthy on-campus workout with Jake Moody). In 2019, we hosted four of our top five picks and had a substantial workout with the fifth (Mitch Wishnowsky). But–of the 20 players who’ve had confirmed pre-draft visits to Santa Clara–none of them are consensus first-round talents.

Since teams are allowed 30 pre-draft visitors, it’s safe to say some chunk of those 10 missing names (maybe all 10 of them) are first-round targets, and that the team has simply done a good job of keeping it under wraps.

But even when these visits don’t tell us exactly who we may be picking, the players we host, visit with at the combine and Senior Bowl, and/or hold private workouts with tell us a lot about the different positions we’re targeting at different points in the draft.

So what do these visits tell us?

  • Offensive Line and Defensive Line will be prioritized on the first two days. We’ve hosted two offensive linemen who could be first or second-day picks and met with six others at the Senior Bowl and combine. We’ve hosted four defensive linemen who could be first or second-day picks and met with four others at the Senior Bowl and combine. 

  • We like the depth at wideout on the second day–having met with seven wideouts with second- or third-round grades–but are plenty interested in guys on the third day as well.

  • Tight end, linebacker, and safety all seem like highly likely picks–even if they’re most likely to happen on the third day.

The Aiyuk Of It All. Thursday should also give us the merciful end to Aiyuk trade rumors, one way or another. Despite repeated claims that the Niners don’t want to move him and Aiyuk’s own agent speaking out against trade speculation, Aiyuk’s cryptic social media presence and a horde of beat reporters’ cited sources continue to stoke the flames of a potential trade.

My stance on Aiyuk hasn’t changed. In the short term, it’s nearly impossible to envision us being a better team a year from now without him on the squad, and we all know that big changes are coming after next season one way or another. Moving Aiyuk creates a gigantic hole on our roster, we immediately become one of the worst receiving corps in the country, and all of our man-beating ability becomes sequestered in the slot—with much of it coming from our running back. That’s not sustainable and will give us a massive matchup disadvantage against some of the teams we may have to battle with to contend for another Super Bowl (Ravens, Chiefs, etc.).

In the long term, it makes just as little sense. Yes, it saves us money, but you need a number one receiver in today’s NFL unless you have a scramble-y big-armed high-level quarterback who can regularly extend plays. The Chiefs’ offense wouldn’t have worked without Mahomes’ ability to do just that. And when they weren’t blatantly holding every other play, that offense didn’t work. The Bills still had Stefon Diggs—even if he wasn’t performing at a high level—when they went on their late-season push, and Josh Allen is their run game and their pass game put into one. The Packers may have not had a No.1, but Jordan Love thrives off buying time and launching rockets over defenders and the Packers have one of the deeper corps of receiving weapons in the NFL. Sure, four No.2’s can often make up for a lack of a No.1. But without Aiyuk, we have neither.

Reports state that the Niners are looking for at least a first-round pick (reasonable) and that they don’t want to pay Aiyuk upwards of $25M/year (unreasonable). While “upwards” is the keyword here, we should be perfectly fine with paying him something in the ballpark of $25M/year as that is fair value. Deebo makes just under $24M/year and that contract was signed two years ago coming off the pandemic. The salary cap has spiked by $47M(!) in the two years since. I agree that we don’t want to pay two wideouts big money long-term, but the wideout we do want to pay that money is Aiyuk, not Deebo. And while it’s more complicated than signing one and moving off the other, that’s why salaries are back-loaded so those moves can be dovetailed over multiple years.

This is also a bad year to trade a wide receiver because the draft class is so stacked at the position that it depreciates receiver trade value. The L’Jarius Sneed trade for a future third isn’t a good comp because the Chiefs very obviously didn’t have the money to pay him and thus had to move him, which dominated their leverage. Neither is the Keenan Allen trade, as Allen is five years and countless injuries older, is worse than Aiyuk, and the Chargers were in too shitty of a cap situation to retain any leverage. But those trades still happened and that still affects Aiyuk’s value on the open market.

My prediction? He stays and we ultimately hammer out an extension earlier than we’ve sealed recent deals with Bosa and Deebo. But that doesn’t mean we won’t be sweating it out come Thursday.

One Last Chance To Look Stupid

After breezing through some potential prospect profiles, getting a general sense of the draft landscape, and trying to read as much as possible into Lynch’s pressers and confirmed and rumored pre-draft meetings, here’s a complete theoretical of how the draft could unfold. I’m not going to mock out the exact picks I would expect because I don’t think that’s particularly useful or predictive given the many variables at play. This is more like a look into how the Niners may come to their decisions this weekend, and—since I’m writing it down—what actually happens is sure to deviate wildly from what I’m about to say.

Day 1

We’re entering this draft with 22 guys with first-round grades and we’d be more than happy to take any of them at pick 31. Due to the shape of the class, we also know that there’s a high likelihood that if any of those 22 falls to us, they play a position of need. But the “if” of whether or not they fall is the big question.

We’ll have our 22 guys broken up into tiers and before the draft starts, we should be 99% certain how high we’re willing to move up (or more accurately, how much we’re willing to give up) in a potential trade-up to obtain any one of them. I have no idea what that line is, but we’ll have one.

As the day progresses, we’ll be tracking our 22 with a specific interest in runs on offensive tackle–our biggest position of need–and eyes on teams picking 5-10 spots before us. The closer it gets to our draft slot, the easier it will be to project other teams’ picks and guess who may be available once we’re on the clock. While we’re tracking players we’re interested in, we should also be tracking the movement of quarterbacks and rooting for as many as possible to go in the first round before we pick. It’s almost certain that at least four will go before we’re on the board, with the highest possible number probably six. If any of those six are still available as our number starts to creep up, we should keep that in mind for potential trade purposes. Due to the fifth-year option that only comes with first-round picks, teams are more than happy to trade into the bottom of the first round for any position, but–due to how expensive QB contracts are and how the fifth-year option price is often the starting point for contract negotiations down the road–this is doubly true for quarterbacks.

If we’re creeping into the twenties, it starts to look like our 22 are going to be off the board, and we don’t like the value (or find the opportunity) for a trade up to secure a talent we’ve graded as a first-rounder, we start hitting the phones to gauge interest in trading down. I don’t know for sure but this seems like a draft where there are a good number of guys with second-round grades. So while looking for trade partners I think about how fat those second-round tiers are. The fatter the top tier is, the harder you want to trade down and the further you’re willing to go back into the second because a fatter tier means a higher likelihood that you can get the same level of player with a trade down that you would have otherwise picked at 31.

At this point, I would say the odds are about even that–if we keep our pick at 31–we wind up with an offensive lineman or a defensive lineman. I would guess that our preference looks something like this:

  1. Top 7 OT (give or take a tackle, as we grade differently)

  2. Jer’Zhan Newton, Chop Robinson, one or both of the interior OL, maybe Darius Robinson, and maaaaaybe Marshawn Kneeland

  3. A cornerback

Ultimately, I don’t expect one of the top 7 tackles to fall to number 31. So unless our tackle cutoff goes to 8 (which it might) and/or our OT hierarchy is different from the consensus (which Lynch hinted could be the case), an interior lineman or a defensive lineman seems more likely to be there at 31. If those DL/interior OL options are also off the board, it is almost mathematically impossible that at least one of the three corners in this range (DeJean, Kool-Aid, Wiggins) is NOT available. And the only way that happens is if someone we thought we had no realistic chance of getting has plummeted to us. In which case, we should take that person.

I don’t know where the Niners’ first-round cutoff is and where “trade down” hops all other prospects on their priority list, but the idea is quite enticing. The greatest internal factor in determining whether or not it happens could come down to how we rank and tier our tackle prospects. If we think the difference between Jordan Morgan/Kingsley Suamataia and Blake Fisher/Roger Rosengarten is minimal, why not trade down, get another pick in the top 100, and still secure a tackle we may have taken at 31?

If we can’t manage a trade down, then we pick the highest-graded dude available at the highest tier available at 31, with a lean towards positional need. Yes, that result inherently leaves some value on the floor, and squeezing value out of every selection is the name of the game, but it takes two to tango. 

Day 2

By splitting up the draft into three days instead of two, the NFL has created a feeding frenzy of trades at the top of the second round, as GMs, coaches, and owners (lol) now have an entire night and morning to look at who’s still available and convince themselves that they have to move up to secure “their guy.”

Just last year, two of the first three picks of the second round were traded. The year before, three of the top six picks were moved. As a potential buyer, this likely doesn’t concern us. But if we do end up trading down a few spots and out of the first round, it’s worth noting that (a) it’s harder than ever to predict who will be going at the top of the second because it’s harder than ever to know what teams will be making those picks, and (b) there’s typically demand for teams looking to trade up if we want to move down a SECOND time.

So how we approach this day will vary depending on what we did on day 1.

If we drafted an offensive tackle… We’re sitting pretty, as we’ve addressed our biggest position of need and now can let the draft come to us as we step into a two-round period flush with DL, WR, and CBs. I continue to think we’d be missing out on a golden opportunity by not drafting one of the defensive tackles in this draft, but is that someone like Fiske or Ruke in the second or someone more like Hall, Smith, or Dorlus in the third? Luckily the receiver class is just as flexible, with plenty of second or third-round targets, so there are various ways we can mix and match over the next two rounds.

Cornerback is an intriguing position because some guys fit our scheme well and others we probably see as slots only. I’m sure there are a few guys in this range (and later) who we see as smaller feisty players who have the makeup and skill set to play outside despite their size, but I have no idea how many of those slot-type bodies we truly think can make that DJ Reed/DeMo Lenoir kind of transition. While the safety class is not particularly strong, they could be worth mentioning in the same breath as the corners because most of the safeties of interest will be off the board on this day, and—if we’re looking at safeties and nickels—it could behoove us to hedge our bets and get a guy who can play both. I’m not sure how many of these guys have that kind of versatility, but we’ve shown the ability to play several different body types in the slot—including former safeties (Logan Ryan, Jimmie Ward)—and someone who can play would help justify spending a second day pick on a defensive back who isn’t an outside corner.

There are some interesting linebacker prospects with speed around this area as well, and that’s a bit of a sleeper position on Day 2, even if it’s more of a luxury pick that could wait until later. Finally, don’t rule out interior OL here or at the top of the third day. McKivitz had a tough year and plays a more premium position, but it was our interior that had a tougher Super Bowl. Banks is only signed for one more year, Feliciano likely hangs it up after this season, Burford didn’t take the step forward that we wanted last year, and there are a lot of guys with high floors and plug-and-play vibes lurking inside on this day.

If we drafted a defensive lineman… The second round seems earmarked for an offensive lineman. Hard to imagine someone like Kingsley or Patrick Paul would be around at the bottom of the second but Blake Fisher or Roger Rosengarten? While some may consider either a slight reach in the second, the value seems right here and they’re both high-ceiling guys who fit our scheme like a glove. There’s also a world where we don’t get a tackle on this day and instead get a guard, although in a world like that someone like Dominick Puni–with some inside/outside potential–becomes a bit more valuable. Or perhaps we really push it and wait until the late third to take a guy like Caedan Wallace. I wouldn’t suggest that method, as it would be playing with fire and more of a reach than Fisher or Rosengarten in the second, but as the draft gets deeper, beggars can’t be choosers.

As far as wideouts, corners, et al., nothing here changes from if we’d drafted an offensive tackle in the first.

If we drafted interior OL… while a massive rebuild of our OL ala the Chiefs a few years ago is certainly possible given the talent of this class and our need to improve in pass protection, it’s probably not all that likely unless the chips just fall in our favor.

If we get an OT in the second or the third after drafting a C/G type in the first it's cause someone fell to us. Like Fisher or Rosengarten at the bottom of the third. Or maybe Puni in the third for versatility if our first-rounder is slotted for center. At that point, sure. It’s value and it’s need. You can’t complain much about that. And we’ll have still gotten a good player at another position in the second.

Otherwise, we’re still on that WR/CB train looking for best available.

If we drafted a cornerback… While I’ve come around a bit to the idea of taking a cornerback in the first round, one of the many reasons I don’t prefer it is that it really forces out hand on day 2. In this situation, we still have a desperate need at OL and are all but guaranteed to miss out on tapping into the day two depth of two of the following position groups (OL, DL, WR).

That’s far from ideal, and in this scenario, it feels like WR is the most likely position to get kicked to the third day–where there should still be a handful of slot receivers and developmental guys but no one who projects as a true No.2 down the road.

If we traded down… While it’s possible we could have traded down for future assets, let’s assume the compensation for a trade down included a second-rounder and an additional pick on this day, giving us four picks in the next two rounds. That would give us a neatly packaged four picks to address OL, DL, CB, and WR–hitting each of the deep positions of this draft and addressing needs with all of them. Granted, it’s not that simple, and I could see a LB or S sneaking in there somewhere. But if we were never getting a guy who we had a first-round grade on anyway, this is the best way to fill a lot of holes before the third day even starts.

Note: Third-round maneuvering seems likely regardless of what we did in the first round. If we have a good number of players with second-round (or cuspy third-round) grades, we’ll likely be aggressive in securing one of those dudes before we get a tier drop-off into the next round. We have the most picks of anyone in this draft but seven are on the third day, so this is likely where we start using them as trade fodder. For reference, our lowest fourth-rounder could move us up around 8 spots. Our fifth-rounder could move us up 5. 

Day 3

Before the final day begins, it’s worth looking at our roster and the guys we’ve already picked so we can zero in on which positions could still use reinforcements and which are likely limited to guys we can stash on the practice squad due to roster size restrictions.

Every position is different and some can use more bodies than others. For instance, even if we extend Aiyuk and Jennings signs his tender, we’ll only have three locked-in wideouts for a position group where we usually roster five-to-six. Despite having Ronnie Bell and Danny Gray in the fold, we could easily add two receivers this draft. Similarly, at linebacker, we have Warner, Campbell, and Flannigan-Fowles but Greenlaw will start on the PUP list. And while Ezekiel Turner will likely be kept around for his special teams value, I wouldn’t be surprised if we want to throw a bunch of bodies at the position and see who emerges from the fray–whether it’s a rookie from this class or one of the two drafted last year. 

Elsewhere it gets more complicated. Since this isn’t the year 1950, we only roster one fullback. Any fullback-type needs to be able to fit on the practice squad or also play tight end. A quarterback? On the practice squad at best. Even a third-day cornerback–despite playing a position of need–would have a tough time making the active roster with three returning starters, Yiadom, Luter, Womack, and Rock Ya-Sin already fighting over a likely five total roster spots. 

This is where the math gets particularly difficult for talented teams who have fewer available roster spots. We may like a developmental player in the fourth, but if we aren’t confident he’ll make our active roster, we need to know we can stash him on the practice squad, and—until the sixth and seventh rounds come around—that’s often quite a gamble.

The workaround for this—which we saw with Cameron Latu last year—is to place a rookie on IR before the season begins. In that case, he doesn’t count against the active roster and is protected from opposing teams. But players placed on IR before the season cannot return at any point in that season, meaning this player—who needs development—won’t be seeing any of that development on the field. While they still benefit from being in a professional training program, attending all the meetings, and watching practice, development off the field can only go so far.

Given all that, here are the number of guys we could take at any given position and which positions seem the most likely to get picked on Day 3.

  • Quarterback (0-1): If we pick one, he’ll come off the board in the last two rounds

  • Running Back (1): we typically roster four running backs and a fullback, meaning an RB taken on the third day has a decent shot to make the team. That points to either a pass-catching specialist who might be able to get some third-down snaps (Dylan or Dillon) or an outsize zone scheme fit with the potential to take on lead backup duties a year from now (Guerendo).

  • Fullback/tight end (1-2): if he’s a tight end proper, he’s got a great shot to make the team, as we typically roster four, and only one (Kittle) is a sure thing. If he’s a fullback… well, hopefully, he can play tight end too.

  • Wide receiver (2-3): three wideouts sounds absurd, but that’s a testament to our lack of depth and the depth of this receiver class (also, the third would be a practice squad guy). One on day two and one on day three would be my guess, with the day three guy expected to make an immediate contribution on special teams. Cowin, McCaffrey, or Means seem the most likely on day three, but there are plenty of viable options here.

  • Offensive Line (2-3): at least one guy who can compete for immediate starter reps and another developmental body.

  • Defensive Line (1-3): we roster 9-10 defensive linemen at any time, so we can always take bodies here. In basically any year, we’re expecting to add at least two defensive linemen in the draft. This year, maybe we add a third. I’d expect a DT with down-the-road starter potential and either a developmental DE or a guy who we know is a subpackage rusher for life (cause we need that too).

  • Linebacker (1-2): As mentioned above, this is a position group where we have a type and we have no issue throwing bodies at the position and seeing who sticks. The Oregon kid seems intriguing as a late-draft flier.

  • Cornerback (1-2): Unlike linebacker, we don’t have a lot of roster spots to play with here, but if we don’t snag someone in the first two days, we may take a similar approach to the position—which would make for one of the better position battles of training camp.

  • Safety (0-1): Despite the need, we can always sign a veteran replacement if Gipson opts not to return, and the safety class as a whole isn’t particularly strong. If we draft a safety, hopefully, it’s Sione Vaki.

  • Specialists (goddamn better be zero, sheeeeit)

Given the lack of back-end depth in this draft class, anyone we pick up in the sixth and seventh rounds should be treated more like a priority free agent, meaning their position doesn’t matter nearly as much as early-round guys.

So What Would We Be Happy With?

Behold, the draft happiness index, an arbitrary point system for an arbitrary emotional response to a rookie draft which we can’t have a genuine informed opinion of until years down the road. Also known as “the vibe check,” “draft grades for Montessori students,” or “phoning it in because I don’t know how to end this write-up.”

Scoring works as follows:

+10: we have a new starting offensive tackle and we think he might be awesome
+5: we have a new starting guard/center and we think he might be awesome
+5: we have a new starting offensive tackle and we don’t think he sucks
+5: we draft one of the 22 players we graded as a first-round talent
+5: we successfully trade down for additional picks without giving up value
+2: we add a defensive lineman to our immediate two-deep
+2: we add a receiver to our immediate two-deep
+2: we add a corner to our immediate two-deep
+1: Roger Goodell says something lizard-like during the draft proceedings
+1: a guest picker gets hyped and goes way over their time
-1: a second guest picker gets hyped and goes way over their time
-1: an old man is tasked with announcing the selection of Ruke Orhorhoro, a name he will inevitably butcher. The older he is, the more likely he is to follow that up with a flippant comment about how he butchered the name.
-5: we pick someone in the first who we could have gotten in the second
-5: we don’t draft a wide receiver or defensive lineman until the third day
-10: we don’t draft an offensive lineman until the third day
-10: we draft a running back in the first two days of the draft
-15: we draft a specialist
-20: we trade Brandon Aiyuk

Once you tally up the score, your suggested emotional response can be found below:

Scores above 20 = LFG!!!
Scores above 10 = let’s go!
Scores below 0 = shit
Scores below -10 = fuck
Scores below -20 = your daughter has brought home her boyfriend, and it’s Bill Vinovich. She claims that the age difference doesn’t bother her so it shouldn’t bother you. They are moving into a studio apartment in Starksville, Mississippi without air conditioning because they “like the culture” there. She is pregnant with octuplets and Bill has convinced her to star in a reality show that will document their rearing. The show is titled: “Good Father, Better Ref.” It runs for twelve seasons.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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